We report, you decide
Clear judgments based on unclear evidence: Person evaluation is strongly influenced by untrustworthy gossip
Julia Baum et al.
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Affective information about other people’s social behavior may prejudice social interactions and bias person judgments. The trustworthiness of person-related information, however, can vary considerably, as in the case of gossip, rumors, lies, or “fake news.” Here, we investigated how spontaneous person likability and explicit person judgments are influenced by trustworthiness, employing event-related potentials as indices of emotional brain responses. Social-emotional information about the (im)moral behavior of previously unknown persons was verbally presented as trustworthy fact (e.g., “He bullied his apprentice”) or marked as untrustworthy gossip (by adding, e.g., allegedly), using verbal qualifiers that are frequently used in conversations, news, and social media to indicate the questionable trustworthiness of the information and as a precaution against wrong accusations. In Experiment 1, spontaneous likability, deliberate person judgments, and electrophysiological measures of emotional person evaluation were strongly influenced by negative information yet remarkably unaffected by the trustworthiness of the information. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and extended them to positive information. Our findings demonstrate a tendency for strong emotional evaluations and person judgments even when they are knowingly based on unclear evidence.
People use less information than they think to make up their minds
Nadav Klein & Ed O’Brien
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 26 December 2018, Pages 13222-13227
Abstract:
A world where information is abundant promises unprecedented opportunities for information exchange. Seven studies suggest these opportunities work better in theory than in practice: People fail to anticipate how quickly minds change, believing that they and others will evaluate more evidence before making up their minds than they and others actually do. From evaluating peers, marriage prospects, and political candidates to evaluating novel foods, goods, and services, people consume far less information than expected before deeming things good or bad. Accordingly, people acquire and share too much information in impression-formation contexts: People overvalue long-term trials, overpay for decision aids, and overwork to impress others, neglecting the speed at which conclusions will form. In today’s information age, people may intuitively believe that exchanging ever-more information will foster better-informed opinions and perspectives - but much of this information may be lost on minds long made up.
Intentionally 'Biased': People Purposely Use To-Be-Ignored Information, But Can Be Persuaded Not To
Berkeley Dietvorst & Uri Simonsohn
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Abundant research has shown that people fail to disregard to-be-ignored information (e.g. hindsight bias, curse of knowledge), which has contributed to the popular notion that people are unwillingly and unconsciously affected by information. Here we provide evidence that, instead, people simply do not want to ignore such information. The findings: in Studies 1 & 2 the majority of participants explicitly indicate a desire to use to-be-ignored information in classic paradigms. In Study 3, the effect of receiving to-be-ignored information is driven entirely by the subset of people who want to use it. In Study 4, convincing participants to ignore inadmissible evidence in a mock jury paradigm is shown to reduce the impact of such evidence by convincing them to plan to ignore it.
The Zero-Sum Fallacy in Evidence Evaluation
Toby Pilditch, Norman Fenton & David Lagnado
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
There are many instances, both in professional domains such as law, forensics, and medicine and in everyday life, in which an effect (e.g., a piece of evidence or event) has multiple possible causes. In three experiments, we demonstrated that individuals erroneously assume that evidence that is equally predicted by two competing hypotheses offers no support for either hypothesis. However, this assumption holds only in cases in which competing causes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (i.e., exactly one cause is true). We argue that this reasoning error is due to a zero-sum perspective on evidence, wherein people assume that evidence that supports one causal hypothesis must disconfirm its competitor. Thus, evidence cannot give positive support to both competitors. Across three experiments (N = 49, N = 193, N = 201), we demonstrated that this error is robust to intervention and generalizes across several different contexts. We also ruled out several alternative explanations of the bias.
Wine for the Table: Self-Construal, Group Size, and Choice for Self and Others
Eugenia Wu, Sarah Moore & Gavan Fitzsimons
Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research examines how consumers make unilateral decisions on behalf of the self and multiple others, in situations where the chosen option will be shared and consumed jointly by the group - for instance, choosing wine for the table. Results across six studies using three different choice contexts (wine, books, and movies) demonstrate that such choices are shaped by the decision-maker’s self-construal (independent versus interdependent) and by the size of the group being chosen for (large versus small). Specifically, we find that interdependent consumers consistently make choices that balance self and others’ preferences, regardless of group size. In contrast, the choices of independent consumers differ depending on group size: for smaller groups, independents make choices that balance self and others’ preferences, while for larger groups, they make choices that more strongly reflect their own preferences. Via mediation and moderation, the data show that differential attention to others underlies the combined effect of self-construal and group size on the joint consumption choices that consumers make for the self and others.
If it is easy to remember, then it is not secure: Metacognitive beliefs affect password selection
Karlos Luna
Applied Cognitive Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this research we applied current theories of metacognition to study computer security and tested the idea that users’ password selection is affected by the metacognitive belief that if a password is memorable, then it is not secure. In two experiments, different types of eight‐character passwords and longer, more secure sentences were presented. Participants rated perceived memorability and perceived security of the passwords and indicated whether they would use them in a critical and in a non‐critical service. The results confirmed the belief. Sentences that are in fact highly secure and perceived as highly memorable were also perceived as weak passwords. The belief strongly affected password selection for critical services, but it had no effect on non‐critical services. In sum, long sentences are a particularly interesting type of password because they meet both security and memorability criteria, but their use is limited by a false belief.
Seeker beware: The interpersonal costs of ignoring advice
Hayley Blunden et al.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, January 2019, Pages 83-100
Abstract:
Prior advice research has focused on why people rely on (or ignore) advice and its impact on judgment accuracy. We expand the consideration of advice-seeking outcomes by investigating the interpersonal consequences of advice seekers’ decisions. Across nine studies, we show that advisors interpersonally penalize seekers who disregard their advice, and that these reactions are especially strong among expert advisors. This penalty also drives advisor reactions to a widely-recommended advice-seeking strategy: soliciting multiple advisors to leverage the wisdom of crowds. Advisors denigrate and distance themselves from seekers who they learn consulted others, an effect mediated by perceptions that their own advice will be disregarded. Underlying these effects is an asymmetry between advisors’ and seekers’ beliefs about the purpose of the advice exchange: whereas advisors believe giving advice is more about narrowing the option set by providing direction, seekers believe soliciting advice is more about widening the option set by gathering information.
Better than expected: The influence of option expectations during decision-making
Francesco Rigoli & Raymond Dolan
Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 12 December 2018
Abstract:
Our choices often arise from a consideration of options presented in a sequence (e.g. the products in a supermarket row). However, whether the precise sequential order of option presentation affects decision-making remains poorly understood. A recent model of choice proposes that, in a set of options presented sequentially, those that are better than expected will be perceived as more valuable, even when options are objectively equivalent within the set. Inspired by this proposal, we devised a novel decision-making task where we manipulated the order of option presentation together with expectations about option value. Even when we compared trials that were exactly equivalent except for option order, we observed a striking preference for options that were better than expected. Our findings show that expectations about options affect which option will be favoured within a sequence, an influence which is manifested as a preference for better-than-expected options. The findings have potential practical implications, as for example they may help policymakers in devising nudge strategies that rely on ad hoc option orders.
The evil of banality: When choosing between the mundane feels like choosing between the worst
Amitai Shenhav, Carolyn Dean Wolf & Uma Karmarkar
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, December 2018, Pages 1892-1904
Abstract:
Our most important decisions often provoke the greatest anxiety, whether we seek the better of two prizes or the lesser of two evils. Yet many of our choices are more mundane, such as selecting from a slate of mediocre but acceptable restaurants. Previous research suggests that choices of decreasing value should provoke decreasing anxiety. Here we show that this is not the case. Across three behavioral studies and one fMRI study, we find that anxiety and its neural correlates demonstrate a U-shaped function of choice set value, greatest when choosing between both the highest value and lowest value sets. Intermediate (moderate-value) choice sets provoke the least anxiety, even when they are just as difficult to select between as the choice sets at the two extremes. We show that these counterintuitive findings are accounted for by decision makers perceiving low-value items as aversive (i.e., negatively motivationally salient) rather than simply unrewarding. Importantly, though, neural signatures of these anxious reactions only appear when participants are required to choose one item from a set and not when simply appraising that set’s overall value. Decision makers thus experience anxiety from competing avoidance motivations when forced to select among low-value options, comparable to the competing approach motivations they experience when choosing between high-value items. We further show that a common method of measuring subjective values (willingness to pay) can inadvertently censor a portion of this quadratic pattern, creating the misperception that anxiety simply increases linearly with set value. Collectively, these findings reveal the surprising costs of seemingly banal decisions.