Party Scene
Expressive Responding and the Economy: The Case of Trump’s Return to Office
Matthew Graham
Journal of Experimental Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The partisan gap in economic perceptions flipped unusually dramatically after the 2024 U.S. presidential election: following the Republican victory, Democrats (Republicans) suddenly rated the economy much more negatively (positively). Was the resulting partisan difference a case of expressive responding, wherein surveys exaggerate partisan bias in measures of economic perceptions? In April 2025, I fielded a panel survey experiment that asked survey respondents to guess then-unpublished measures of economic growth, inflation, and unemployment in the current month or quarter (Prolific, N = 2,831). Randomly selected respondents were offered $2 per correct answer. Partisan bias did not shrink as a result, suggesting genuine differences in economic perceptions. Two measures of response effort (response time and looking up answers) increase, suggesting that misreporting does not fully explain the effects of pay-for-correct treatments.
Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters
Yamil Velez, Donald Green & Semra Sevi
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 16 December 2025
Abstract:
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are interactive tools that communicate information about elections, yet their effectiveness in enhancing political knowledge and participation remains understudied. Moreover, traditional VAAs may disproportionately attract politically engaged users with already well-formed ideological views, limiting their potential to inform a broader and less engaged electorate. This paper introduces a “VAA Bot” that employs large language models (LLMs) and retrieval-augmented generation to deliver balanced, personalized information drawn from official party platforms and public documents. We evaluate the VAA Bot’s impact across three experimental studies aimed at young politically unaffiliated adults. The findings provide evidence that the VAA Bot improves knowledge of party stances on issues of great importance to each user. However, the VAA Bot produces weak effects on downstream outcomes such as vote preferences and party evaluations among respondents whose primary issue position aligns closely with one of the parties. These findings contribute to ongoing debates about the role of political information in shaping behavior and clarify both the promise and the limitations of LLM-based tools for civic learning.
Examining the correspondence between political ideology and gun policy attitudes among Black and White people in the United States
Joy Losee et al.
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present research examined whether political ideology corresponded with gun attitudes among people disproportionately experiencing gun violence—Black people in the United States. Across four studies (N = 25,847) we found that race (Black vs. White) interacted with political ideology to predict gun attitudes, safety perceptions, and policy preferences. Among White participants, being more conservative corresponded with more positive gun attitudes, perceptions, and support for pro-gun policies. Among Black participants, the relationship was weak or nonsignificant. Further, experience with gun violence also interacted with political ideology such that the relationship between gun attitudes, policy preferences and political ideology was weaker among participants who reported experience with gun violence compared with participants that reported no experience. These results have implications for the generalizability of the single-item political ideology scale. This research also indicates that efforts to reduce gun violence focusing on reducing political polarization overlook that the polarization occurs largely among White people which may ultimately divert attention and resources from Black communities most impacted by gun violence.
COVID-19, political orientation, and residential real estate returns
Zinat Alam & Miran Hossain
Real Estate Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We use the COVID-19 pandemic as a shock to partisan-based perceptions of risk and study its effect on residential real estate returns. Using county–month data from January to December 2020, difference-in-differences estimates show that Democratic-leaning counties and those with greater liberal-news viewership experienced monthly return declines of about 0.8–1.2 percentage points, wiping out the typical 0.80% monthly gain at the onset of the crisis. This pattern is not explained by flight from dense or urban locations. Mechanism tests point primarily to partisan differences in economic expectations, amplified by political uncertainty. Overall, our findings suggest that political orientation matters for asset returns primarily in the presence of external shocks such as COVID-19.
Partisan Ingroup-Outgroup Bias in Investment Decisions
Young Jae (Jay) Choi et al.
University of North Dakota Working Paper, November 2025
Abstract:
We experimentally document a novel "negative peer effect" in financial markets: investors actively trade against recommendations from political opponents. Using 30,000+ investment decisions, we show investors both follow politically aligned peers and oppose misaligned peers. We also show the effect is mainly (but not entirely) driven by investors' inferring the political leanings of firms based on the peer recommenders' ideologies. These partisan biases persist even with transparent fundamentals (earnings guidance, analyst targets), indicating that investors gain direct utility (disutility) from investing in politically aligned (misaligned) firms.
Competing moral minds? Estimating moral disagreement in American politics
Christopher Johnston, David Ciuk & Jesse Lopez
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
What drives ideological and partisan divisions in contemporary American politics? An influential line of research suggests they are rooted in disagreement about the nature of morality. While the left uses principles of care and fairness in moral judgment, the right considers loyalty, authority, and sanctity to be additional morally relevant values. This creates a “moral empathy gap” that makes it difficult for people to understand the perspective of their political opponents and fosters intolerance and gridlock. Evidence for moral disagreement between the left and right rests largely on a survey measure with significant limitations -- the moral foundations questionnaire. We review the methodological issues associated with this measure and use two alternative strategies to examine moral disagreement in American politics. Across six distinct empirical tests with U.S. adults, we find that moral differences between the left and right are smaller than what is measured with the moral foundations questionnaire.
A Measurement Gap? Effect of Survey Instrument and Scoring on the Partisan Knowledge Gap
Lucas Shen, Gaurav Sood & Daniel Weitzel
Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 2025, Pages 812-836
Abstract:
Research suggests that partisan gaps in political knowledge with partisan implications are wide and widespread in the United States. Using a series of experiments, we estimate the extent to which the partisan gaps in commercial surveys reflect differences in confidently held beliefs rather than motivated guessing. Knowledge items on commercial surveys often have guessing-encouraging features. Removing such features yields scales with greater reliability and higher criterion validity. More substantively, partisan gaps on scales without these “inflationary” features are roughly 40 percent smaller. Thus, contrary to some prior research, which finds that the upward bias is explained by the knowledgeable deliberately marking the wrong answer (partisan cheerleading), our data suggest that partisan gaps on commercial surveys in the United States are strongly upwardly biased by motivated guessing by the ignorant. Relatedly, we also find that partisans know less than what toplines of commercial polls suggest.
Between a prosecutor and a convicted felon? Political allegiance, abolition, and felon's rights in the context of the 2024 U.S. presidential election
Flora Blanchette, Minh Duc Pham & Kimberly Chaney
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, December 2025
Abstract:
U.S. Republicans endorse more punitive beliefs and support for current systems of law and order, while Democrats tend toward greater acknowledgement of flaws in these systems and endorsement of reforms or even abolition of carceral systems. Yet, following Donald Trump's 2024 convictions on 34 felony counts, Republicans questioned the legitimacy of the legal system and continued to endorse Trump as a fit presidential candidate, while Democrats praised the justice system and construed Trump as unfit for office due to his felon status. In a mixed-method study, we examined how political allegiance and abolitionist ideology shaped perceptions of Trump's felony charges and beliefs about the fitness of felons (including Trump specifically) to hold public office. Data from 196 politically diverse U.S. participants were collected immediately following Trump's re-election. Results indicated Democratic identification and voting for Harris/Walz (vs. Trump/Vance) were generally associated with heightened endorsement of abolition. Yet, political party allegiance consistently trumped abolitionist ideologies in predicting felon-in-office beliefs. Republicans endorsed both general and Trump-specific felon-in-office beliefs more strongly than Democrats; the role of abolitionist ideology in predicting felon-in-office beliefs was suppressed by political party identification. Qualitative analyses supported these findings; Republicans generally were unsupportive of Trump's convictions and endorsed his fitness for the presidency, while Democrats were supportive of Trump's convictions and argued his felony status rendered him unfit for the presidency. Our findings suggest that allegiance to one's political party, rather than one's ideology, appears to predict responses to Trump's convictions. We consider the implications of these findings for political and activist mobilization.
Resistance is Far-Right from Futile: Deplatforming, Resilience, and Persistent Presence Across Platforms as Drivers of Accelerationist Politics
Katherine Kountz et al.
Political Communication, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study investigates how a far-right extremist group, The Base, enacts communicative resilience (CR) strategies across digital platforms despite deplatforming efforts. In our empirical analysis, we conducted a content analysis of 69 conversations about bans that occurred in The Base’s encrypted chatrooms on Matrix and Wire between 2018 and 2020. We examined if and how the CR processes outlined in the communication theory of resilience (CTR) applied to far-right extremists groups operating online. Our analysis shows that deplatforming, while disruptive, triggers CR processes that activate collaborative discovery of new methods to remain resilient. Additionally, we discovered an additional, online performative process of persistent presence in response to a perceived constant, existential threat. That strategy demonstrates operational capacity, reinforces group-based identities, accrues social capital, and performs a proven capacity to challenge detractors. By assessing The Base’s online dynamics, this study contributes to broader conversations on mediated CTR, deplatforming, extremism, and the role of CR in political legitimation.
Resentment or Empowerment? Civic Education and the Political Efficacy of Rural Individuals
Joshua Jansa & Eve Ringsmuth
American Politics Research, January 2026, Pages 27-39
Abstract:
Research on rural identity and political behavior has flourished in the past decade and has highlighted the importance of place-based resentment in shaping individuals’ views of government and politics. We provide a novel perspective on the rural-urban divide by examining the extent to which internal political efficacy and place-based resentment change as one is exposed to civic education. Our analysis suggests that rural identity plays a significant role in individuals’ growth in internal efficacy when exposed to civic education, especially for rural individuals who are first-generation college students. We also find that individuals’ place-based resentment remains unchanged by civic education, and that high resentment -- found almost exclusively among rural individuals -- constrains growth in internal political efficacy. Ultimately, the results shed light on fundamental questions in American democracy, such as who feels equipped to make a meaningful difference, who feels marginalized, and the extent to which civic education can boost or combat these issues, respectively.