Playing Government
Playing Ball: Collaboration in the U.S. Congress
SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor & Riley Millburne
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Members of Congress, pundits, and scholars alike have emphasized the importance of personal connections in developing policy. Yet, in the modern era of leader-led lawmaking, there are few opportunities for rank-and-file members to develop meaningful connections, particularly bipartisan ones. As a result, the dearth of personal connections has made sources of collaboration difficult to study. This research note examines a seemingly simple -- yet effective -- source of congressional collaboration: the Annual Congressional Baseball Game. We apply a novel dataset of baseball rosters from the 114th through the 117th Congress to a network analysis of cosponsorship between all members, and find that membership on the Congressional Baseball Team increases the likelihood of intra-party and bipartisan collaboration at higher rates than other common areas of social connection. This research contributes to work on social connections in Congress, using novel data collection and network analysis.
When Politics Is Not Pivotal: Supermajority Debate Rules in State Legislatures
James Curry & Robert Oldham
Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 2025
Abstract:
The 60-vote end-debate threshold is a key institution in the United States Senate. Most winning coalitions require 60 votes, effectively giving veto power to a minority of senators. But do supermajority debate rules necessarily translate into minority veto power? We examine this in state legislatures, where there is far more variation in whether chamber rules require a majority or a supermajority of legislators to cut off debate. Across multiple analyses and data sources, we fail to find systematic evidence that supermajority debate rules are associated with several outcome variables, including the size of bill passage coalitions, news coverage of obstruction, and the success of major proposals. The lack of evidence indicates that, in many cases, debate rules do not translate into legislative "pivots" and that case-specific knowledge is necessary for understanding the influence of legislative rules.
Executive Policymaking Coalitions, Veto Activation, and Collective Action Problems
Nicholas Napolio
British Journal of Political Science, August 2025
Abstract:
Thousands of federal policies have been produced by coalitions of executive agencies over the last few decades. Despite this, little attention has been paid to why agencies collaborate. The decision among relatively autonomous agencies to collaborate and therefore cede some of their power demands theoretical attention. I argue that agencies form coalitions to overcome legislative oversight attempts by activating veto points and exploiting collective action problems in Congress. Using data on dozens of agencies over twenty-four years, I find that agencies form policy-making coalitions when it helps them activate veto points and exploit collective action problems among their overseers in Congress: namely, committee freeriding in oversight and legislative gridlock in lawmaking. These collective action problems, in turn, inhibit Congressional attempts to overturn bureaucratically led policies and therefore allow agency policies to stick. Agencies form coalitions actively in order to insulate their policies against congressional oversight.
Lights, Camera, Inaction? The Effects of Gavel-to-Gavel Floor Coverage on U.S. State Legislatures
Jeffrey Lyons & Josh Ryan
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
As elected officials and citizens struggle to understand the increasingly polarized political landscape in the United States, some have pointed to the introduction of "gavel-to-gavel" camera coverage in legislative bodies as driving the downward trajectory of these institutions. Advocates of increased transparency suggest cameras empower voters, producing more moderate behavior among legislators, whereas opponents suggest cameras encourage partisanship and dysfunction. Previous research offers mixed conclusions, in part, because of a focus on national legislatures where the introduction of cameras occurs only once. Using an original dataset of the adoption of gavel-to-gavel coverage in state legislative chambers, we examine whether cameras are associated with a range of chamber- and individual-level outcomes. The findings suggest that there are no systematic impacts from the introduction of gavel-to-gavel coverage. Normative concerns about cameras in legislatures may be overstated, an important finding given their proliferation in public proceedings since the COVID-19 pandemic.
Rhetorical and Revealed Opposition to Compromise Among Local and State Legislators
Melody Crowder-Meyer
Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 2025
Abstract:
Policymaking in democratic governments requires compromise, yet polarized legislators face mixed incentives around compromise. These incentives also vary by gender and party, with women and Democrats facing greater pressure to express support for compromise. I investigate how legislators handle this situation by revealing both how often legislators openly report supporting compromise and legislators' willingness to oppose compromise when they can do so in secret. Drawing on original surveys of local and state legislators, I find that many legislators rhetorically support compromise but oppose compromise surreptitiously. Further, while women and Democrats are equally or more likely than men and Republicans to report supporting compromise when asked directly, this pattern reverses with women and some Democratic legislators opposing compromise more than men and Republicans when they can do so secretly. Evidence suggests this is due, in part, to women and Democrats being more likely to seek office due to policy issue motivations.
The Source of Economic Shocks Matters for their Political Outcomes
Leonardo Baccini, Costin Ciobanu & Krzysztof Pelc
Research and Politics, September 2025
Abstract:
Do different economic shocks favor different types of political leadership? Using a survey experiment conducted on 3,500 American respondents, we offer causal evidence for an unexpected relation between different types of economic shocks and a demand for a radical political response. First, we show that individuals believe politicians have a role in preventing layoffs due to both offshoring and automation, compared to run-of-the-mill bankruptcies. Second, we find strong evidence that economic shocks due to offshoring lead to greater demands for leaders who display authoritarian traits, with no equivalent effect for layoffs due to automation. When presented with news of an offshoring event, respondents favor leaders who claim to be more willing to flout the rule of law, to implement divisive policies, and to employ force. By contrast, traits commonly associated with populism, such as siding with "the people" or preferring political outsiders, see no association with either offshoring or automation shocks. Our findings support the view that some economic shocks provide a greater opportunity for political candidates willing to turn to radical political solutions.
Conflating Lobbying and PACs: The Surprisingly Low Overlap in Organizational Lobbying and Campaign Expenditures
Alexander Furnas, Timothy LaPira & Clare Brock
PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article investigates whether campaign contributions and lobbying are complementary, substitutive, or distinct forms of organizational political engagement. Our study reveals minimal overlap between organizations that engage in lobbying and those that make campaign contributions despite the perception that these activities are interchangeable forms of "money in politics." Using comprehensive contribution and lobbying report data from 1998 to 2018, we find that most politically active organizations focus exclusively on either lobbying or making campaign contributions. Only a small percentage of organizations engage in both activities. This finding challenges the assumption that these forms of political activity are inherently linked. The majority of organizations engaged in political activity do so exclusively through lobbying. However, the top lobbying groups spend the most money and almost always have affiliated political action committees (PACs). Most lobbying money is spent by a small number of big spenders -- organizations that also have affiliated PACs. Organizations that both lobby and make campaign contributions tend to be well resourced and rare.
Are Policymakers Persuaded in Parallel?: Policymakers, Evidence, and Motivated Reasoning
Daniel Bergan et al.
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Policymakers are highly involved with political issues, politically polarized, and knowledgeable about politics, all traits that could contribute to biased reasoning about policy evidence. In this paper, we explore whether policymakers are influenced by compelling policy evidence from ideologically disparate viewpoints, or whether they respond to evidence in an ideologically biased fashion. We conduct an experiment in which we randomly assign a sample of local policymakers to policy-relevant evidence that varies in quality as well as in its ideological implications. We find that there is a positive, statistically significant effect of strong evidence on policymakers' attitudes and a smaller, positive (but not statistically significant) effect of weak evidence. We find no evidence of a moderating effect of ideology on the persuasive effects of either strong or weak evidence. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings as well as avenues for future research.
Status-Amplified Deterrence: Paul Manafort's Prosecution Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
Jin Hyung Kim, Reuben Hurst & Jordan Siegel
Organization Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social control agents often struggle to deter organizational deviance. We propose a theory of "status-amplified deterrence" wherein enforcement's deterrent effects are amplified when carried out against high-status organizational actors. First, this enforcement is interpreted as willingness and ability for far-reaching enforcement. Next, amplified deterrence occurs as these episodes become widely known through (1) extensive media coverage and (2) the marketing efforts of third-party compliance advisors. We examine this theory in the context of the U.S. Department of Justice's enforcement against Paul Manafort for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Using a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate that enforcement against Manafort caused a widespread, sustained, and economically significant reduction in FARA noncompliance. We show supplementary evidence consistent with the idea that deterrence was amplified in significant part by media attention and by law firms referencing the episode while successfully marketing FARA advisory services. We contribute to literature illuminating how organizations, in conjunction with third-party compliance advisors, adjust deviant activities in response to shifting regulatory environments.
Presidential Particularism (and the Trump Anomaly): Evidence from Federal Contract Awards and Capital Markets
Ling Cen et al.
Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
We document presidential particularism in the allocation of U.S. federal government contracts. Firms in "Swing" and "Core" states receive disproportionately higher federal contracts during election cycles. Contracts peak in reelection years for incumbent presidents suggesting electoral and partisan motives. Awards to "Core" states fall relative to "Hostile" states in election years of the presidents' second terms. Government agencies engage more aggressively in particularism when aligned with the president's party. Particularism disappeared during the Trump presidency, with Hostile-state firms awarded more contracts. Market participants, who are slow to recognize the relationship between particularism and corporate earning, underreact to this phenomenon.
Addressing the Limitations of Election and Sortition With Jury-Based Deliberative Democracy
Kai O'Reilly
Stanford Working Paper, September 2025
Abstract:
Randomly selected representative bodies have the potential to address seemingly intractable problems with electoral systems. However, existing designs are at risk of becoming polarized, insular, and corrupt like elected legislatures. I propose three systems based on short-term, evaluative, conclusive, and multi-choice juries, which are supported by contemporary and historical precedent. These large random juries choose between options proposed by elected legislators, reducing gridlock and polarization. This hybrid approach leverages the differing strengths of politicians and jurors, separating partisan proposers and dispassionate deciders to make both more effective. The three proposed designs address the limitations of both pure sortition and election, achieving the responsiveness and equality of sortition, while retaining the expertise and participation of election. First, deliberative law uses juries to choose agenda items and bills from among those proposed by legislators. Second, deliberative appointment uses juries to choose from among candidates nominated by legislators for judicial and independent executive positions. Finally, a deliberative senate is selected through deliberative appointment in each region. These designs of deliberative government provide a pragmatic pathway for testing and adoption by retaining existing systems while addressing their flaws.