Off to the Side
An adversarial collaboration on the rigidity-of-the-right, symmetry thesis, or rigidity-of-extremes: The answer depends on the question
Shauna Bowes et al.
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In an adversarial collaboration, two preregistered U.S.-based studies (total N = 6181) tested three hypotheses regarding the relationship between political ideology and belief rigidity (operationalized as less evidence-based belief updating): rigidity-of-the-right, symmetry, and rigidity-of-extremes. Across both studies, general and social conservatism were weakly associated with rigidity (|b| ~ .05), and conservatives were more rigid than liberals (Cohen's d ~ .05). Rigidity generally had null associations with economic conservatism, as well as social and economic political attitudes. Moreover, general extremism (but neither social nor economic extremism) predicted rigidity in Study 1, and all three extremism measures predicted rigidity in Study 2 (average |bs| ~ .07). Extreme rightists were more rigid than extreme leftists in 60% of the significant quadratic relationships. Given these very small and semi-consistent effects, broad claims about strong associations between ideology and belief updating are likely unwarranted. Rather, psychologists should turn their focus to examining the contexts where ideology strongly correlates with rigidity.
One of Us: Autocratic Leadership Undermines Leader Support Less When Leader and Follower Are Politically Aligned
Kathryn Kincaid et al.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Autocratic leadership is on the rise globally, even in many long-standing democracies. While democratically elected leaders who violate democratic norms often lose public support, political allegiances can shape the extent to which citizens withdraw that support. Drawing on social identity theory and the transgression credit theory of leadership, we hypothesize that while group members typically prefer nonautocratic over autocratic political leaders, this preference may weaken when a leader's political orientation or party affiliation aligns with that of group members, and thus the leader is viewed as a member of the ingroup. We test this hypothesis in seven studies (total N = 6385) spanning three countries, a range of leader targets (e.g., UK political leadership, Justin Trudeau, the leaders of the major Canadian political parties, Donald Trump, and Hillary Clinton), among both liberals and conservatives, at multiple time points over the span of 6 years, and combining both original survey data (Studies 1–4) and secondary analyses of nationally representative panel data from the United States (Studies 5–7). In all studies, participants reported their political affiliation, rated how autocratic they perceive their political leaders (Studies 1–4) or how much they perceive their political leaders disrespect democracy (Studies 5–7), and then evaluated their political leaders. We find robust support for our hypothesis that political affiliation moderates the relationship between perceived autocratic leadership style and leader support. Autocratic leadership style or perceived disrespect for democracy was associated with less favorable leader evaluations, but this negative association was significantly weakened when the leader shared the participants' political affiliation. Thus, although perceiving a leader as autocratic tends to erode leader support, it does so to a significantly lesser extent when the leader represents one's political ingroup.
Why depolarization is hard: Evaluating attempts to decrease partisan animosity in America
Derek Holliday, Yphtach Lelkes & Sean Westwood
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 30 September 2025
Abstract:
Affective polarization is a corrosive force in American politics. While numerous studies have developed interventions to reduce it, their capacity for creating lasting, large-scale change is unclear. This study comprehensively evaluates existing interventions through a meta-analysis of 77 treatments from 25 published studies and two large-scale experiments. Our meta-analysis reveals that the average effect of treatments on animosity is modest (a 5.4-point shift on a 101-point scale), and decays within two weeks. We experimentally test whether stacking multiple treatments in one sitting or repeating them over time as “booster shots” enhances their impact. We find no evidence that multiple or repeated exposures produce substantially larger or more durable reductions in partisan animosity. This reveals the uneven utility of these interventions. They serve as valuable tools for testing the psychological mechanisms of polarization, but our findings indicate they are not, on their own, a scalable solution for reducing societal-level conflict. We conclude that achieving lasting depolarization will likely require a shift in focus, moving beyond individual-level treatments to address the elite behaviors and structural incentives that fuel partisan conflict.
Becoming partisan: The development of children’s social preferences based on political markers
Annie Schwartzstein & Hyesung Hwang
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
What political party or what presidential candidate a person supports is often used by adults to divide their social world. However, little is known about whether young children also engage in such tendencies or whether political groups are even socially meaningful for young children. To trace the beginnings of these tendencies, the present study investigated whether 6- to 12-year-old U.S. children use political markers, such as political party affiliation and support for presidential candidates, to guide their social preferences. We also examined children’s ability to report their political affiliation, whether their political affiliation matched their parents’, how accurate they are at reporting their parents’ political affiliations, and whether having parent–child conversations about politics predicted children’s political affiliation and social preferences. We found that children as young as 6 years of age showed ingroup preferences for individuals who shared their own or their parents’ political affiliations -- especially based on support for presidential candidates. Notably, even if children could not report their own presidential candidate choice or were inaccurate at predicting their parents’ presidential candidate choice, children still preferred people who supported the same presidential candidate as their parents. Further, children who had conversations with their parents about politics were more likely to prefer people who matched their parents’ political affiliations. This study provides the first empirical evidence that 6- to 12-year-old children are using political markers to form ingroup preferences and show rudimentary forms of political partisanship.
Believing What Politicians Communicate: Ideological Presentation of Self and Voters’ Perceptions of Politician Ideology
Hans Hassell, Michael Heseltine & Kevin Reuning
British Journal of Political Science, October 2025
Abstract:
Politicians’ presentation of self is central to election efforts. For these efforts to be successful, they need voters to receive and believe the messages they communicate. We examine the relationship between politicians’ communications and voters’ perceptions of their ideology. Using the content of politicians’ ideological presentation of self through social media communications, we create a measure of messaging ideology for all congressional candidates between 2018 and 2022 and all congressional officeholders between 2012 and 2022 along with voter perceptions of candidate ideology during the same time period. Using these measures, our work shows voters’ perceptions of candidate ideology are strongly related to messaging, even after controlling for incumbent voting behavior. We also examine how the relationship between politician messaging and voter perceptions changes relative to other information about the politician and in different electoral contexts. On the whole, voters’ perceptions of candidate ideology are strongly correlated with politician communications.
The persistence of cross-cutting discussion in a politicized public sphere
Diana Mutz
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 21 October 2025
Abstract:
Although studies of Americans’ general discussant networks have been repeated over time, research that assesses change in the nature of Americans’ political discussion networks has yet to be conducted in nationally representative probability surveys. In this study I answer two questions about the quality of the American public sphere that have generated widespread speculation, but little evidence to date. First, how have Americans’ political discussion networks changed over the past 25 y? Second, are the consequences of these changes what one would expect based on previous theory linking Americans’ interpersonal information environments to political tolerance and political participation? I resolve competing claims suggesting that people feel less free to discuss politics, with claims suggesting instead that political discussion now permeates everyday life to a greater extent than in the past. Findings suggest widespread increases in political discussion, changes driven almost entirely by increases in like-minded political discussion partners. Surprisingly, Americans are no more or less likely to engage in conversations across lines of political difference. The predicted consequences of these fluctuations confirm an intrinsic tension between characteristics valued in democratic citizens. Political tolerance has declined significantly, along with decreased awareness of rationales for others’ relative to one’s own views. Political participation is significantly higher on average than 25 y ago. Few people reported engaging with online political discussants, despite efforts to make sure they were included in network measures.
Politics at the dinner table: Thanksgiving and social influences on political polarization
Kirsten Cornelson
Economic Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can socializing with people who disagree with you change your opinions, and reduce political polarization? I answer this question using a shock that induces us to socialize and discuss politics with a more ideologically diverse set of people: Thanksgiving. Using a sample of American and Canadian survey respondents, I show that people converge towards their families’ viewpoints in the week after Thanksgiving, and that this significantly reduces opinion polarization. People with very left-wing family move about 11% of a standard deviation to the left in the week of Thanksgiving, with a slightly larger response in the opposite direction for people with very right-wing family. The probability of having a centrist opinion rises by 3.9% just after Thanksgiving. There are no significant effects on affective polarization. The effects are short lived in this setting, but provide novel quasi-experimental evidence on how real-life interactions can alleviate “echo-chamber effects.”
Perceiving opponents as self-disclosing bridges partisan divides
Emily Kubin, Peter Luca Versteegen & Kurt Gray
Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, November 2025, Pages 3316-3343
Abstract:
Political polarization is driving disconnection and animosity between opponents in the United States. We propose perceiving opponents as self-disclosing helps foster connection and reduce animosity. Building on research demonstrating that self-disclosure fosters interpersonal relationships, we test whether vignettes expressing political views that seem self-disclosing increase connection, respect, and willingness to interact among opponents. Across six studies, we demonstrate self-disclosure reduces partisan animosity by building connection between political opponents. Previous work shows that vignettes about opponents’ personal experiences bridge divides better than fact-based vignettes. The results from the current research suggest this is because experiences are especially self-disclosing. Leveraging this, we find that many statements partisans share can improve connection and reduce animosity when they are perceived as self-disclosing. We test this through manipulating the self-disclosure of statements in experiments and by teaching people how to make their statements more self-disclosing. Results indicate self-disclosure is consistently effective for liberal and moderate partisans but in many cases are also effective for conservatives. By highlighting the power of self-disclosure, our findings offer a promising path toward bridging partisan divides.
Facts over partisanship: Evidence-based updating of trust in partisan sources
Giannis Lois, Elias Tsakas & Arno Riedl
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
A prominent explanation for the proliferation of political misinformation and the growing belief polarization is that people engage in motivated reasoning to affirm their ideology and to protect their political identities. An alternative explanation is that people seek the truth but use partisanship as a heuristic to discern credible from dubious sources of political information. In three experiments, we test these competing explanations in a dynamic setting where participants are repeatedly exposed to messages from ingroup or outgroup partisan sources and can learn which source is reliable based on external feedback. Participants initially showed a partisan bias as they incorporated information from ingroup sources more than from outgroup sources. This pattern was stronger among partisans that displayed high affective polarization. With experience, this partisan bias declined or even changed direction, as supporters of both groups gradually incorporated information from reliable sources more than unreliable sources irrespective of the source’s partisanship. Importantly, the content of the shared information (i.e., neutral vs. political), the presence of partisan sources as opposed to neutral sources and the presence of external monetary accuracy incentives did not affect the learning process indicating the presence of strong internal accuracy motives. In contrast, increased uncertainty regarding source reliability undermined the learning process. These findings demonstrate that partisans follow Bayesian learning dynamics. Although participants initially display a partisan bias in the incorporation of information, they overcome this bias in the presence of external feedback and learn to trust credible sources irrespective of partisanship.