Where shall they live?

JAMES L. SUNDSQUIST

By the end of this century, 100 million people will be added to the population of the United States. That is as many people as now live in Great Britain and France combined.

Where shall they live?

If present trends continue—if they are allowed, that is, to continue—most of the 300 million Americans of the year 2000 will be concentrated on a very small proportion of the nation's land area. Projections of the Urban Land Institute place 60 per cent of the country's population—or 187 million persons—in just four huge urban agglomerations. One continuous strip of cities, containing 68 million people, will extend 500 miles down the Atlantic seaboard from north of Boston to south of Washington, D.C. Another, with 61 million, will run from Utica, New York along the base of the Great Lakes as far as Green Bay, Wisconsin. Some 44 million persons will live on a Pacific strip between the San Francisco bay area and the Mexican border. A fourth agglomeration, with 14 million, will extend along the Florida east coast from Jacksonville to Miami and across the peninsula to Tampa and St. Petersburg.

Most of the remaining 40 per cent of Americans will live in urban concentrations, too—and big ones. In this decade, the larger concentrations have been growing fastest; metropolitan areas over 150,000 grew faster than the national average of 9.8 per cent be-
between 1960 and 1965, while the smaller areas grew more slowly, as the following data show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIZE OF URBAN AREA</th>
<th>1960-65 GROWTH RATE (PER CENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20,000 — 50,000</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 — 100,000</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 — 150,000</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150,000 — 250,000</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 — 500,000</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 — 1,000,000</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 1,000,000</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all metropolitan areas</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonmetropolitan areas</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations from Rand McNally.

These trends, continued for the next three decades, would place 77 per cent of the coming 300 million Americans on 11 per cent of the land (excluding Alaska and Hawaii). Only 12 per cent of the population would be outside urban areas of 100,000 or more population.

Is this the way we want to live?

Two questions are presented. The first pertains to regional balance. Is it desirable that population be massed in a few enormous "megalopolises" along the seacoasts and lakeshores? The second relates to rural-urban balance (or, more accurately, the balance between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas). Is it in the best interest of the country, and its people, to continue indefinitely the depopulation of rural and small-town America and the building of ever bigger metropolitan complexes, in whatever region? In short, the 300 million can be highly concentrated in a few "megalopolises," or they can be distributed more evenly as among regions and dispersed in a more nearly balanced way among large metropolitan areas, middle-sized cities, and thriving small towns and villages. Which do we want?

But there is an earlier, and even more fundamental, question. Is population distribution a matter upon which the United States should have a policy at all?

Population policy or laissez-faire?

The projections of the enormous population concentrations that are in prospect have appeared in the popular press, but they are presented as Sunday supplement curiosities—as glimpses into the inevitable and ordained future—not as a subject for public debate and acceptance or rejection. Yet surely the subject is one worthy of debate. How each family lives is profoundly influenced, even controlled, by the size of the population cluster in which it is em-
bedded. The degree to which population is massed determines the amenity and congeniality of the whole environment in which adults and children live and grow and work. It affects their personal efficiency, their sense of community, their feelings about the relationship between man and nature, their individual and collective outlooks on the world. The impact of size is most emphatic on the lives of the ghetto dwellers of the great cities, of course, but no one in a megalopolis is immune. The resident of Scarsdale or Winnetka is not wholly spared the stresses of big city life; the larger the metropolitan area, the greater the strains and irritations of commuting and the more inevitable that the environmental pollution that arises from population concentration will affect the most idyllic suburbs, too. In any case, the desirability of population concentration must be measured by its consequences for the majority of families who live at near-average or below-average levels, not upon the few who can insulate themselves in political and social enclaves.

So the question is, what kind of environment do we want to build? The nation, through its government, has established policies on matters of far less crucial import, yet the extent to which the country's population will be concentrated remains essentially laissez-faire. That would be all right, perhaps, if by laissez-faire one meant free choice by the individuals and the families that make up the population. But it is far from that. The movement of people from smaller to larger places is, to a large extent though no one knows the exact proportions, involuntary, forced migration. Young people going freely to the cities in search of adventure and opportunity make up part of the migrant flow, but only part; among the rest are millions of uprooted, displaced families who have little desire, and less preparation, for life in large cities and whose destination is often inevitably the city slums. These displaced families are simply forced into the migration stream by economic forces they cannot control.

The spatial distribution of population is determined, of course, by the distribution of jobs. With the exception of the limited numbers of the self-employed and the retired, people are not in reality free to live just anywhere. The vast majority are employees who must live where there are jobs, and the location of jobs is not their choice. The concentration of the country's population is the result of employer-created job patterns that the people have had to follow.

For the most part employers have not been free to create jobs just anywhere, either. They have been bound by considerations of economic efficiency—the location of raw materials and of markets, the transportation cost differentials of alternative locations, etc. As a result, the basic pattern of population distribution has been designed by the play of economic forces, not by men acting rationally as environmental architects; events have been in the saddle once again.
It need not be. In the past, population distribution has been a subject of conscious national policy and it can be again. In the first hundred years of the nation, the government pursued a deliberate policy of dispersing population westward. Motivated in part by desire to confirm its title to the empty continent, the government subsidized turnpikes, railroads, and river navigation, herded Indians onto reservations, and opened public lands to settlement.

Once the continent was spanned, governmental programs continued to encourage a balanced regional development—reclamation, navigation, and electric power projects traditionally, and more recently the more sophisticated and broader efforts authorized in the Appalachian Regional Development Act and the “depressed areas” legislation of the 1960’s. The government enacted rural development programs specifically aimed at rural-urban balance, administered for the most part by the Department of Agriculture.

But there is apparently no clear sense of national purpose like that which motivated the early policies for western development. The present regional and rural development programs essentially are the product of legislative log-rolling—the chance balancing of political forces analogous to economic laissez-faire. Urban programs need rural votes so urban areas support rural programs. The west, or the south, or the Appalachian states can muster enough political strength to enact limited programs. But they are offset—more than offset, probably—by other programs that encourage population concentration, like the postwar housing programs that fostered suburban growth around big cities but were inoperative in most smaller cities and rural areas. Congress responds to the pressures of its various constituent regions more or less in proportion to their relative political strength, which means that future congresses will be less and less likely to tilt the benefits of its programs toward non-metropolitan areas, that are declining in relative political importance, unless it is guided by a conscious policy of population distribution.

Perhaps it is enough to repeat the well-worn observation that a lack of policy is itself a policy. If the nation chooses not to have a population distribution policy, then it is, in effect, accepting the agglomeration that is in prospect, in preference to any alternative spatial distribution patterns that might be brought about by decisive intervention to influence and control the forces that shape the future.

Is it possible to develop a better population distribution pattern than the one in prospect, if the country’s scholars, philosophers, and politicians were to put their minds to it?

Making a population distribution policy

It is far easier to agree in the abstract on the logic of having a population policy than to agree upon the policy itself, which may
be the most practical and telling argument for laissez-faire. But let us see what might be involved in such an exercise.

Two criteria are apparent. A population distribution pattern could be designed either according to what is considered good for people or according to what they want. (As we know from documents as early as the book of Genesis and as late as the Surgeon General's Report, those are not necessarily the same.) Unfortunately, in either case we must do our thinking without benefit of solid data because no one knows for sure either what is best for people or what they want. Nevertheless, there are many clues.

Even in the absence of quantified evidence, it seems reasonably clear that our largest urban concentrations have grown well beyond the point at which diseconomies of scale begin to show. The costs of moving people and things within large metropolitan areas are demonstrably greater than the costs of moving them in smaller population centers. Commuting distances are obviously longer, the time loss greater, the costs higher. The flight of industry from central cities to the suburbs is a reflection, in part, of the cost of transportation to and within congested areas. The cost of urban freeway construction varies directly with the population density of the areas affected, and subway systems are an enormous expense that only the larger metropolitan areas require. Such municipal functions as water supply and sewage and solid waste disposal are probably also subject to diseconomies of scale, for the simple reason that the water and the waste must be carried over longer distances. San Francisco, for example, had contemplated dispatching a 70 car train daily to carry its solid waste over 300 miles into the mountains on the Nevada-California border.

The diseconomies are ultimately measurable, at least in theory, in dollars and cents. Other disadvantages of scale are less measurable but no less real. Air pollution, for example, is a function of the dense concentration of automobiles. Similarly, water pollution is more amenable to control in areas where population is dispersed; there, given the will, the way is at least available.

One other factor that must be considered in any calculation of costs and benefits of urbanization is the social and economic cost of migration itself. To decide which new plant location is really most efficient, it is not enough to measure only the building and operating costs of the plant, although that has been the sole criterion of our laissez-faire philosophy. There are enormous costs, as well as appalling cruelties, in the forced displacement and migration of populations, whether it be Negroes from the south, mountaineers from Appalachia, or small businessmen from the declining regions of the Great Plains and the midwest. (In the 1950's, more than half of America's counties suffered a net loss of population.) Families lose their homes and savings and equities and property values along
with their most deeply cherished associations; communities lose their tax base for public services; community institutions wither. Some of the migrants are too ill-prepared, too sick, or too poor to adjust to city life successfully; many of them wind up on welfare, and they burden every kind of institution. Yet these costs and losses are not borne by the industry locating the plant, but by people and communities, thereby entering no one's cost-benefit equation, no one's computations of efficiency. If they did so enter, then calculations of simple efficiency would no doubt show that, as a general rule, it is far from economical from the standpoint of the whole society to create new economic opportunities where the people are rather than allow existing communities to die while building other whole communities from the ground up in the name of "economic efficiency."

Moving from the physical to the social environment, hard data on disadvantages of scale are even more difficult to come by. Yet we know that as population in general is concentrated, so is poverty (large ghettos exist only in large urban concentrations) and crime, drug addiction, family breakdown and every other form of social pathology. It may be specious to argue that rural poverty is better than urban poverty when both are bad enough, yet the fact remains that the social evils associated with poverty tend to be mutually reinforcing when the poor are herded together in concentrated masses—as studies of public housing populations, for example, have clearly shown. Racial tension and rioting are not limited to big cities, to be sure, but in their most terrifying aspects they seem to be. Perhaps most important of all, the problem of unemployment and underemployment of the urban poor appears all but insoluble in the largest urban complexes, because transportation systems just cannot economically link the inner cities where the poor live with the scattered suburban sites where the new jobs are being created. In smaller places, by contrast, people can even walk to work.

For all these reasons, it is not hard to accept as a hypothesis, at least, that our largest metropolitan agglomerations are less governable, less livable and economically less sound than smaller urban centers. If this is the case, then it should not matter whether the people like their agglomerations; in the public interest, they should be dispersed. However, what little evidence is available suggests that people do not like to live in unlivable places; they are there, in substantial proportion, against their will. A Gallup poll in 1968 showed that 56 per cent of Americans would choose a rural life, if they were free to choose, only 18 per cent a city and 25 per cent a suburb. Even a majority of the inhabitants of Paris—surely one of the most livable of large cities—were shown in a polling sample to prefer small town life. The polling methods may be suspect—the Parisians may have been comparing the city life they know to an
idealized life in a romanticized rather than a real small town—but the results are indicative if not conclusive.

More important, from the standpoint of judging what people want, is the plain fact cited earlier that a high proportion of population migration is involuntary movement. Except for economic pressures, many, perhaps most, people would not move to the city in the first place. And they go home eagerly when the economic pressures shift. Each slump in the auto industry finds the Appalachians in Detroit heading back to the hills, and the first generation Puerto Ricans in New York City characteristically look upon themselves as transients who will return home as soon as they are financially able to do so.

It should be possible, within a reasonable time, to fashion a quantitative methodology that would supply at least some hard data on these questions—both on the economic costs and benefits of population concentration and on the reaction of human beings to the life styles they find themselves compelled to assume in centers of population density. Let us suppose that these data agree in confirming what intuition seems to tell us: that our largest metropolitan agglomerations have grown too far beyond the human scale, that their further growth should be arrested, and that their population should, if possible, be lessened. What then? Other countries have become concerned about population concentration—Great Britain, for instance, has been worried for two decades about the drift of people to the densely-settled south—without finding the means to check or reverse the concentration process. Is there any reason to think that the United States can do better?

**Getting the problem on the national agenda**

The first problem is one of gaining attention and getting interest. Henry David has remarked that, to keep its sanity, a society must practice "selective inattention"—it simply cannot attack all of its problems all at once. Population distribution is one of the problems that, until very recently at least, had been marked for inattention.

Over the last decade, only one leading figure in public life has made it his mission to sound the alarm on the question of population distribution policy. That was the recent Secretary of Agriculture, Orville L. Freeman. For the whole of his eight years in office, he led a personal crusade for what he initially called "rural areas development" and later came to call "rural-urban balance." Before a House Subcommittee in 1967, he said, "I say it is folly to stack up three-quarters of our people in the suffocating steel and concrete storage bins of the city, while a figurative handful of our fellow citizens rattle around in a great barn full of untapped resources and empty dreams." And then he got carried away: "The whiplash
of economic necessity which today relentlessly drives desperate people into our huge cities must be lifted from the bleeding back of rural America."

Freeman's metaphors could be excused; no one listened to all his years of sober pleas and reasoned argument. True, President Johnson gave him moral support and himself made a speech or two on rural development and sent the Congress some minor measures, but the subject remained low on the president's priority list and even lower on the lists maintained by the Bureau of the Budget and other staff agencies that advise the president. As for the congressional committees on agriculture, who might have been expected to take some leadership, Freeman could not even get them to set up active subcommittees to consider rural development. Their concern for rural America extended to the price of agricultural commodities and the location of Department of Agriculture research stations, but not much further.

The nation's intellectual community, insofar as it was aware of the Freeman thesis, treated it with a disdain that blended into outright hostility. Teachers, writers, scholars, and editors for the most part live in cities; it is there that newspapers are published and television shows produced. The country's intelligentsia is wholly urban now; the voices that once sang of rural life, the Hamlin Garlands and Willa Cathers and Robert Frosts, are now stilled without replacement. One can stock a library with books on "the urban crisis," but try to fill a single shelf with works that deal in depth with the corresponding rural crisis!

A composite view of the urban intelligentsia toward rural America can be portrayed, with a touch of caricature, something like this: culturally, the cities have a monopoly, and have had since the Age of Pericles. Urban means urbane; rural means rustic. The theater, the concert hall, the museum are exclusively urban institutions; the countryside cannot produce the higher culture, and those who insist on living there are, by definition, both culturally unrefined and, what is worse, content to remain so. Economically, rural America is destined for decay; the economic forces that built the cities are too powerful to be reversed, even if it were desirable to do so. Freeman's "back to the farm" movement (which, for the record, is not what it was) is romantic nonsense that flies in the face of every economic reality. Sociologically, rural America is a backwater populated by misshapen characters out of Faulkner, given to choosing as their leaders men like George Wallace and Lester Maddox, and to hunting down civil rights workers and interring them on the banks of the Tallahoga river. Politically, it is time that rural America got its come-uppance; the farmers have been exploiting the cities far too long through outrageous programs that pay them enormous subsidies to cut production while the
urban poor—and the rural poor as well—go hungry. Let the land grant colleges—the "cow colleges," that is—worry about the Podunks and the hicks and hayseeds who live there; we are an urban nation now.

This picture of the rural areas is not, unfortunately, wholly unrelated to reality. The fact is that the rural areas of the country are disadvantaged in many ways: they are culturally isolated (although their isolation has been drastically reduced by television and good roads); they have declined economically; their governmental and social institutions are often primitive and backward; racial exploitation is rife. But the cities are not all that superior. There is truth, too, in Freeman's counter-portrait of big cities as places of "congestion and confusion, crime and chaos, polluted air and dirty water, overcrowded schools and jobless ghettos, racial unrest . . . and riots in the streets."

But there are signs, now, that the intellectual world may at last be rediscovering rural and small town America and looking with fresh eyes upon the problem of rural-urban balance. Like so many other trends of current history, this one was set in motion in August 1965—in Watts. The analysts of that explosion, and those which followed, suddenly discovered that the problems they called urban had rural roots. "We're being overwhelmed," cried the urbanists. "Stop the migration. Get these people off our backs!"

Joseph P. Lyford was among the first to see the rural-urban relationship. "Why," he asked in his study of a New York slum, The Airtight Cage, "do we treat the consequences and ignore the causes of massive and purposeless migration to the city? Why are we not developing new uses for those rural areas that are rapidly becoming depopulated? Why do we still instinctively deal with urban and rural America as if they were separate, conflicting interests when in fact neither interest can be served independently of the other?"

So the rural and the urban interest may have converged, finally, and it is out of such convergence that effective political coalitions are born and problems attain their place on the national agenda. The prospects for such a coalition are expressed most sharply in, of all places, the 1968 Republican platform. "Success with urban problems requires acceleration of rural development in order to stem the flow of people from the countryside to the city," reads the GOP's plank. The language is not without irony for the party of small town America and the party that enacted the Homestead Act. Should development of rural America be accelerated because rural people are suffering economically and, as God-fearing Americans, deserve a better fate? No. Should it be accelerated because rural development is a worthy goal on its own merits? Not at all. The whole subject is treated under the heading, "Crisis in the Cities;" rural development should be accelerated because
the problems of the big cities, where the Democrats live, must be solved.

The leadership for a rural development coalition, also ironically, will have to come from those very cities. Groups with names like the Urban Coalition, the Urban Institute, and the Urban League will have to assume the burden of worrying about rural America, because there is no rural coalition, no rural institute, no rural league. Nobody has ever organized to speak for rural and small town people in the nation’s councils as the United States Conference of Mayors, say, and the Urban Coalition speak for city people. Farm groups exist, to be sure, but their interest is the economic interest of farmers as producers, and most rural Americans—whatever the definition of the word “rural”—are not farmers but small town and small city dwellers. And they are not organized at all.

When rural America is saved, it is clear, it will be for the wrong reasons and under the wrong leadership. But that is better than not being saved at all.

The outlines of a program

The first requirement of any program to cope with America’s population distribution ills—and the greater ills that are in prospect—must be a research component. As I observed earlier, those who would cope with the question have hardly any data at all on the consequences of population concentration, on the diseconomies and disadvantages of scale. (What data exist are summarized in the excellent 1968 report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth, from which the figures used earlier in this article were taken.) Criteria do not exist for deciding how many people in a metropolitan area are too many or, at the other extreme, how much dispersal is too much dispersal.

Nevertheless, the country cannot afford to wait until all the analyses have been completed and all the facts are in. Action normally must precede research; it takes the actuality or imminence of action to attract scholars, and the funds required for their support, to an issue. The objective must be to move toward an ideal population distribution pattern while at the same time perfecting its design. And that is possible; in driving to the Pacific, one need not have a map of the entire route to know that he begins by heading westward.

We can begin by defining one objective—to bring to a halt, as nearly as possible, all involuntary migration. The purpose of governmental policy, then, would be to permit people to live and work where they want to live and work; if they prefer to move to the big city, well and good, but if they want to remain where
they are the objective should be to bring the jobs to them. That
would serve the dual end of protecting the big cities against the
unwanted influx of the displaced poor, and of taking from the
shoulders of the poor themselves—and the involuntary migrants
who may not be poor—the burden of paying through their own
hardship and economic loss for the adjustments in employment
patterns brought about by technological advance.

This proposal will be confronted at once by the objection that
some rural areas are too remote, too backward to be salvageable
in any circumstances—that no matter how much they are sub-
sidized they are beyond the reach of economic opportunity. I hide
behind the qualifying phrase; forced migration should be brought
"as nearly as possible" to a halt, and where a rural community
lies beyond the possibility of redevelopment (the Appalachian "head
of the hollow" communities come to mind) then it is by definition
impossible to help. However, the number of people living in such
communities is far smaller than is usually believed, if one under-
stands that the jobs to be provided need only be near, not at, the
community concerned. Commutation is a fact of life in this auto-
mobile age in rural areas as well as on Long Island, and rural
people commonly travel daily to jobs within a radius of 25 to 50
miles. Circles with 25 mile radii drawn around small cities that
have a proven economic potential—proven by the fact that they
are growing now—cover the vast majority of the country's rural
population east of the high plains, and if the circles are extended
to 50 mile radii they blanket almost the whole country but for a
few sparsely-settled sections of the Western mountains and the
plains.

In the administration of the Appalachian Regional Development
Act and the Public Works and Economic Development Act, growth
centers are designated, and investment is concentrated in those
places to stimulate the growth not just of the centers themselves
but of the hinterlands they serve. Usually every rural settlement
in an area being assisted is within reasonable commutation distance
of a growth center. The commutation radius can be greatly in-
creased, of course, by the improvement of road transportation,
which is part of the rationale behind the heavy emphasis in the
Appalachian program upon the construction of "developmental
highways."

A population distribution policy, then, would seek to encourage
an accelerated rate of growth in the smaller natural economic
centers of the country's less densely populated regions, as the al-
ternative to further concentration of population in the larger metropo-
lar areas. To effectuate such a policy, the present approaches
would have to be extended in both breadth and depth. First, they
would need to be expanded beyond Appalachia and the other
presently-recognized redevelopment areas to cover all areas that are sources of out-migration. Second, they would need to be greatly improved in potency, so that they have a decisive impact upon the migration stream. Present federal programs are limited to public investment—roads, hospitals, vocational training schools, and so on—to strengthen the "infrastructure" of the nonmetropolitan areas, and loans and loan guarantees to encourage private investment. To these would have to be added the policy instrument of tax incentives that has proved so effective in stimulating and channeling investment both for war production and for peacetime economic growth. If an extra investment tax credit were available for defined types of new industry located in the places where the national population distribution policy called for it to be located, then jobs would be created where the people are rather than in places to which they have to migrate. Specific legislation to aid the development of new cities would also be helpful, although for the most part existing smaller cities should be the nuclei for urban growth. Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth carefully catalogs a wide range of other possible program measures.

The rub will come, of course, when the Congress begins to write the language defining exactly the places eligible for benefits. While the objective of aiding sources of out-migration is simple enough in conception, the problem of drawing boundary lines is not. Specifically, growth centers that serve areas of out-migration would have to be included among the beneficiaries, even though the centers themselves were areas of in-migration. But only up to a certain point. A cutoff population figure would have to be established, at the point where a growth center is considered to have grown large enough, or at least to be able to attain its further growth under its own power. But given the old-fashioned booster psychology that still conditions the thinking of the leadership of even the largest cities, the Congress will find it difficult to designate any area, even the New York City area, as one that is destined—if national policy can bring it about—to stop growing. Real estate values still benefit from population increase, and wholesale and retail trade increase, no matter what the ancillary evils of population concentration. To most community influentials, bigger and bigger still mean greater and greater and richer and richer. A population distribution policy may therefore ultimately have to await a major shift in the national psychology.

When the country has to be jarred loose from a traditional outlook and shocked into a new one, the best means is often the institutional device that the United States has adopted from Great Britain—the royal commission. Such commissions have sometimes jarred us in the past; the Kerner commission, despite adverse circumstances, did so. Population distribution policy seems singularly
appropriate as a subject for study by such a body. To its credit, the Senate passed a resolution in 1967 and again in 1969 to create a Commission on Balanced Economic Growth. It remains for the House of Representatives and the president to act.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

CHARLES M. HAAR is Professor of Law at Harvard. He was formerly Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . . . .

JOHN F. KAIN is Professor of Economics at Harvard . . . . Formerly Assistant Director of the Budget, PETER A. LEWIS now practices law with Lazard Freres and Company . . . . THOMAS E. LISCO is Chief Economist for the Chicago Area Transportation Study . . . .

JOHN R. MEYER is President of the National Bureau of Economic Research and Professor of Economics at Yale . . . . DONALD A. SCHON is the President of the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI) . . . .

CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, formerly Director of the Budget, is now Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution . . . . JAMES L. SUNQUIST, formerly Deputy Undersecretary Department of Agriculture and a member of President Johnson's Poverty Task Force, is now Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution . . . . ROBERT C. WOOD, former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), is Director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University.