Playing with Others
Young children's understanding of violations of property rights
Federico Rossano, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello
Cognition, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present work investigated young children's normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party's object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights.
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Intergroup and interindividual resource competition escalating into conflict: The elimination option
Sterling McPherson & Craig Parks
Group Dynamics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This experiment addresses the situational influences and decision process that results in the elimination of an opposing group (or individual) during competition over a valued resource. Subjects were told they had done well or poorly on a trivia test, and then performed as individuals, or groups of similar-scoring members, in a multitrial competition against a group or individual with the opposite level of performance. At break points, subjects learned how they were doing relative to the competitor, and were given the chance to take action against the opponent, including elimination from the experiment. Results suggest that groups are faster to eliminate the opposition than are individuals, and that the advantaged (i.e., group/individual currently winning the competition) are more likely to eliminate the opposition than are the disadvantaged. This is consistent with previous theorizing and real-world situations of intergroup competition over valued resources that result in violence.
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Danu Anthony Stinson et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Chronically insecure individuals often behave in ways that result in the very social rejection that they most fear. We predicted that this typical self-fulfilling prophecy is not immutable. Self-affirmation may improve insecure individuals' relational security, and this improvement may allow them to express more welcoming social behavior. In a longitudinal experiment, a 15-min self-affirmation improved both the relational security and experimenter-rated social behavior of insecure participants up to 4 weeks after the initial intervention. Moreover, the extent to which self-affirmation improved insecure participants' relational security at 4 weeks predicted additional improvements in social behavior another 4 weeks after that. Our finding that insecure participants continued to reap the social benefits of self-affirmation up to 8 weeks after the initial intervention demonstrates that it is indeed possible to rewrite the self-fulfilling prophecy of social rejection.
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Is population growth conducive to the sustainability of cooperation?
Oded Stark & Marcin Jakubek
Economics & Human Biology, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper asks whether population growth is conducive to the sustainability of cooperation. A simple model is developed in which farmers who live around a circular lake engage in trade with their adjacent neighbors. The payoffs from this activity are governed by a prisoner's dilemma "rule of engagement." Every farmer has one son when the population is not growing, or two sons when it is growing. In the former case, the son takes over the farm when his father dies. In the latter case, one son stays on his father's farm, whereas the other son settles around another lake, along with the "other" sons of the other farmers. During his childhood, each son observes the strategies and the payoffs of his father and of the trading partners of his father, and imitates the most successful strategy when starting farming on his own. Then mutant defectors are introduced into an all-cooperator community. The defector strategy may spread. A comparison is drawn between the impact in terms of the sustainability of cooperation of the appearance of the mutants in a population that is not growing, and in one that is growing. It is shown that the ex-ante probability of sustaining the cooperation strategy is higher for a community that is growing than for a stagnant community.
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Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals
Carlos Roca & Dirk Helbing
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 12 July 2011, Pages 11370-11374
Abstract:
Human wellbeing in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate greediness favors social cohesion by a coevolution between cooperation and spatial organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although enhancing individuals' returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior.
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Friends with benefits: On the positive consequences of pet ownership
Allen McConnell et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social support is critical for psychological and physical well-being, reflecting the centrality of belongingness in our lives. Human interactions often provide people with considerable social support, but can pets also fulfill one's social needs? Although there is correlational evidence that pets may help individuals facing significant life stressors, little is known about the well-being benefits of pets for everyday people. Study 1 found in a community sample that pet owners fared better on several well-being (e.g., greater self-esteem, more exercise) and individual-difference (e.g., greater conscientiousness, less fearful attachment) measures. Study 2 assessed a different community sample and found that owners enjoyed better well-being when their pets fulfilled social needs better, and the support that pets provided complemented rather than competed with human sources. Finally, Study 3 brought pet owners into the laboratory and experimentally demonstrated the ability of pets to stave off negativity caused by social rejection. In summary, pets can serve as important sources of social support, providing many positive psychological and physical benefits for their owners.
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All I need is a stage to shine: Narcissists' leader emergence and performance
Barbora Nevicka et al.
Leadership Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many of the world's leaders appear to possess narcissistic characteristics (e.g., Deluga, 1997). This begs a question as to whether and why narcissistic individuals are chosen as leaders and how they perform. Prior research has suggested that leadership emergence and performance of narcissistic personalities may depend on contextual factors. Of particular interests are those contextual factors that pertain to the interdependence of work relationships, because narcissists typically tend to "shine" in social settings where they can influence others. Therefore, the present study investigated the leadership emergence and performance of narcissistic individuals in low versus high reward interdependent teams that participated in an interactive team simulation task. We found that narcissists emerged as leaders irrespective of the team's level of reward interdependence and their individual performance. Yet, high narcissists performed better in the high reward interdependent condition than in the low reward interdependent condition.
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Andrew Delton et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 9 Aug 2011, Pages 13335-13340
Abstract:
Are humans too generous? The discovery that subjects choose to incur costs to allocate benefits to others in anonymous, one-shot economic games has posed an unsolved challenge to models of economic and evolutionary rationality. Using agent-based simulations, we show that such generosity is the necessary byproduct of selection on decision systems for regulating dyadic reciprocity under conditions of uncertainty. In deciding whether to engage in dyadic reciprocity, these systems must balance (i) the costs of mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction (hence, risking a single chance of being exploited) with (ii) the far greater costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction (thereby precluding benefits from multiple future cooperative interactions). This asymmetry builds organisms naturally selected to cooperate even when exposed to cues that they are in one-shot interactions.
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Do I Really Want to Know? A Cognitive Dissonance-Based Explanation of Other-Regarding Behavior
Astrid Matthey & Tobias Regner
Games, March 2011, Pages 114-135
Abstract:
We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a dictator game variant subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior when the payoffs of the receiver are known, choose to ignore these consequences if possible. This behavior is inconsistent with preferences about outcomes. Other-regarding behavior may also be explained by avoiding cognitive dissonance as in Konow (2000). Our experiment's choice data is in line with this approach. In addition, we successfully relate individual behavior to proxies for cognitive dissonance.
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Audience Influence on EGM Gambling: The Protective Effects of Having Others Watch You Play
Matthew Rockloff & Nancy Greer
Journal of Gambling Studies, September 2011, Pages 443-451
Abstract:
One component of social facilitation on gambling is the potential for an audience of people to observe the play of Electronic Gaming Machine (EGM) gamblers and influence their behaviour without participating directly in gambling themselves. An experiment was conducted with an audience of onlookers, purported to be students of research methods, taking notes while watching the participants play an EGM. Forty-three male and 82 female participants (N = 125), aged 18-79 (M = 49.2, SD = 15.6), played a laptop simulated 3-reel EGM using a $20 stake in three conditions: (1) alone, (2) watched by a simulated audience of six persons, or (3) watched by an audience of 26. Outcomes on the poker machine were rigged with a fixed sequence of five wins in the first 20 spins and indefinite losses thereafter. The results found smaller bet-sizes associated with larger audiences of onlookers, and this outcome is consistent with a hypothesized motivation to display more wins to the audience. Moreover, final payouts were greater in the audience conditions compared to the control, further suggesting that an audience may be a protective factor limiting player losses.
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The Social Contagion of Gambling: How Venue Size Contributes to Player Losses
Matthew Rockloff, Nancy Greer & Carly Fay
Journal of Gambling Studies, September 2011, Pages 487-497
Abstract:
The Social Facilitation Effect shows performance on many simple tasks is enhanced by crowds of onlookers or co-actors (others performing the same activity). Previous experimental research has shown that Electronic Gaming Machine (EGM) betting behavior is intensified by the belief that others are gambling along with the subject (Rockloff and Dyer, J Gambl Stud 23(1):1-12, 2007). The present study extends these findings by simulating crowds of differing sizes using a fake video-conference along with a live confederate who gambles concurrently with the subjects. Fifty-four male and 81 female subjects aged 18-82 (M = 46.9, SD = 16.7) played a laptop simulated 3-reel EGM using a $20 stake in 3 conditions: (1) alone, (2) in a simulated group of 5 persons plus 1 live confederate, or (3) in a simulated group of 25 persons plus 1 live confederate. The EGM outcomes were rigged with a fixed 20 trial winning sequence followed by an indefinite losing sequence. As hypothesised, gambling intensity, as measured by trials played, speed of betting and final payouts, was progressively greater with larger crowd sizes (P < .05). In contrast, bet-size was slightly lower with larger crowds. The results suggest that gambling venues with more players tend to increase gambling persistence and contribute to greater long term monetary losses.
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Strangers in sync: Achieving embodied rapport through shared movements
Tanya Vacharkulksemsuk & Barbara Fredrickson
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper examines the emergence of behavioral synchrony among strangers in the context of self-disclosure, and their path in predicting interaction quality. Specifically, we hypothesize that behavioral synchrony mediates the direct effect of self-disclosure on the development of embodied rapport. Same-sex stranger pairs (n = 94) were randomly assigned to a videorecorded self-disclosure or control condition, and afterward each member rated their social interaction. Following the procedure used by Bernieri, Reznick, & Rosenthal (1988), two trained judges independently watched each video record and rated each pair interaction on behavioral synchrony. Bootstrapping analyses provide support for the hypothesized mediating effect of behavioral synchrony, which emerged as independent of the effects of self-other overlap and positive affect. The authors discuss implications of behavioral synchrony for relationship formation processes and the inevitable entwinement of behavior and judgments in light of embodied cognition.
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Evaluating the rewarding nature of social interactions in laboratory animals
Viviana Trezza, Patrizia Campolongo & Louk Vanderschuren
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Positive social interactions are essential for emotional well-being, healthy development, establishment and maintenance of adequate social structures and reproductive success of humans and animals. Here, we review the studies that have investigated whether forms of social interaction that occur in different phases of the lifespan of animals, i.e. maternal behavior, social play and sexual interaction are rewarding in rodents and non-human primates. We show that these three forms of social interaction can be used as incentive for place conditioning, lever pressing and maze learning, three setups that have been extensively used to study the rewarding properties of food and drugs of abuse and their neural underpinnings. The experience of positive social interactions during key developmental ages has profound and long-lasting effects on brain function and behavior in emotional, motivational and cognitive domains. For instance, pup interaction is more rewarding than cocaine for early-postpartum dams and rats deprived of the opportunity to play during adolescence show social and cognitive impairments at adulthood. Furthermore, sexual behavior is only overtly rewarding when animals can control the rate at which the sexual interaction occurs. Last, we discuss how animal models contributed to our understanding of social reward mechanisms and its psychological components throughout development.
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Spontaneous prosocial choice by chimpanzees
Victoria Horner et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
The study of human and primate altruism faces an evolutionary anomaly: There is ample evidence for altruistic preferences in our own species and growing evidence in monkeys, but one of our closest relatives, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), is viewed as a reluctant altruist, acting only in response to pressure and solicitation. Although chimpanzee prosocial behavior has been reported both in observational captive studies and in the wild, thus far Prosocial Choice Tests have failed to produce evidence. However, methodologies of previous Prosocial Choice Tests may have handicapped the apes unintentionally. Here we present findings of a paradigm in which chimpanzees chose between two differently colored tokens: one "selfish" token resulting in a reward for the actor only (1/0), and the other "prosocial" token rewarding both the actor and a partner (1/1). Seven female chimpanzees, each tested with three different partners, showed a significant bias for the prosocial option. Prosocial choices occurred both in response to solicitation by the partner and spontaneously without solicitation. However, directed requests and pressure by the partner reduced the actor's prosocial tendency. These results draw into question previous conclusions indicating that chimpanzees have a limited sensitivity to the needs of others and behave prosocially only in response to significant prompting.
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Social norms of sharing in high school: Teen giving in the dictator game
Catherine Eckel et al.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
We conduct a study of altruistic behavior among high school students using the dictator game. We find a much stronger norm of equal splitting than previously observed in the typical university student population, with almost 45% of high school subjects choosing an equal split of the endowment. Tests indicate that this difference is not due to factors traditionally considered in the analysis of these games, such as demographics. Rather, we find that dictators who score higher on a social generosity measure are much more likely to conform to the 50/50 norm. Additionally, high school students who score in the high range of an independence measure send significantly less to recipients.
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Not 'Just the two of us': Third party externalities of social dilemmas
Hanne van der Iest, Jacob Dijkstra & Frans Stokman
Rationality and Society, August 2011, Pages 347-370
Abstract:
Many real-life social dilemmas contain third parties who cannot make decisions in the dilemma, but are affected by its outcome (receive externalities) nonetheless. Dilemmas with identical payoffs for decision-making actors may greatly vary in their externalities for third parties. If actors value the welfare of thirds, externalities will affect actors' decisions. We test behavioral predictions from three leading ideas on social preferences (altruism, inequality aversion, competition) in two studies that employ four one-shot, 2-person prisoner's dilemmas (PDs) that differ only in their externalities. The PDs respectively include a third party that (i) is indifferent, (ii) prefers defection, (iii) prefers cooperation. Our results show that while aggregate behavior is not affected by externalities, individual behavior is. Compared to a PD without externalities, prosocial individuals cooperate more when a third benefits from cooperation, but do not defect more when a third benefits from defection. The opposite pattern is found for competitive individuals.