Street Smarts
Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy & Lukasz Pomorski
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining "opportunistic" traders yields value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed opportunistic traders are local, non-executive insiders from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement.
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Investor Inattention and the Market Impact of Summary Statistics
Thomas Gilbert et al.
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We show that U.S. stock and Treasury futures prices respond sharply to recurring stale information releases. In particular, we identify a unique macroeconomic series - the U.S. Leading Economic Index® (LEI) - that is released monthly and constructed as a summary statistic of previously released inputs. We show that a front-running strategy that trades S&P 500 futures in the direction of the announcement a day before its release and then trades in the opposite direction of the announcement following its release generates an average annual return of close to 8%. These patterns are more pronounced for high beta stocks, for stocks that are more difficult to arbitrage, and during times when investors' sensitivity to firm-specific stale information is high. Treasury futures exhibit similar, albeit less pronounced, price patterns. Other measures of information arrival, such as price volatility and volume, spike following the release. These empirical findings suggest that some investors are inattentive to the stale nature of the information included in the LEI releases, instead interpreting it as new information, and thereby causing temporary yet significant mispricing.
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Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections
Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
Contributions by investor-owned companies play major roles in financing the campaigns of candidates for elective office in the United States. We look at the presidential level and analyze contributions by companies before an election and their stock market performance following US presidential elections from 1992 to 2004. We find that companies experienced abnormal positive post-election returns with (i) a higher percentage of contributions given to the eventual winner and (ii) with a higher total contribution given. Hypothetical portfolios of the 30 largest corporate contributors formed according to (i) the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii) the total contribution (divided by market capitalization) would have earned significant abnormal returns in the two years after an election. While all results hold for Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, they are stronger by a magnitude of two to three under W. Bush.
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Dangerous interconnectedness: Economists' conflicts of interest, ideology and financial crisis
Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth & Gerald Epstein
Cambridge Journal of Economics, January 2012, Pages 43-63
Abstract:
This study investigates potential conflicts of interest among academic economists and some measures to address them. We investigated the financial affiliations of 19 prominent academic financial economists who were associated with two economist groups proposing financial reform measures in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. We assessed whether they had private financial affiliations, and identified the degree to which these economists disclosed these affiliations in their academic and media publications from 2005 to 2009 and again from January 2011 through April 2011. We found that private affiliations were common but that these academic economists disclosed these affiliations infrequently and inconsistently. We advocate the adoption of a code of ethics by the economics profession, similar to those commonly implemented by other disciplines, prescribing more transparent conduct for economists facing such potential conflicts of interest.
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Music and the market: Song and stock volatility
Philip Maymin
North American Journal of Economics and Finance, January 2012, Pages 70-85
Abstract:
Popular music may presage market conditions because people contemplating complex future economic behavior prefer simpler music, and vice versa. In comparing the annual average beat variance of the songs in the U.S. Billboard Top 100 since its inception in 1958 through 2007 to the standard deviation of returns of the S&P 500 for the same or the subsequent year, a significant negative correlation is observed. Furthermore, the beat variance appears able to predict future market volatility, producing 2.5 volatility points of profit per year on average.
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CEO Power and Risk Taking: Evidence from the Subprime Lending Industry
Krista Lewellyn & Maureen Muller-Kahle
Corporate Governance, forthcoming
Research Question/Issue: There is a general consensus that the lack of restraint by US financial firm executives to engage in risky subprime mortgage lending practices played a contributing role in both the inflation and deflation of the housing bubble at the heart of the global financial crisis. Evidence is less clear on what influenced the managerial proclivity to ignore warning signs and take on more and more risk to the detriment of numerous firm stakeholders. Our study examines the effects of power on Managerial Risk Taking in the context of the subprime mortgage industry.
Research Findings/Insights: We hypothesize that a CEO's power is positively related to excessive risk taking. We find general support for these hypotheses in a matched pair sample of 74 firms and 344 firm years, where half the firms specialized in subprime lending and the other did not from 1997 to 2005.
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Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?
Rients Galema, Robert Lensink & Roy Mersland
Journal of Management Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recently, microfinance is coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis following from microfinance-induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far-reaching consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a characterization of the microfinance industry. Based on a sample of 280 microfinance institutions, our results suggest that powerful CEOs of microfinance nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have more decision-making freedom than powerful CEOs of other types of MFIs. This induces them to make more extreme decisions that increase risk. Furthermore, the decision-making freedom powerful CEOs have in NGOs appears to lead to worse decisions, because the presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated with lower performance.
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John Goodell & Richard Bodey
Public Choice, March 2012, Pages 633-650
Abstract:
Using electronic-markets data, this paper investigates partial determinants of change in Graham's price-earnings ratios (P/E) during US presidential election cycles. We document evidence over six elections, that as the probable winner of the election becomes clearer, markets surprisingly respond with decreases in P/E ratios. We consider that our results are consistent with rational markets reacting to presidential campaigns focused on influencing biased, sociotropic voters. These results should be of great interest to researchers concerned with market reaction to election cycles, public policy, and the overall role of election uncertainty in financial markets.
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Measuring economic uncertainty and its impact on the stock market
Michal Dzielinski
Finance Research Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper proposes a novel measure of economic uncertainty based on the frequency of internet searches. The theoretical motivation is offered by findings in economic psychology that agents respond to increased uncertainty by intensifying their information search. The main advantages of using internet searches are broad reach, timeliness and the fact that they reflect actions, rather than words, which however are not directly related to the stock market. The search-based uncertainty measure compares well against a peer group of alternative indicators and is shown to have a significant relationship with aggregate stock returns and volatility.
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Global, local, and contagious investor sentiment
Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler & Yu Yuan
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We construct investor sentiment indices for six major stock markets and decompose them into one global and six local indices. In a validation test, we find that relative sentiment is correlated with the relative prices of dual-listed companies. Global sentiment is a contrarian predictor of country-level returns. Both global and local sentiment are contrarian predictors of the time-series of cross-sectional returns within markets: When sentiment is high, future returns are low on relatively difficult to arbitrage and difficult to value stocks. Private capital flows appear to be one mechanism by which sentiment spreads across markets and forms global sentiment.
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Tranching, CDS, and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes
Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, January 2012, Pages 190-225
Abstract:
We show how the timing of financial innovation might have contributed to the mortgage bubble and then to the crash of 2007-2009. We show why tranching and leverage first raised asset prices and why CDS lowered them afterward. This may seem puzzling, since it implies that creating a derivative tranche in the securitization whose payoffs are identical to the CDS will raise the underlying asset price, while the CDS outside the securitization lowers it. The resolution of the puzzle is that the CDS lowers the value of the underlying asset since it is equivalent to tranching cash.
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Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street
Michael Dorsch
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the United States. The paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics. District heterogeneity implies district-specific electoral constraints on legislators' ability to collect rents from, and cast dissonant votes in support of, special interests. An empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal, using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables. The empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias, using valid instruments, and considers several intuitive sub-sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue. The paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout.
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Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices
Lubos Pastor & Pietro Veronesi
Journal of Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
We analyze how changes in government policy affect stock prices. Our general equilibrium model features uncertainty about government policy and a government whose decisions have both economic and non-economic motives. The model makes numerous empirical predictions. Stock prices should fall at the announcements of policy changes, on average. The price fall should be large if uncertainty about government policy is large, and also if the policy change is preceded by a short or shallow economic downturn. Policy changes should increase volatilities and correlations among stocks. The jump risk premium associated with policy decisions should be positive, on average.
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Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, January 2012, Pages 1-21
Abstract:
We illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and show how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of "market confidence," defined as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. Small probability events can unravel market confidence. We discuss the role of contagious adverse selection and the problem of "toxic assets" in the recent financial crisis.
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Pay for Performance from Future Fund Flows: The Case of Private Equity
Ji-Woong Chung et al.
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Lifetime incomes of private equity general partners (GPs) are affected by their current funds' performance not only directly, through carried interest profit-sharing provisions, but also indirectly by the effect of the current fund's performance on GPs' abilities to raise capital for future funds. In the context of a rational learning model, which we show better matches the empirical relations between future fund-raising and current performance than behavioral alternatives, we estimate that indirect pay for performance from future fund-raising is of the same order of magnitude as direct pay for performance from carried interest. Consistent with the learning framework, indirect pay for performance is stronger when managerial abilities are more scalable and weaker when current performance is less informative about ability. Specifically, it is stronger for buyout funds than for venture capital funds, and declines in the sequence of a partnership's funds. Total pay for performance in private equity is both considerably larger and much more heterogeneous than implied by the carried interest alone. Our framework can be adapted to estimate indirect pay for performance in other asset management settings.
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They just fade away: Mortality in the US venture capital industry
Christopher Rider & Anand Swaminathan
Industrial and Corporate Change, forthcoming
Abstract:
Organizational mortality events are better understood than the process by which organizations cease to be. Complementing research on organizing, we theorize about disorganizing. We propose that disorganizing organizations attempt to avoid mortality by reducing audience engagement. We also propose that, typically, such behaviors only delay the inevitable because reduced engagement diminishes audience appeal which, in turn, raises mortality hazards. Analyzing life histories of 1891 organizations that experience protracted mortality processes, we find support for our arguments. Reducing engagement increases the mortality hazard for venture capital firms by reducing the firm's appeal to co-investors, but gradual reductions attenuate the effects of reduced engagement on both mortality and appeal. We discuss implications of these findings for organizational theory, entrepreneurs, and institutional investors.
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Radu Vranceanu, Angela Sutan & Delphine Dubart
Journal of Socio-Economics, January 2012, Pages 72-78
Abstract:
This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do not alter their behavior in a significant way, at least not for a very small external risk. Financial assets all come with a predetermined and contractual probability that by the time when the buyer has to receive the reward for his investment, "bad luck" might have brought the asset value down to zero. In the light of the experimental findings, such trades would not provide a favorable environment for building trust.
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"Price-Quakes" Shaking the World's Stock Exchanges
Jørgen Vitting Andersen et al.
PLoS ONE, November 2011, e26472
Background: Systemic risk has received much more awareness after the excessive risk taking by major financial instituations pushed the world's financial system into what many considered a state of near systemic failure in 2008. The IMF for example in its yearly 2009 Global Financial Stability Report acknowledged the lack of proper tools and research on the topic. Understanding how disruptions can propagate across financial markets is therefore of utmost importance.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we use empirical data to show that the world's markets have a non-linear threshold response to events, consistent with the hypothesis that traders exhibit change blindness. Change blindness is the tendency of humans to ignore small changes and to react disproportionately to large events. As we show, this may be responsible for generating cascading events - pricequakes - in the world's markets. We propose a network model of the world's stock exchanges that predicts how an individual stock exchange should be priced in terms of the performance of the global market of exchanges, but with change blindness included in the pricing. The model has a direct correspondence to models of earth tectonic plate movements developed in physics to describe the slip-stick movement of blocks linked via spring forces.
Conclusions/Significance: We have shown how the price dynamics of the world's stock exchanges follows a dynamics of build-up and release of stress, similar to earthquakes. The nonlinear response allows us to classify price movements of a given stock index as either being generated internally, due to specific economic news for the country in question, or externally, by the ensemble of the world's stock exchanges reacting together like a complex system. The model may provide new insight into the origins and thereby also prevent systemic risks in the global financial network.
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Do arbitrageurs amplify economic shocks?
Harrison Hong, Jeffrey Kubik & Tal Fishman
Journal of Financial Economics, March 2012, Pages 454-470
Abstract:
We test the hypothesis that arbitrageurs amplify economic shocks in equity markets. The ability of speculators to hold short positions depends on asset values. Shorts are often reduced following good news about a stock. Therefore, the prices of highly shorted stocks are excessively sensitive to shocks compared with stocks with little short interest. We confirm this hypothesis using several empirical strategies including two quasi-experiments. In particular, we establish that the price of highly shorted stocks overshoots after good earnings news due to short covering compared with other stocks.
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Tracking Traders' Understanding of the Market Using e-Communication Data
Serguei Saavedra, Jordi Duch & Brian Uzzi
PLoS ONE, October 2011, e26705
Abstract:
Tracking the volume of keywords in Internet searches, message boards, or Tweets has provided an alternative for following or predicting associations between popular interest or disease incidences. Here, we extend that research by examining the role of e-communications among day traders and their collective understanding of the market. Our study introduces a general method that focuses on bundles of words that behave differently from daily communication routines, and uses original data covering the content of instant messages among all day traders at a trading firm over a 40-month period. Analyses show that two word bundles convey traders' understanding of same day market events and potential next day market events. We find that when market volatility is high, traders' communications are dominated by same day events, and when volatility is low, communications are dominated by next day events. We show that the stronger the traders' attention to either same day or next day events, the higher their collective trading performance. We conclude that e-communication among traders is a product of mass collaboration over diverse viewpoints that embodies unique information about their weak or strong understanding of the market.
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Commodity durability, trader specialization, and market performance
John Dickhaut et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
The original double auction studies of supply and demand markets established their strong efficiency and equilibrium convergence behavior using economically unsophisticated and untrained subjects. The results were unexpected because all individual costs and values were private and dependent entirely on the market trading process to aggregate the dispersed information into socially desirable outcomes. The exchange environment, however, corresponded to that of perishable, and not re-traded goods in which participants were specialized as buyers or sellers. We report experiments in repeated single-period markets where tradability, and buyer-seller role specialization, is varied by imposing or relaxing a restriction on re-trade within each period. In re-trade markets scope is given to speculative motives unavailable where goods perish on purchase. We observe greatly increased trade volume and decreased efficiency but subject experience increases efficiency. Observed speculation slows convergence by impeding the process whereby individuals learn from the market whether their private circumstances lead them to specialize as buyers or sellers.
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Recreational versus professional bettors: Performance differences and efficiency implications
A.C. Bruce, J.E.V Johnson & J. Peirson
Economics Letters, February 2012, Pages 172-174
Abstract:
Using a novel dataset, which allows comparisons across heterogeneous sub-groups of pari-mutuel bettors, we demonstrate significant behaviour and performance distinctions between recreational and professional investors. Professionals' ability to earn abnormal returns on short odds horses in high volume markets challenges the existing empirical consensus, which offers very limited evidence of betting market inefficiency. The results offer important lessons for betting operators and regulators and highlight the potential for similar avenues of investigation in other speculative markets.
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When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As
Andrey Golubov, Dimitris Petmezas & Nickolaos Travlos
Journal of Finance, February 2012, Pages 271-312
Abstract:
We provide new evidence on the role of financial advisors in M&As. Contrary to prior studies, top-tier advisors deliver higher bidder returns than their non-top-tier counterparts but in public acquisitions only, where the advisor reputational exposure and required skills set are relatively larger. This translates into a $65.83 million shareholder gain for an average bidder. The improvement comes from top-tier advisors' ability to identify more synergistic combinations and to get a larger share of synergies to accrue to bidders. Consistent with the premium price-premium quality equilibrium, top-tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions.
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Relationship lending and the transmission of monetary policy
Kinda Hachem
Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Repeated interactions allow lenders to uncover private information about their clients, decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing financiers. This paper constructs a credit-based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects monetary transmission. I examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output. The results demonstrate that relationship lending prevails in equilibrium, smooths the steady state output profile, and induces less volatile responses to certain monetary shocks.