Working together
For Members Only: Ingroup Punishment of Fairness Norm Violations in the Ultimatum Game
Saaid Mendoza, Sean Lane & David Amodio
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although group membership has many privileges, members are expected to reciprocate those privileges. We tested whether in-group members would be punished more harshly than out-group members for marginal fairness norm violations within ultimatum game bargaining interactions. Participants considered monetary splits (of US$20) from in-group and out-group proposers, which ranged in proportion. Accepting an offer yielded the proposed payout; rejecting it caused each player to earn nothing - a punishment of the proposer at a personal cost. Participants exacted stricter costly punishment on racial in-group than out-group members for marginally unfair offers (Study 1), an effect that was replicated with college group membership and magnified among strong in-group identifiers (Study 2). Importantly, ultimatum game decisions were driven by fairness perceptions rather than proposer evaluations (Study 3), suggesting our effects reflected norm enforcement and not esteem preservation. These findings illuminate a previously unexplored process for maintaining group-based norms that may promote in-group favoritism.
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The reputational and social network benefits of prosociality in an Andean community
Henry Lyle & Eric Smith
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1 April 2014, Pages 4820-4825
Abstract:
Several theories have emerged to explain how group cooperation (collective action) can arise and be maintained in the face of incentives to engage in free riding. Explanations focusing on reputational benefits and partner choice have particular promise for cases in which punishment is absent or insufficient to deter free riding. In indigenous communities of highland Peru, collective action is pervasive and provides critical benefits. Participation in collective action is unequal across households, but all households share its benefits. Importantly, investment in collective action involves considerable time, energy, and risk. Differential participation in collective action can convey information about qualities of fellow community members that are not easily observable otherwise, such as cooperative intent, knowledge, work ethic, skill, and/or physical vitality. Conveying such information may enhance access to adaptive support networks. Interview and observational data collected in a Peruvian highland community indicate that persons who contributed more to collective action had greater reputations as reliable, hard workers with regard to collective action and also were considered the most respected, influential, and generous people in the community. Additionally, household heads with greater reputations had more social support partners (measured as network indegree centrality), and households with larger support networks experienced fewer illness symptoms.
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Laboratories of Oligarchy? How the Iron Law Extends to Peer Production
Aaron Shaw & Benjamin Hill
Journal of Communication, forthcoming
Abstract:
Peer production projects like Wikipedia have inspired voluntary associations, collectives, social movements, and scholars to embrace open online collaboration as a model of democratic organization. However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, suggesting that they may not fulfill democratic ideals. Instead, peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," which proposes that democratic membership organizations become increasingly oligarchic as they grow. Using exhaustive data of internal processes from a sample of 683 wikis, we construct empirical measures of participation and test for increases in oligarchy associated with growth in wikis' contributor bases. In contrast to previous studies, we find support for Michels' iron law and conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms.
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Do Natural Disasters Enhance Societal Trust?
Hideki Toya & Mark Skidmore
Kyklos, May 2014, Pages 255-279
Abstract:
In this article we investigate the relationship between disasters and societal trust. A growing body research suggests that factors such as income inequality, ethnic fractionalization and religious heritage are important determinants of social capital in general and trust in particular. We present new panel data evidence of another important determinant of trust - the frequency of natural disasters. Frequent naturally occurring events such as storms require (and provide opportunity for) societies to work closely together to meet their challenges. While natural disasters can have devastating human and economic impacts, a potential spillover benefit of greater disaster exposure may be a more tightly knit society.
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Computer Games and Prosocial Behaviour
Friederike Mengel
PLoS ONE, April 2014
Abstract:
We relate different self-reported measures of computer use to individuals' propensity to cooperate in the Prisoner's dilemma. The average cooperation rate is positively related to the self-reported amount participants spend playing computer games. None of the other computer time use variables (including time spent on social media, browsing internet, working etc.) are significantly related to cooperation rates.
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Hunter gatherer population structure and the evolution of contingent cooperation
Robert Boyd, Roberto Schonmann & Renato Vicente
Evolution and Human Behavior, May 2014, Pages 219-227
Abstract:
Unlike other vertebrates, humans cooperate in large groups with unrelated individuals. Many authors have argued that the evolution of such cooperation has resulted from reciprocity and other forms of contingent cooperation. This argument is not well supported by existing theory. The theory of contingent cooperation in pairs is well developed: reciprocating strategies are stable when common, and can increase when rare as long as population structure leads to modest levels of relatedness. In larger groups, however, it is not clear whether contingent cooperation can increase when rare. Existing work suggests that contingent strategies cannot increase unless relatedness is high, but depends on unrealistic assumptions about the effects of population structure. Here we develop and analyze a model incorporating a two level population structure that captures important features of human hunter-gatherer societies. This model suggests that previous work underestimates the range of conditions under which contingent cooperation can evolve, but also predicts that cooperation will not evolve unless (1) social groups are small, and (2) the relatedness within ethnolinguistic groups is at the high end of the range of empirical estimates.
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Wallflowers: Experimental Evidence of an Aversion to Standing Out
Daniel Jones & Sera Linardi
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
An extensive literature on reputation signaling in prosocial settings has focused on an intrinsic desire for positive reputation. In this paper, we provide experimental evidence that some individuals are averse to both positive and negative reputation and will therefore respond to visibility by signaling that they are an "average altruism type" relative to their audience. We formalize our hypotheses about "wallflower" behavior in a theoretical model. Our experimental results show that instead of uniformly increasing contributions, visibility draws contributions toward the middle of others' contributions. As a result, visibility is associated with higher levels of giving only in scenarios where others are giving a large amount. We also observe heterogeneity in reputation concerns: wallflower behavior is particularly strong for women and can be observed in several different settings.
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Michael Restivo & Arnout van de Rijt
Information, Communication & Society, Spring 2014, Pages 451-462
Abstract:
The successful provision of public goods through mass volunteering over the Internet poses a puzzle to classic social science theories of human cooperation. A solution suggested by recent studies proposes that informal rewards (e.g. a thumbs-up, a badge, an editing award, etc.) can motivate participants by raising their status in the community, which acts as a select incentive to continue contributing. Indeed, a recent study of Wikipedia found that receiving a reward had a large positive effect on the subsequent contribution levels of highly-active contributors. While these findings are suggestive, they only pertained to already highly-active contributors. Can informal rewards also serve as a mechanism to increase participation among less-active contributors by initiating a virtuous cycle of work and reward? We conduct a field experiment on the online encyclopedia Wikipedia in which we bestowed rewards to randomly selected editors of varying productivity levels. Analysis of post-treatment activity shows that despite greater room for less-active contributors to increase their productive efforts, rewards yielded increases in work only among already highly-productive editors. On the other hand, rewards were associated with lower retention of less-active contributors. These findings suggest that the incentive structure in peer production is broadly meritocratic, as highly-active contributors accumulate the most rewards. However, this may also contribute to the divide between the stable core of highly-prodigious producers and a peripheral population of less-active contributors with shorter volunteer tenures.
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Imitation in Mediation: Effects of the Duration of Mimicry on Reaching Agreement
Jacques Fischer-Lokou et al.
Social Behavior and Personality, Winter 2014, Pages 189-195
Abstract:
We conducted 2 experiments (N = 180 participants in Study 1 and N = 102 in Study 2) to examine the effect of imitation shown by a mediator towards negotiators who were on opposing sides in regard to a financial decision being made by a fictitious company. Contrary to what was expected, data in the first study showed that, when the mediator imitated the negotiator during the first 5 minutes of an interview, this was insufficient to predispose negotiators to be more likely to reach an agreement with one another. The results in the second study showed that imitation conducted over a longer time and repeated more often during negotiations predisposed opposing parties to be more likely to agree with one another. Applications and limitations of these studies are discussed.
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Starting Small towards Voluntary Formation of Efficient Large Groups in Public Goods Provision
Gary Charness & Chun-Lei Yang
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a public-goods game, where efficiency increases with group size (up to a limit, in one treatment). It is feasible to exclude group members, to exit one's group, or to form larger groups through mergers involving the consent of both merging groups. We find a great degree of success for this mechanism, as the average contribution rate is very high. The driving force appears to be the economies of scale combined with the awareness that bad behavior will result in exclusion or no admission. However, an important additional component is that it is possible for previous outsiders to later redeem themselves by becoming high contributors, typically in efficient large groups.
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Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game: Are there brains in games?
Sean Duffy & John Smith
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We find that differences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply differences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the availability of cognitive resources by applying a differential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a finitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two different measures, we find evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically. First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than the high load subjects. Second, we find evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.
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Imitation Is Necessary for Cumulative Cultural Evolution in an Unfamiliar, Opaque Task
Helen Wasielewski
Human Nature, March 2014, Pages 161-179
Abstract:
Imitation, the replication of observed behaviors, has been proposed as the crucial social learning mechanism for the generation of humanlike cultural complexity. To date, the single published experimental microsociety study that tested this hypothesis found no advantage for imitation. In contrast, the current paper reports data in support of the imitation hypothesis. Participants in "microsociety" groups built weight-bearing devices from reed and clay. Each group was assigned to one of four conditions: three social learning conditions and one asocial learning control condition. Groups able to observe other participants building their devices, in contrast to groups that saw only completed devices, show evidence of successive improvement. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that imitation is required for cumulative cultural evolution. This study adds crucial data for understanding why imitation is needed for cultural accumulation, a central defining feature of our species.