Relative to them
Priming and Fake News: The Effects of Elite Discourse on Evaluations of News Media
Emily Van Duyn & Jessica Collier
Mass Communication and Society, forthcoming
Abstract:
Fake news has become a prominent topic of public discussion, particularly amongst elites. Recent research has explored the prevalence of fake news during the 2016 election cycle and possible effects on electoral outcomes. This scholarship has not yet considered how elite discourse surrounding fake news may influence individual perceptions of real news. Through an experiment, this study explores the effects of elite discourse about fake news on the public’s evaluation of news media. Results show that exposure to elite discourse about fake news leads to lower levels of trust in media and less accurate identification of real news. Therefore, frequent discussion of fake news may affect whether individuals trust news media and the standards with which they evaluate it. This discourse may also prompt the dissemination of false information, particularly when fake news is discussed by elites without context and caution.
The Home as a Political Fortress: Family Agreement in an Era of Polarization
Shanto Iyengar, Tobias Konitzer & Kent Tedin
Journal of Politics, October 2018, Pages 1326-1338
Abstract:
The manifestations of party polarization in America are well known: legislative gridlock, harsh elite rhetoric, and at the level of the electorate, increasing hostility across the partisan divide. We investigate the ramifications of polarization for processes of family socialization. Using the classic 1965 Youth-Parent Political Socialization Panel data as a baseline, we employ original national surveys of spouses and offspring conducted in 2015 supplemented by the 2014 and 2016 TargetSmart national voter files to demonstrate that political correspondence between married couples and parent-offspring agreement have both increased substantially in the polarized era. We further demonstrate that the principal reason for increased spousal correspondence is mate selection based on politics. Spousal agreement, in turn, creates an “echo chamber” that facilitates intergenerational continuity. Overall, our results suggest a vicious cycle by which socialization exacerbates party polarization.
Interpersonal accuracy in a political context is moderated by the extremity of one's political attitudes
Igor Ivanov et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, November 2018, Pages 95-106
Abstract:
The political orientation of others can be perceived above chance level from looks alone. However, the effect is usually small and there is considerable interpersonal variance. We propose that the ability to accurately perceive others' political orientation is highest for those who hold more extreme political views themselves, as compared to people with more moderate views. This is because more extreme persons have a higher need to establish clear group boundaries and distinguish between political allies and adversaries. In six studies we investigate the proposed relationship, using participants from three different countries and two different sets of politicians as targets. In line with our hypothesis, attitude extremity was associated with higher accuracy. The robustness of our findings is supported by a small-scale meta-analysis over our studies. An alternative account that attitude strength in general – of which attitude extremity is a sub-facet – would lead to higher accuracy was not supported. Implications and suggestions for future research on interpersonal accuracy are discussed.
When Efforts to Depolarize the Electorate Fail
Matthew Levendusky
Public Opinion Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The mass public has become affectively polarized — ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party, with negative consequences for politics. Drawing on work in political and social psychology, this paper tests two mechanisms for reducing this discord, both of which have been shown to reduce similar biases in other settings: heightening partisan ambivalence, and using self-affirmation techniques. A population-based survey experiment shows that neither strategy reduces affective polarization in the aggregate. But this null finding masks an important heterogeneity: Heightening partisan ambivalence reduces affective polarization for ideological moderates, but increases such discord for those with more extreme ideological identities. Efforts to depolarize the electorate can make it more deeply divided, with important implications for our understanding of contemporary politics and the durability of affective polarization.
Primaries and Candidate Polarization: Behavioral Theory and Experimental Evidence
Jonathan Woon
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme, polarized positions? Standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter’s position with complete information, but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy-motivated and have out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Theoretically, I show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation, depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents. In a controlled incentivized experiment, I find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions. Voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme, which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence. The analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions.
Party Control of Government and American Party Ideology Development
Verlan Lewis
Studies in American Political Development, forthcoming
Abstract:
Throughout U.S. history, the two major political parties have switched positions many times on a variety of issues, including how powerful the national government should be and how much it should regulate and guide the American economy. Are these changes simply the product of historical contingency, or are there structural factors at work that can help explain these developments? This article finds that change in party control of government can help explain change in party ideologies with respect to economic policy. Parties in long-term control of unified government tend to develop their ideology in ways that call for a stronger national government and more economic intervention, while parties in opposition tend to change their ideology in ways that call for less national government power and less economic intervention.
The source attribution effect: Demonstrating pernicious disagreement between ideological groups on non-divisive aphorisms
Paul Hanel et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, November 2018, Pages 51-63
Abstract:
We tested whether mere source attribution is sufficient to cause polarization between groups, even on consensual non-divisive positions. Across four studies (N = 2182), using samples from Germany, the UK, and the USA, agreement with aphorisms was high in the absence of source attribution. In contrast, atheists agreed less with brief aphorisms when they were presented as Bible verses (Studies 1 and 2), whereas Christians agreed more (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans (USA) and Labour supporters and Conservative supporters (UK) agreed more with politically non-divisive aphorisms that were presented as originating from a politician belonging to their own party (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Corbyn) than with the same aphorisms when they were presented as originating from a politician belonging to the rival party (Studies 3 and 4). This source attribution effect was not moderated by education, amount of thinking about the aphorisms, identification with the ingroup, trust, dissonance, fear of reproach, or attitude strength. We conclude that source attribution fundamentally interferes with epistemic progress in debate because of the way in which attributions of statements to sources powerfully affects reasoning about their arguments.
The relationship between emotional abilities and right-wing and prejudiced attitudes
Alain Van Hiel et al.
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous research revealed that cognitive abilities are negatively related to right-wing and prejudiced attitudes. No study has, however, investigated if emotional abilities also show such a relationship, although this can be expected based on both classic and recent literature. The aim of the present study was 2-fold: (a) to investigate the relationship between emotional abilities and right-wing and prejudiced attitudes, and (b) to pit the effects of emotional and cognitive abilities on these attitudes against each other. Results from 2 adult samples (n = 409 and 574) in which abilities scores were collected in individual testing sessions, revealed that emotional abilities are significantly and negatively related to social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes, as well as to blatant ethnic prejudice. These relationships were as strong as those found for cognitive abilities. For economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes, emotional abilities were even the only significant correlate. It is therefore concluded that the study of emotional abilities has the potential to significantly advance our understanding of right-wing and prejudiced attitudes.
Handedness predicts Conservative-Republican preference and eliminates relations of Big Five personality to political orientation using the 48 contiguous American states as analytical units
Stewart McCann
Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition, forthcoming
Abstract:
The two present nomothetic studies focused on the period from 1996 to 2012 to determine relations between handedness and political orientation using the 48 contiguous American states as analytical units. The estimated percentage of left-handers in each state operationally defined handedness. A composite measure of Conservative-Republican preference was created from CBS/New York Times/Gallup polls of state resident conservatism and the percent in each state voting Republican in each presidential election from 1996 to 2012. Study 1 showed that state levels of left-handedness correlated to an extremely high degree with Conservative-Republican preference (r = −.80). As well, with common demographic differences between states reflected in socioeconomic status, White population percent, and urban population percent controlled through multiple regression, handedness still accounted for an additional 37.2% of the variance in Conservative-Republican preference. Study 2 found that each of the Big Five personality variables correlated significantly with handedness and with Conservative-Republican preference, but in the opposite direction. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated quite surprisingly that all Big Five personality relations to Conservative-Republican preference were eliminated when handedness was controlled in multiple regression equations. For all regression equations, the global Moran’s I test specifically developed for detecting residual spatial autocorrelation indicated no significant spatial autocorrelation.
Are “they” out to get me? A social identity model of paranoia
Katharine Greenaway, Alexander Haslam & William Bingley
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research tests a social identity model of paranoia, building on work showing that identification with social groups is associated with less paranoid thinking. Studies 1 (N = 800) and 2 (N = 779) supported this model, showing that national group identification is associated with lower paranoia. Study 3 (N = 784) added to the literature by probing the mechanisms underlying these relationships, and found that it is through enhanced control and trust that identification is associated with better mental health. Studies 4 (N = 390) and 5 (N = 904) manipulated identification to provide evidence of causality. A minimeta analysis revealed a robust association between national identification and paranoia across the studies, although no association emerged between political identification and paranoia. The results point to the role that lack of social connections can play in underpinning paranoid thinking, and suggest that, as with other mental health issues, the problems caused by paranoia may have a social cure.
False beliefs and confabulation can lead to lasting changes in political attitudes
Thomas Strandberg et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, September 2018, Pages 1382-1399
Abstract:
In times of increasing polarization and political acrimony, fueled by distrust of government and media disinformation, it is ever more important to understand the cognitive mechanisms behind political attitude change. In two experiments, we present evidence that false beliefs about one’s own prior attitudes and confabulatory reasoning can lead to lasting changes in political attitudes. In Experiment 1 (N = 140), participants stated their opinions about salient political issues, and using the Choice Blindness Paradigm we covertly altered some of their responses to indicate an opposite position. In the first condition, we asked the participants to immediately verify the manipulated responses, and in the second, we also asked them to provide underlying arguments behind their attitudes. Only half of the manipulations were corrected by the participants. To measure lasting attitude change, we asked the participants to rate the same issues again later in the experiment, as well as one week after the first session. Participants in both conditions exhibited lasting shifts in attitudes, but the effect was considerably larger in the group that confabulated supporting arguments. We fully replicated these findings in Experiment 2 (N = 232). In addition, we found that participants’ analytical skill correlated with their correction of the manipulation, whereas political involvement did not. This study contributes to the understanding of how confabulatory reasoning and self-perceptive processes can interact in lasting attitude change. It also highlights how political expressions can be both stable in the context of everyday life, yet flexible when argumentative processes are engaged.
Personality Basis for Partisan News Media Use: Openness to Experience and Consumption of Liberal News Media
Minchul Kim & Cheonsoo Kim
Mass Communication and Society, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study explores the link between Openness to Experience (one dimension of the Big Five personality traits) and attitude-challenging news media use (crosscutting exposure). Two distinctive behavioral tendencies of Openness (political affinity toward liberal ideals vs. tolerance to political differences) allow us to propose two equally possible, but mutually exclusive, hypotheses regarding the association between Openness and crosscutting exposure. Two American National Election Study surveys conducted during the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections were used to test the competing hypotheses. Across the two elections, a positive link between Openness and liberal news media use was found regardless of self-reported party identification. Openness promoted attitude-consistent news media use (selective exposure) among Democrats, whereas it encouraged crosscutting exposure among Republicans. Our findings suggest the distinction between “selective” and “crosscutting” exposure based on one’s party identification may mask the common foundation that influences exposure decisions to partisan news media.
United in States of Dissatisfaction: Confirmation Bias Across the Partisan Divide
Amy Lerman & Daniel Acland
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Partisan polarization is a central feature of American political life, and a robust literature has shown that citizens engage in partisan motivated reasoning when processing political information. At the same time, however, recent events have highlighted a rising tide of antigovernment sentiment among Democrats and Republicans alike. Using an original set of survey experiments, we find that citizens engage in confirmation bias when they encounter new information, and this is driven not only by party and ideology but also by beliefs about the quality and efficiency of government. Taken together, our findings suggest important limitations to citizens’ capacity to learn about public administration, and expand our understanding of what drives confirmation bias with respect to public and private service provision.
Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on Social Media
Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow & Chuan Yu
Stanford Working Paper, September 2018
Abstract:
We measure trends in the diffusion of misinformation on Facebook and Twitter between January 2015 and July 2018. We focus on stories from 570 sites that have been identified as producers of false stories. Interactions with these sites on both Facebook and Twitter rose steadily through the end of 2016. Interactions then fell sharply on Facebook while they continued to rise on Twitter, with the ratio of Facebook engagements to Twitter shares falling by approximately 60 percent. We see no similar pattern for other news, business, or culture sites, where interactions have been relatively stable over time and have followed similar trends on the two platforms both before and after the election.
Encountering Dissimilar Views in Deliberation: Political Knowledge, Attitude Strength, and Opinion Change
Kaiping Zhang
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Conversing with diverse points of view stands as the central tenet of deliberative democracy, yet empirical evidence has suggested mixed outcomes related to perspective change as a result of deliberative encounters. I propose a difference‐driven model that suggests individual predispositions moderate the processing of dissimilar views when changing policy preferences. My analysis is based on a random sample of over 400 voters at a California‐wide deliberative event, where participants discussed proposals for reforming the state politics. I find that encountering more and different arguments transforms policy attitudes. Yet it is more difficult for people to change their minds on issues about which they hold strong beliefs. Some evidence suggests that different psychologies are at play for people who enter deliberation with substantial or weak political knowledge and for those who deliberate while holding strong or moderate prior opinions. Well‐grounded strong opinions are resistant to change, while well‐grounded moderate opinions are persuadable in deliberative groups. Uninformed positions can become entrenched in like‐minded groups, yet they can be adjusted once participants deliberate with dissimilar views, especially opinions that are held strongly without good informational ground. The findings urge deliberative forums that introduce participants to diverse perspectives to foster a considered public opinion.
Partisan Media Selectivity and Partisan Identity Threat: The Role of Social and Geographic Context
Jacob Long, William Eveland & Michael Slater
Mass Communication and Society, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is growing concern about the polarizing impact of citizens primarily choosing sources of political information consistent with their existing partisan perspective. Although research has begun providing answers about the consequences, questions remain about what factors drive such selective use of political media. This study conceptualizes partisanship as a social identity and the decision to selectively use like-minded political media as a method for maintenance of that identity. Using the logic of the reinforcing spirals model (Slater, 2007, 2015), we investigated partisan media selectivity as a response to identity threat. We argue the partisan composition of one’s geographic locale and the presence of partisan difference in one’s interpersonal network are common causes of identity threat, which we predict will be associated with compensatory use of partisan media. Results from national survey data generally provide support for the assertion that greater partisan media selectivity is associated with the presence of various forms of identity threat, especially for strong partisans.
Retrospective Voting and Party Polarization
Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo
International Economic Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naiveté and party polarization. We contrast sophisticated (Nash) vs. retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies. Retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy; instead, they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance, as determined in equilibrium. We show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective, compared to Nash, voting. Moreover, this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals.