Tough Choices
Individual differences in risk preference: Selection and socialization effects
Yunrui Liu, David Richter & Rui Mata
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Risk preference varies considerably across individuals, but the consequences and causes of this heterogeneity remain insufficiently understood. This study examines the predictive validity of risk preference for various life events (i.e., selection effects) and the role of life events in shaping risk preference (i.e., socialization effects). Using a large representative sample from the German socioeconomic panel (N = 14,558), we employed propensity score matching to construct synthetic treatment and control groups -- individuals experiencing (or not experiencing) a life event -- while controlling for various confounding variables. We then evaluated the extent to which general and domain-specific measures of risk preference predict the occurrence of 12 life events related to family transitions (e.g., marriage) and professional development (e.g., self-employment), as well as how these life events shape risk preference. Our findings provide evidence for selection effects by demonstrating that risk preference significantly predicts the occurrence of various life events. Furthermore, the predictive utility of risk preference generalizes across domains, with general or composite measures demonstrating somewhat superior predictive power relative to domain-specific ones. In turn, after adjusting for selection bias, socialization effects were negligible, with most life events showing no significant association with changes in risk preference. Overall, our results suggest that while risk preference has broad predictive power across various life areas, life events have a limited influence on shaping it. These findings reinforce the predominance of selection effects and underscore the importance of carefully distinguishing between selection and socialization processes.
Sycophantic Chatbots Cause Delusional Spiraling, Even in Ideal Bayesians
Kartik Chandra et al.
MIT Working Paper, February 2026
Abstract:
"AI psychosis" or "delusional spiraling" is an emerging phenomenon where AI chatbot users find themselves dangerously confident in outlandish beliefs after extended chatbot conversations. This phenomenon is typically attributed to AI chatbots' well-documented bias towards validating users' claims, a property often called "sycophancy." In this paper, we probe the causal link between AI sycophancy and AI-induced psychosis through modeling and simulation. We propose a simple Bayesian model of a user conversing with a chatbot, and formalize notions of sycophancy and delusional spiraling in that model. We then show that in this model, even an idealized Bayes-rational user is vulnerable to delusional spiraling, and that sycophancy plays a causal role. Furthermore, this effect persists in the face of two candidate mitigations: preventing chatbots from hallucinating false claims, and informing users of the possibility of model sycophancy. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for model developers and policymakers concerned with mitigating the problem of delusional spiraling.
Flagged but Fooled? Rethinking Misinformation Inoculation on Short-Form Video Apps
Yongnam Jung
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social media platforms are fighting misinformation by adding warning flags and suggesting related content. However, it is still unclear how users understand these flags and whether they influence users' willingness to share content or believe false information -- especially on video platforms such as TikTok. Do users notice these flags? If so, do the flags change how they view the content? Inoculation theory suggests that if individuals are forewarned about the potential for misinformation and are exposed to weakened forms of such misinformation, they may become less susceptible to misinformation. Does inoculating users with flagged content reduce false acceptance and sharing intentions later? To address these questions, we conducted a user study (N = 322) utilizing a TikTok-like interface, employing a 2 (misinformation warning: absent, present) × 3 (counterargument in pre-suggested false-flagged content: absent, cue, action) between-subject experimental design. While users noticed flags as intended, their perceptions regarding the frequency and harm of misinformation remain unchanged. Furthermoe, neither warning nor counterargument messages effectively reduced users' acceptance of misinformation or their intention to share it, highlighting the boundary conditions of inoculation theory within immersive short video contexts. Interestingly, media literacy and TikTok dependency have emerged as significant predictors of false acceptance. This study discusses the practical implications for the design of ethical social media interfaces.
Behavioral Consequences of Blunting Fear With Acetaminophen
Savannah Yerman & Pat Barclay
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
The widely used painkiller acetaminophen (also known as paracetamol) has been found to blunt various emotional states and evaluations, possibly through the same mechanisms by which it dulls the affective component of physical pain. However, there are limited investigations into the behavioral consequences of blunting emotions pharmacologically. Previous work has demonstrated that acetaminophen lessens risk perception and increases risk-taking in tasks with low-stakes incentives, though no studies have tested its effects in fear-inducing contexts that require evaluating safety risk. As fear promotes behaviors that keep us safe, dampening fear could alter how people respond to threatening situations. To test this possibility, 260 participants were given either 1,000 mg of acetaminophen or placebo capsules prior to a frightening virtual reality plank walk at extreme heights. Compared to the placebo group, those on acetaminophen took less time to step onto the plank, walked across it faster, and had lower heart rates. These findings suggest that acetaminophen may reduce protective behaviors associated with the fear response, raising potential safety concerns for everyday users.
How watching sports shapes zero-sum thinking: Correlational, experimental, and longitudinal evidence
Jinseok Chun, Hemant Kakkar & Aaron Kay
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The popularity of professional sports has increased exponentially in recent decades. Although prior social psychological research has emphasized how sports foster group identification and social bonding, we show that consuming sports-related content has an unintended cognitive consequence: strengthening zero-sum beliefs. Specifically, watching and following sports increases the belief that success inherently requires others to lose. Across two correlational studies (Studies 1 and 2, Ns = 788, 1,994), two experiments (Studies 3 and 4, Ns = 1,164, 585), and one longitudinal study (Study 5, N = 830) conducted in the United States and India, we find that watching and following sports is both correlationally and causally associated with zero-sum thinking. These effects extend beyond sports contexts to shape attitudes toward immigrants and a distributive (win-lose) orientation in negotiation. Together, our findings reveal how sports engagement can systematically influence social cognition and broader worldviews.
Laypeople's and researchers' perspectives on real-life risky choices: A comparative analysis of overlaps and discrepancies
Olivia Fischer, Aaron Lob & Renato Frey
Decision, forthcoming
Abstract:
To validate novel measurement instruments of people's decision making, the behavioral sciences often assess how frequently people make specific risky choices in real life. However, it remains unclear to what degree the risky choices tapped by such frequency measures reflect those choices people actually (have to) make. To address this issue, we compared 100 risky choices representing laypeople's perspective with 63 risky choices representing researchers' perspective. In Study 1, we leveraged natural language processing calibrated on human judgments to gauge the similarity between choices of both perspectives and found that they only had 18% of the choices in common. In Study 2, we further examined the implications of this mismatch in terms of the psychological mechanisms that the various choices may tap into by asking 825 participants to rate the perceived relevance of seven classes of psychological mechanisms to their decision making in these choices. Bayesian mixed effects models revealed credible differences between the two perspectives in five out of seven classes of mechanisms: For choices representing laypeople's perspective, choice attributes, time factors, experience and knowledge, and goals and motivation were on average perceived as more relevant, and social factors were perceived as less relevant, relative to the choices representing researchers' perspective. These findings suggest that decision-making paradigms calibrated on frequency measures from the researchers' perspective may have limited generalizability to the broad range of risky choices people face in their lives, underscoring the need to better understand the complexity of real-life decision making.
Thinking out of the Box: Divergent Thinking Is Associated with Increased Aperiodic Neural Activity
Chenyan Zhang et al.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Creativity, the ability to produce novel and useful ideas, is a fascinating ability about which we know surprisingly little. Here, we asked how people manage to think "out-of-the-box" -- how they generate truly novel ideas. We hypothesized that higher levels of aperiodic neural activity (often termed "neural noise") may facilitate overcoming the constraints of prior knowledge, thus supporting novel idea generation. Participants (n = 51) performed two classical creativity tasks tapping divergent (alternative uses task) and convergent thinking (remote associates task), respectively, while EEG was recorded. Aperiodic activity was estimated from the EEG power spectrum using the FOOOF (fitting oscillations and one-over-f) toolbox. We found that engaging in divergent, out-of-the-box thinking (but not convergent thinking) was associated with a significant increase of aperiodic activity, reflected in a decreased aperiodic exponent. Moreover, individuals with more increased aperiodic activity during divergent thinking generated more novel ideas. Our findings suggest that aperiodic, "noisy" brain dynamics play a functional role in supporting divergent thinking. Aperiodic activity, which is often neglected in neuroscientific research, may be an important mechanism of human cognition.
Investigating the conditional effects of action versus inaction decisions on regret
Sunil Contractor
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research posits that when people, who make a proactive choice for a justified reason, encounter an interim negative outcome (e.g., a temporary loss from a stock investment that could yield a profit in the future), they engage in the self-justification mechanism to view their decision more favorably, initiate self-serving bias to minimize self-blame for the outcome, and trigger confirmatory bias to interpret the outcome favorably. Therefore, individuals who are responsible for switching a course (action decision), or choosing not to switch a course (inaction decision), for a justified reason minimize self-blame and reduce counterfactual thinking, ultimately leading to lower regret for negative interim outcomes than individuals with no-decision responsibility. Furthermore, this research suggests that when a negative outcome is terminal (e.g., end-of-the-semester final grade in a course) or the foregone option is superior, this mitigating effect on regret is minimized and moderated. Nine studies, including two replication studies reported in the Supplemental Material, document the conditional effects and show that decision justification reduces regret; however, people experience more regret from counterfactual thinking about imaginary alternatives than from self-blame. The studies also suggest that action decisions are not more abnormal than inaction decisions, because they elicit the same level of decision responsibility and control to affect downstream constructs, including justification, counterfactual thinking, self-blame, and regret, equivalently. Overall, this research clarifies various constructs associated with responsibility, refines our understanding of the relationship between decision responsibility and regret, and deepens insights into the psychology of regret.