Poll Numbers
Email Mobilization Messages Suppress Turnout Among Black and Latino Voters: Experimental Evidence From the 2016 General Election
Michael Rivera, Alex Hughes & Micah Gell-Redman
Journal of Experimental Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Email can deliver mobilization messages at considerably lower cost than direct mail. While voters’ email addresses are readily available, experimental work from 2007 to 2012 suggests that email mobilization is ineffective in most contexts. Here, we use public data to reexamine the effectiveness of email mobilization in the 2016 Florida general election. Unsolicited emails sent from a university professor and designed to increase turnout had the opposite effect: emails slightly demobilizing voters. While the overall decrease in turnout amounted to less than 1 percent of the margin of victory in the presidential race in the state, the demobilizing effect was particularly pronounced among minority voters. Compared to voters from the same group who were assigned to control, black voters assigned to receive emails were 2.2 percentage points less likely to turn out, and Latino voters were 1.0 percentage point less likely to turn out. These findings encourage both campaigns and researchers to think critically about the use and study of massive impersonal mobilization methods.
Voting rights and the resilience of Black turnout
Kyle Raze
Economic Inquiry, forthcoming
Abstract:
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 increased turnout among Black voters, which then generated economic benefits for Black communities. In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Supreme Court invalidated the enforcement mechanism responsible for these improvements, prompting concerns that states with histories of discriminatory election practices would respond by suppressing Black turnout. I estimate the effect of the Shelby decision on the racial composition of the electorate using triple-difference comparisons of validated turnout data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The data suggest that the Shelby decision did not widen the Black-white turnout gap in states subject to the ruling.
Overestimating Reported Prejudice Causes Democrats to Believe Disadvantaged Groups Are Less Electable
Brett Mercier, Jared Celniker & Azim Shariff
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Four studies show that Democrats overestimate the explicit prejudice reported by the American electorate, leading them to perceive presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups as less electable. Study 1 (MTurk; n = 728) found that Democrats overestimated the percentage of Americans who say they would not vote for presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups. Study 2 (MTurk; n = 597) replicated this finding and demonstrated that Democrats who perceive high levels of explicit prejudice toward a group also believe presidential candidates from that group are less electable. Moreover, Democrats who more frequently interacted with Republicans were more accurate in estimating the amount of explicit prejudice reported by Republicans, Democrats, and Americans in general. Studies 3A (Prolific; n = 930) and 3B (YouGov; n = 747) found that presenting information about true levels of reported prejudice made Democrats believe generic presidential candidates from disadvantaged groups would be more electable. We did not find evidence that information about true levels of reported prejudice affected Democrats' beliefs about the electability of specific candidates in the 2020 Democratic Primary or their support for these candidates.
Trump and Trust: Examining the Relationship between Claims of Fraud and Citizen Attitudes
Florian Justwan & Ryan Williamson
PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite winning the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump alleged “millions of illegal votes” and other election fraud. He continued using this rhetoric throughout his tenure as president and ultimately suggested that if he did not win reelection in 2020, it would be because it somehow was stolen from him. Through an original survey experiment, this article explores how such allegations of fraud influence the public’s attitudes toward the conduct of elections, election outcomes, representation, and democracy as a whole. In doing so, we found that respondents expressed significantly and substantively more negative attitudes toward elections and democracy after being exposed to claims of fraud (even without evidence). Additionally, Republican identifiers were more likely than Democrats or Independents to doubt that their vote was counted fairly. These results bear important implications for our current understanding of politics in the United States.
Electoral accountability and political competence
Lindsey Gailmard
Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Much research contends that candidate competence brings technical or political skill, such that selecting against such attributes seems irrational. However, if special interest coalitions are sufficiently strong, a majority may expect that political expertise will be used to select policies that generate rents for narrow constituencies at the expense of its own welfare. I develop a model in which a majority prefers to elect the less competent politician in order to undermine the incumbent’s ability to pursue the special interest agenda and derive the implications for accountability in this setting. The results demonstrate that the majority’s attempts to reassert control over policy through its retention decisions impede social welfare maximizing reform and distort aggregate welfare by either encouraging (ii) inefficient policy selection or (iiii) inefficient candidate selection. Even if politicians choose policies that maximize social welfare doing so may only worsen aggregate welfare by providing voters with more information about candidate competence, which enables the majority to better select inept politicians.
Disentangling the Effects of Ad Tone on Voter Turnout and Candidate Choice in Presidential Elections
Brett Gordon et al.
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study the effects of positive and negative advertising in presidential elections. We develop a model to disentangle these effects on voter turnout and candidate choice. The central empirical challenges are highly correlated and endogenous advertising quantities that are measured with error. To address these challenges, we construct a large set of potential instruments, including interactions with incumbency that we demonstrate provide the critical identifying variation, and apply machine-learning causal inference methods. Using data from the 2000 and 2004 U.S. presidential elections, we find that positive and negative ads play fundamentally different roles. Negative ads are more effective at driving relative candidate shares, whereas positive ads stimulate turnout. These results indicate that a candidate geographically targeting tone trades off local relative share gains and local increases in turnout for localities with a strong base. Counterfactual simulations, where the candidates adjust the quantity of positive and negative advertising while budgets remain fixed, indicate that ad tone alone can impact the outcome of close elections. Our analysis also provides potential explanations as to why past studies have produced mixed findings on both ad-tone and turnout effects.
Does digital advertising affect vote choice? Evidence from a randomized field experiment
Alexander Coppock, Donald Green & Ethan Porter
Research & Politics, March 2022
Abstract:
Despite the increasing sums devoted to online political advertising, our understanding of the persuasive effects of such advertising is limited. We report the results of a ZIP code level randomized field experiment conducted over Facebook and Instagram during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections in Florida. The ads, produced by a Democratic-leaning political action committee, were designed to spur Democratic vote share and were seen more than 1.1 million times with over 100,000 full views. This wide saturation notwithstanding, we find that these advertisements had very small estimated effects on Democratic vote share at the precinct level (−0.04 percentage points, SE: 0.85 points). Our results underline the challenges of political persuasion via digital advertisements, particularly in competitive electoral contexts.
Economic Distress and Electoral Consequences: Evidence from Appalachi
Daniel Firoozi
Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Information about inequality can change political attitudes in lab and survey experiments. I use data from the Appalachian Regional Commission and a regression discontinuity design to test whether salient information about local poverty can impact voter behavior in a field setting. I find that when the poorest decile of counties is labeled “economically distressed,” the Democratic share of the Presidential and House popular vote rises in subsequent elections. I present suggestive evidence linking this result to local news coverage, rather than spending or other outcomes.
Understanding the Factors that Affect the Incidence of Bellwether Counties: A Conditional Probability Model
Bernard Grofman & Haotian Chen
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
We update previous work on bellwethers in U.S. presidential elections. Comparing the most recent elections (2000-2020) to those in earlier periods (1960-1980), we see a striking decline in the proportion of bellwethers. We provide a model linking this decline to conditional probability calculations that recognize that (a) a county’s predictive success likelihood varies depending upon whether the winning candidate is going to be a Democrat or going to be a Republican; (b) as polarization rises, the number of potential bellwethers declines; and (c) election competitiveness can matter, but closer elections do not guarantee a greater likelihood of bellwethers. Indeed, we now have very close elections but a very low likelihood of bellwethers.
Donald Trump and the Lie
Kevin Arceneaux & Rory Truex
Perspectives on Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This “losers’ consent” allows the winners to govern, and when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede but also actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This article studies the evolution of public opinion about Donald Trump’s “big lie” using a rolling cross-sectional daily tracking survey, yielding 40 days of polls and more than 20,000 responses from US voters from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky: the number of Republicans and independents saying that they believe the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. Belief in the lie may have buoyed some of Trump supporters’ self-esteem. In reaction to the lie and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for violent political activism among Democrats, which only waned after efforts to overturn the election clearly failed. Even if these findings merely reflect partisan cheerleading, we nonetheless find significant and potentially long-term consequences of the lie. A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to continue to do so in the next electoral cycle. These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.
Online Incivility in the 2020 Congressional Elections
Michael Heseltine & Spencer Dorsey
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper explores the prevalence and correlates of political incivility among Congressional candidates in the 2020 election cycle, focusing specifically on which types of candidates were most likely to use uncivil language in their online communications and the self-reinforcing nature of incivility between candidates. Based on a comprehensive analysis of more than two million tweets sent by major party candidates in the 2020 House and Senate races, we conclude that several individual and electoral factors were influential in driving candidate incivility. Specifically, Republicans, challengers, and candidates in less competitive races were more likely to use uncivil rhetoric. Women, racial minorities, and candidates running in open seat races were less prone to incivility. We also find that incivility begets incivility, with candidates whose opponents used higher rates of incivility also being more likely to use incivility themselves. Uncivil tweets were also found to generate significantly more likes and retweets, suggesting that incivility is a viable means of driving engagement for candidates. These results shed light on the factors behind incivility among political elites, as well as highlight the feedback effects which contribute to a self-reinforcing rise in political incivility.
Parents, Infants, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the United States
Angela Cools
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Winter 2022, Pages 91-119
Abstract:
Despite evidence that infants affect families' economic and social behaviors, little is known about how young children influence their parents' political engagement. I show that U.S. women with an infant during an election year are 3.5 percentage points less likely to vote than women without children; men with an infant are 2.2 percentage points less likely to vote. Suggesting that this effect may be causal, I find no significant decreases in turnout the year before parents have an infant. Using a triple-difference approach, I then show that universal vote-by-mail systems mitigate the negative association between infants and mothers' turnout.