Too Partisan
Overestimating the social costs of political belief change
Trevor Spelman et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do U.S. partisans expect members of their political ingroup to react when they diverge from the typical view of their party on a partisan issue (e.g., a Democrat adopting a more conservative stance on private gun ownership)? How accurate are these expectations, and how do they influence whether people choose to speak up or stay silent? Five main studies and five supplemental studies (N = 4,535) employing diverse research methods — including surveys, behavioral outcomes, live participant interactions, and coded open-ended responses — revealed that partisans consistently overestimate the social sanctions they will face for changing their minds (average weighted effect size [d] of .87). These inflated expectations, which are associated with a greater likelihood of self-censoring dissenting views, may reflect a concern that dissent will signal greater group disloyalty than it actually does. Indeed, a brief intervention prompting individuals to reflect on their past loyalty to the group reduced this concern and was associated with more accurate expectations about ingroup reactions to their dissenting belief change. By examining the social forces that suppress dissent within political groups, this work offers insight into how to reduce conformity pressures and promote more open political discourse.
Political Polarization and Partisan Consumption Cycles
Nathan Fernig, Richard Sias & Austin Sobotka
University of Arizona Working Paper, January 2026
Abstract:
Partisanship and political polarization have a substantial impact on discretionary consumption: counties aligned with the party of the sitting president increase consumption significantly more than unaligned counties. The effect size of political alignment is comparable to that of per capita income and population growth and has grown over time as Democrats and Republicans have become increasingly polarized. We show that the consumption difference between politically aligned and unaligned counties persists throughout the presidential term, consistent with a channel through which expectations influence consumer behavior and propagate through local economic activity. These findings highlight how political affiliation and polarization influence economic behavior at the local level, with broader implications for macroeconomic dynamics and both theoretical and empirical finance.
Short-Haul Moves and the Political Geography of Partisanship: Intrametropolitan Migration as a Force for Change in U.S. Politics
James Gimpel, Jordon Newton & Andrew Reeves
Urban Affairs Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We consider how the high volume of short-distance migration within metropolitan areas contributes to partisan sorting across the United States. Compared to long-distance moves, these local moves involve many more individuals each year and thus have substantial potential to shape political geography. At the same time, short-distance moves set a high bar for any assortative hypothesis because local movers face more limited destination options. If one cannot find a more politically compatible neighborhood nearby, it may be impossible to move to one. We draw on voter records comparing movers and nonmovers within 215 metro areas across nine states. Our results show surprisingly high levels of sorting even when moves occur within the same core-based statistical area and state. These patterns persist even after accounting for other destination characteristics known to influence relocation. Short-distance moves contribute modestly but meaningfully to the growing political lopsidedness of many legislative districts between censuses.
Trajectories of Psychological Outcomes During the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election
Olga Stavrova et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
The 2024 U.S. presidential election seemed to have the potential to profoundly impact the national economy, financial markets, and geopolitics. Did Donald Trump’s re-election influence Americans’ psychology as well? We conducted a 7-wave longitudinal survey tracking N = 623 Americans (36% male, Mage = 45.05 years (SDage = 22.97) from 3 weeks before the election to 16 weeks after. As the election results came in, Democratic supporters reported a decrease in well-being, optimism and personal control, lower institutional trust, higher cynicism, more experiences of disrespect, and a stronger conspiracy mentality — changes that persisted up to 4 months post-election. In contrast, Republican supporters experienced changes in the opposite direction, effectively reversing the previously observed liberal advantage in institutional trust and diminishing the liberal–conservative gap in other psychological outcomes. These results challenge the notion of inherent psychological differences between liberals and conservatives, highlighting how such differences can shift depending on which party holds power.
The emotional cost of political engagement
Alexander Walker et al.
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political polarization is increasingly recognized as a critical threat to individual and collective well-being. Prevailing frameworks suggest that political engagement diminishes well-being by evoking negative emotions, which act as chronic stressors. However, the relationship between politics and emotion has largely been investigated by relying on static snapshots of emotional reactions to political events, overlooking how well-being is impacted by the temporal dynamics of political engagement and associated emotional responses. Across two longitudinal experience-sampling studies that include long-form “diary” responses (N = 259, 1,788 observations), we examine how political engagement shapes daily affective experiences. Contrary to the prevailing notion that engaging with politics leads to sustained negative moods, we find that political engagement is characterized by heightened affective instability — that is, frequent and large fluctuations in affective states — which, in turn, predicts lower well-being (i.e., greater anxiety). Politically polarizing events are particularly destabilizing when they are highly salient and when individuals spontaneously engage with these events. Strong partisans on both ends of the political spectrum also show the greatest fluctuations in daily affect, characteristic of an unstable emotional life. By observing that political engagement is intimately tied to increased affective instability, this research reveals an overlooked emotional cost of political involvement. These findings open new avenues for understanding and mitigating the emotional and mental health consequences of political engagement in an era of deepening divides.
The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky
Econometrica, January 2026, Pages 71-103
Abstract:
We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous districts to maximize his party's expected seat share. The designer faces both aggregate, district-level uncertainty (how many votes his party will receive) and idiosyncratic, voter-level uncertainty (which voters will vote for his party). Segregate-pair districting, where weaker districts contain one type of voter, while stronger districts contain two, is optimal for the gerrymanderer. The optimal form of segregate-pair districting depends on the designer's popularity and the relative amounts of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. When idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates, a designer with majority support pairs all voters, while a designer with minority support segregates opposing voters and pairs more favorable voters; these plans resemble uniform districting and “packing-and-cracking,” respectively. When aggregate uncertainty dominates, the designer segregates moderate voters and pairs extreme voters; this “matching slices” plan has received some attention in the literature. Estimating the model using precinct-level returns from recent U.S. House elections shows that, in practice, idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates. We discuss implications for redistricting reform, political polarization, and detecting gerrymandering. Methodologically, we exploit a formal connection between gerrymandering -- partitioning voters into districts — and information design — partitioning states of the world into signals.
Left-Wing Governments and Far-Right Success
Albert Falcó-Gimeno, Ignacio Jurado & Markus Wagner
British Journal of Political Science, January 2026
Abstract:
In recent decades, support for the far right has surged in many countries. One common explanation for this is that far-right support is a backlash against left-wing governments and their policies. We investigate the causal effect of the partisan make-up of governments on the electoral results of far-right parties. Evidence from over-time comparative data and a quasi-experimental analysis based on a regression discontinuity design in Spain indicates that far-right parties benefit electorally when the current government is on the left. In further analyses, we employ a novel regression discontinuity design (RDD)-based sampling strategy to examine original individual-level survey data from Spanish municipalities close to the discontinuity cutoff. These data show that the likely mechanism underlying the backlash effect is an ideological shift to the right among the electorate when left-wing parties govern. Overall, the far right benefits more when the mainstream left governs than when the mainstream right does.
Do We Appeal to the Knowledge of Our Political Rivals?
Almos Molnar, Vini Rupchandani & Steven Sloman
Cognitive Science, January 2026
Abstract:
Categorical explanations involve the use of labels to account for various properties of the explanandum. Prior research shows that the degree to which a label is perceived to be entrenched in society impacts the judged quality of the categorical explanation that invokes it regardless of how informative the explanation actually is. The aim of the present paper is to investigate whether the label entrenchment effect persists even when the label is said to be entrenched only in a particular community (rather than in society at large) and whether one's relationship to the entrenching community mediates the effect. Across five online behavioral experiments, we show that US partisans (Democrats and Republicans) rated the informativeness of a circular categorical explanation as higher when the label it invokes is entrenched in their own political community than when it is entrenched in the rival political community. However, being entrenched in the rival political community led to higher informativeness judgments than not being entrenched at all. Finally, we show that the effect does not occur when the label is entrenched in an epistemically suspect community, the Flat Earth Society.
Unaffected polarization? Populism and affective polarization in comparative perspective
Alberto Stefanelli & Bruno Castanho Silva
Political Psychology, February 2026
Abstract:
With both affective polarization and populism on the rise in several countries, many have proposed a link between the two phenomena. Yet, research offers little direct evidence on whether populist individuals are more polarized than their mainstream counterparts. This paper aims to fill this gap by using data from 37 elections in 31 countries to provide a comparative account of the relationship between populism and affective polarization at the individual level. Contrary to common assumptions, results show no significant difference in affective polarization between more and less populist individuals. Instead, we identify a curvilinear relationship wherein both individuals who strongly endorse or reject populist ideas exhibit high levels of polarization, with substantial variations across countries. Furthermore, we find that populism is associated with a general disdain for all political parties rather than just rival parties. These findings challenge the prevailing assumption that populism is asymmetrically associated with affective polarization. We also provide evidence that ideological extremism, rather than populism, is more consistently and strongly associated with affective polarization in a large number of advanced democracies.