News of the World
Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?
Kyungwon Suh
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
The nuclear competition school, an emerging theoretical perspective on the political effect of nuclear weapons, argues that a favorable nuclear balance can significantly reduce one's expected costs of nuclear war and therefore affect the interaction between nuclear-armed states, such as deterrence and crisis outcomes. This new perspective also presents a wide array of empirical evidence demonstrating the significant effect of the nuclear balance of power on political outcomes, thereby challenging the theory of the nuclear revolution, which argues that the nuclear balance of power produces no meaningful effects on political outcomes because no state can escape costly nuclear destruction. Little attention, however, has been paid to systematically exploring the effect of the nuclear balance on the initiation of nuclear crises. This is surprising, given that observable factors, such as the nuclear balance, should have a powerful effect at the crisis initiation stage because countries can observe military balance and assess the costs and benefits of entering a crisis. This article tests a core argument of the nuclear competition school regarding the effect of the nuclear balance on the initiation of nuclear crises. With original data on strategic nuclear balance, my statistical analysis shows that having a superior nuclear arsenal than another nuclear-armed opponent does not lead to a reduced likelihood of nuclear crisis initiated by the opponent. These core findings hold after conducting a series of robustness tests with various measures of the balance of nuclear forces. They encourage us to reconsider the persuasiveness of the nuclear competition school and offer implications for US nuclear policy and force size.
Pier Competitor: China's Power Position in Global Ports
Isaac Kardon & Wendy Leutert
International Security, Spring 2022, Pages 9-47
Abstract:
China is a leader in the global transportation industry, with an especially significant position in ocean ports. A mapping of every ocean port outside of China reveals that Chinese firms own or operate terminal assets in ninety-six ports in fifty-three countries. An original dataset of Chinese firms' overseas port holdings documents the geographic distribution, ownership, and operational characteristics of these ports. What are the international security implications of China's global port expansion? An investigation of Chinese firms' ties to the Party-state reveals multiple mechanisms by which the Chinese leadership may direct the use of commercial port assets for strategic purposes. International port terminals that Chinese firms own and operate already provide dual-use capabilities to the People's Liberation Army during peacetime, establishing logistics and intelligence networks that materially enable China to project power into critical regions worldwide. But this form of networked state power is limited in wartime because it depends on commercial facilities in non-allied states. By providing evidence that overseas bases are not the sole index of global power projection capabilities, findings advance research on the identification and measurement of sources of national power. China's leveraging of PRC firms' transnational commercial port network constitutes an underappreciated but consequential form of state power projection.
Public Opinion and Impression Management in the Communication of Performance During the Second Iraq War
Pino Audia, Horacio Rousseau & Mary Kate Stimmler
Organization Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although studies show that organizations engaged in controversial actions often aim to minimize the release of threatening information, scholars know relatively little about what may prompt organizations to increase transparency in these situations. In this study, we focus on support from public opinion as a condition that may influence the disclosure of sensitive performance information to the public. Using the second Iraq War as an empirical context, we focus on the extent to which public officials-Pentagon spokespersons-release and frame information about war performance. This outcome is critical because the way in which organizations communicate their performance to outsiders has often been regarded as a key defensive impression management tactic. We hypothesize that high public support for the war will increase the likelihood that Pentagon officials release information about sensitive combat performance indicators in their press briefings and identify contingencies, such as adversity and organizational spokespersons' power, that moderate this relationship. We also explore whether high public support decreases the strategic use of alternate performance frames that emphasize metrics that signal progress toward a desirable end state. Using a unique data set based on the coding of press briefings, public opinion data, and other public sources, we find support for several of our hypotheses. We discuss implications for understanding the relationship between public opinion and impression management and highlight the importance of extending this research to nongovernmental organizations.
Does the International Criminal Court Target the American Military?
Daniel Krcmaric
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
American policymakers have been wary of the International Criminal Court (ICC) since its founding. United States' opposition is largely due to the fear that the ICC might initiate biased investigations that target members of the American military scattered across the globe. The recent ICC investigation into war crimes committed on Afghanistan's territory during the American occupation has produced a new surge of interest in this topic. But do ICC investigations, in fact, target America's military? Using a global sample of cases the ICC could plausibly investigate and data on the locations of all US foreign military installations, I examine how the presence of American troops in a country affects the likelihood of an ICC investigation. Contrary to the common narrative of anti-American bias, the estimated effects of US military presence are statistically indistinguishable from zero and substantively negligible. These results highlight the need to rethink America's combative approach to the ICC.
Travel to and from the United States and Foreign Leader Approval
Jeffrey Cohen
Presidential Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
A growing literature examines the motivations and outcomes of high-level public diplomacy, the international visits of top-level leaders. That literature looks primarily at the impact of visits from major leaders, like U.S. presidents, on their approval from voters in the host country. This article asks, instead, whether visits to and from the United States can affect the approval of the foreign leader among their voters back home. Using monthly data from the Executive Approval Project for 32 nations from 1991 to 2020, results suggest that foreign leader travel to the United States improves their approval, but neither presidential nor secretary of state visits impact foreign leader approval.
Restitution or Retribution? Detainee Payments and Insurgent Violence
Christopher Blair
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Counterinsurgents frequently rely on mass arrests to impede rebel operations, but in so doing, risk detaining innocent civilians. Wrongful detention can backfire, fueling insurgent violence by alienating detainees and their kin. Can counterinsurgents mitigate wrongful detention through targeted compensation? I study this question using project-level data on US payments to individuals deemed innocent and released from Coalition custody in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in the allocation of detainee release payments, I document a robust, negative association between counterinsurgent compensation for wrongful detention and insurgent violence. The violence-reducing effects of detainee release payments were greatest in Sunni and mixed sectarian areas; for the types of insurgent attacks, most prone to civilian informing; and when detainee release was complemented by other population-centric reforms. These results suggest that post-harm mitigation helps shift civilian perceptions, inducing civilians to share more information with counterinsurgent forces.
Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict
Renanah Miles Joyce
International Security, Spring 2022, Pages 48-90
Abstract:
The United States regularly seeks to promote the liberal norms of respect for human rights and deference to civilian authority in the militaries that it trains. Yet norm-abiding behavior often does not follow from liberal foreign military training. Existing explanations ascribe norm violations either to insufficient socialization or to interest misalignment between providers and recipients. One reason violations occur is because liberal training imparts conflicting norms. How do militaries respond when they confront the dilemma of conflict between the liberal norms of respect for human rights and civilian control of the military? The U.S. policy expectation is that trained militaries will prioritize human rights over obedience to civilian authorities. But when liberal norms clash, soldiers fall back on a third norm of cohesion, which refers to the bonds that enable military forces to operate in a unified, group- and mission-oriented way. Cohesion functions as both a military norm (particularly at the individual level) and an interest (particularly at the institutional level). If a military prioritizes cohesion, then it will choose the path that best serves its organization, which may entail violating human rights, civilian control, or both. An exploration of the effects of norm conflict on military attitudes among the Armed Forces of Liberia uses an experiment embedded in a survey to probe the theory. Results provide preliminary evidence that norm conflict weakens support for human rights and democracy. Results are strongest among soldiers with more U.S. training.
Norm Diffusion through US Military Training in Tunisia
Sharan Grewal
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Proponents claim that US military training diffuses norms of democracy and civilian control into foreign militaries. I argue that foreign trainees are likely to absorb the United States' entire pattern of civil-military relations, including the more political trends that have emerged in recent decades, such as military personnel identifying with and voting for political parties, and serving in senior positions in government upon retirement. Through interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel, I show that US trainees are more supportive than French trainees of active-duty personnel voting and of retired officers serving as president and defense minister. The diffusion of these more political attitudes to foreign trainees may help explain why US military training does not uniformly correlate with apolitical behavior.
Peaceful Neighborhoods and Democratic Differences
Mark Nieman & Douglas Gibler
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Democracies are thought to behave differently than other states, particularly when cooperating in international institutions, such as alliances. We contend, however, that these democratic differences largely depend upon geopolitical environments that make cooperation possible. Though studies have demonstrated endogeneity between democracy and peace, few analyze the effects of this joint relationship on democratic differences in cooperative foreign policy behavior. We explore this argument using the alliance literature. We argue that the empirical finding that democracies are more reliable alliance partners is driven by the tendency of democracies to cluster in peaceful environments. Alliances are more likely to be "scraps of paper" when found in more dangerous environments. By jointly modeling regime type and political environment using data on alliance termination from 1920-2001, we show that alliance reliability is a function of the latter rather than the former. Our argument has important ramifications for a host of literatures focused on regime type, as well as current debates over the effectiveness of democratic deterrence.
A certain gamble: Institutional change, leader turnover, and their effect on rivalry termination
Richard Saunders
Conflict Management and Peace Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous research shows that leader turnover and change in a leader's winning coalition are associated with rivalry termination. However, this research often conflates change in leadership or winning coalition with more fundamental reform of the institutions governing the state. This article argues that only changes in a rival's governing institutions should lead to rivalry termination. Changes in leader preferences may lead to conciliatory policies, but provide no certainty regarding the sincerity or longevity of these policies. Fundamental changes to the institutions of a state alter the menu of policy options available to the leadership and are difficult to undo. Institutional reform in Rival A makes the leadership of Rival B more willing to undertake potentially risky cooperative action, leading to rivalry termination. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry terminations spanning 1919-2010, finding that institutional reform in one rival leads to an increase in the likelihood of rivalry termination regardless of the issues of contention. Irregular leader turnover and change in a state's winning coalition have no effect. Further, in a break with previous research, I find that any institutional reform - toward autocracy, toward democracy or laterally - is associated with an increased likelihood of rivalry termination.