Regimes
Kinship, group loyalty and conflict
David Le Bris & Petros Sekeris
European Economic Review, April 2026
Abstract:
This paper develops a theoretical model rooted in Ibn Khaldun's concept of asabiyya, or group loyalty, analyzing the role of kinship in conflict and territorial expansion. We predict that groups with strong kinship bonds are more successful in expanding their territorial control in low-stakes setups. The opposite happens if groups contest large and highly valuable territories. In line with our predictions, across history cohesive kin-based groups have dominated in early or low-stakes conflicts, while modern states rely on weaker kinship structures to expand. The model explains the vulnerability of early states as emphasized by James C. Scott. We also rationalize setups studied by Scott, where predatory states are surrounded by a strong kin periphery that escapes the central power control.
Rulers on the road: Itinerant rule in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919-1519
Carl Müller-Crepon et al.
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Itinerant rule, rule exercised through traveling, was a common yet insufficiently researched, premodern form of governance. Studying the determinants of ruler itineraries in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919-1519, we argue that rulers' visits targeted "marginal" elites. Powerful rulers could count on family members and thus targeted unrelated local elites. Weak emperors had to monitor their less loyal relatives and left unrelated nobles unvisited. We reconstruct emperors' itineraries from 72,665 dated and geolocated documents and measure territorial control by their relatives. Exploiting the weakening of imperial power through the Great Interregnum (1250-1273), we find that strong, pre-1250 emperors frequented areas controlled by their relatives relatively less. In contrast, family control increased visits post-1273. Causal identification rests on the discontinuous reduction of emperors' power through the Great Interregnum and differences in family relations between subsequent emperors. The results show strategic itinerant rule as an important but understudied form of governance.
Professional Gatekeepers of Authoritarian Legality: Evidence from China's Legal Aid Hotlines
Ziwen Zu
University of California Working Paper, March 2026
Abstract:
How do authoritarian regimes make law accessible without letting it become politically dangerous? I argue that when states delegate legal aid to frontline lawyers, they separate legal recognition from legal empowerment: citizens may receive courteous, legally framed acknowledgment without the actionable guidance needed to press claims. I test this argument with a nationwide audit experiment of China's state-run legal-aid hotline system based on 3,200 randomized calls across 302 cities. Politically sensitive and socially disadvantaged callers still receive answers, but those answers are less claim-enabling: minority-name and petition cues reduce substantive guidance and concrete referrals, while symbolic accommodation remains available. Positive evaluation raises both substantive and symbolic responsiveness, whereas complaint pressure improves visible service more than claim-enabling assistance. These findings show how authoritarian regimes can widen access to law while withholding the forms of assistance most likely to generate empowerment.
China's Internal Security Spending: An Assessment of New Data
Sheena Chestnut Greitens
China Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Internal security has been a governance priority under Xi Jinping. How does China's budget reflect this prioritization? This research report presents updated data on China's internal security spending, 1992-2022, revealing a mix of continuity and change. Domestic security expenditure continues to rise, more than doubling from 2012 to 2022, but has risen mostly in proportion to the People's Republic of China's overall expenditure. The balance between central and local expenditure has shifted further towards local spending, which, in the context of rising local fiscal constraint, may increase pressure on local public security bureaus. The Ministry of Public Security continues to receive the largest share of domestic security spending, while the proportion of internal security spending allocated to the People's Armed Police (PAP) has decreased, probably reflecting the reorganization of the PAP in 2017-2018. Spending per capita and relative to GDP continues to be higher in locations that are politically sensitive, including Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang.
China's democratic experiments during its economic takeoff
Tao Li
Democratization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Amid the third wave of global democratization in the 1980s, China strengthened the Communist Party Congress, where its decentralized structure enabled provincial deputies to coordinate dissenting votes. Using a new method to uncover previously classified party congress voting records (1945-2017), we find that dissenting votes systematically targeted non-local candidates imposed by Beijing. During China's province-led economic takeoff in the 1980s and 1990s, dissenting votes were hundreds of times more frequent than in the Soviet Union or in China today. We conclude that Chinese politics was most democratic and decentralized at the onset of its economic miracle. We suggest that a limited democratic experiment by an authoritarian regime might leave an enduring legacy.
The accountability dilemma in mass purges
Xiaoli Guo
Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite expectations that large-scale anti-corruption campaigns would enhance governance, they often lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and economic decline, as seen in China and Vietnam. This paper examines these purges as a top-down accountability mechanism in authoritarian regimes. Through a game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that systemic corruption traps rulers in a persistent trade-off between social productivity and political stability. Whether rulers incentivize informants, distinguish between ideologically congruent and non-congruent agents, prioritize profit or survival, or base purges on corruption or performance, the core dilemma remains -- and often becomes more intricate. Our findings challenge the effectiveness of mass purges as a sustainable governance strategy.
Selection pressure and institutional adaptation: An evolutionary comparison of the 1340 and 1348 epidemics in Florence, Italy
Beniamino Callegari & Christophe Feder
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, April 2026
Abstract:
Evolutionary economics is a powerful lens for understanding the heterogeneous, complex, and bidirectional relationship between economic development and disease spreading. This paper supports the relevance of this approach by investigating the well-documented socioeconomic consequences of two successive 14th-century plague outbreaks in Florence, Italy. By analyzing the institutional responses to both the 1340 epidemic and the 1348 Black Death, we demonstrate that mortality alone did not determine post-plague trajectories. Instead, the 1340 outbreak eroded incumbent authorities' legitimacy and fostered fiscal experimentation, briefly empowering reform-minded coalitions, while the 1348 Black Death enabled surviving oligarchic factions to reconsolidate power and implement rent-extractive policies that stifled economic and demographic recovery. Because both shocks occurred within the same political and socioeconomic context, our single-case comparison preserves contextual consistency and highlights the granular mechanisms that produced sharply divergent outcomes, providing a deep evolutionary perspective. Drawing on the co-evolutionary circuit of selection, adaptation, and feedback, we demonstrate that institutional selection pressures were decisive in shaping sharply divergent economic paths, thereby providing a unified mechanistic account for pandemic heterogeneity. Finally, we draw policy lessons by emphasizing how adaptive governance, transparent accountability, and elites renewal may prevent regressive lock-ins in the face of health shocks.
Only in it for Power and Wealth? The Neglect of Policy-Seeking Motives among Dictators
Matilde Tofte Thorsen
PS: Political Science & Politics, April 2026, Pages 261-266
Abstract:
Contrary to the dominant literature on autocracies, this article argues and demonstrates that dictators, in addition to being office-seeking, often are driven by policy-seeking motivation -- that is, broader beliefs and ideology. The empirical investigation enlists new original data, based on obituaries, about dictators' political motives. The dataset contains information on 297 deceased dictators who held power at some point during the period 1945-2008. The results reveal that the dictators had a variety of different motives for being in power. Many were strongly ideologically motivated, several were primarily motivated by money and power ambitions, and others held power to create stability and democratize. Thus, dictators' motives seem to be substantially more diverse than typically assumed, and the data make it possible to measure motivation. This is key to investigating the direct as well as the conditional impact on political dynamics in autocracies.
Youth reeducated: The economic preference impacts of China's sent-down movement
Sheryl Ball et al.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, April 2026
Abstract:
We survey Chinese adults, many of whom experienced the sent-down movement as adolescents, to identify the impact of forced rustication on economic preferences and attitudes. To distinguish the effect of being sent down from the effects of confounding factors correlated with the likelihood of being sent down and the duration of stay, we exploit a discontinuity in the probability of being sent down resulting from the unanticipated termination of the movement. We find that individuals who were sent down are more risk averse, more altruistic, and more likely to return the kindness of others. They are also less likely to support redistribution policies or trust the government.
Revolutionary Sparks: Exploring the Resource Spillover Effect of Street Protests on Entrepreneurship
Jeremy Lei Xu et al.
Organization Science, March-April 2026, Pages 772-793
Abstract:
Research in advanced economies shows that street protests can indirectly influence untargeted firms through informational spillovers. We propose that, in developing economies, the indirect effects of street protests extend beyond information cues to include a resource spillover effect. Specifically, local officials may be motivated to defuse or redirect the momentum of street protests by appealing to constituents' aspirations for economic well-being. This middle-ground approach sits between symbolic gestures and targeted policies directly addressing activists' grievances and can facilitate the creation of new organizations. Using a longitudinal data set organized by city-year observations in China between 2008 and 2019, we examine how street protests over noneconomic issues impact the founding of new ventures. We find that city mayors' response to street protests indirectly facilitates entrepreneurship by lowering business operating costs and increasing access to capital. Further, the resource spillover effect on businesses is accentuated by a political opportunity structure that enhances the impact of street protests on the responses of local politicians.