Mindset
A strategic mindset: An orientation toward strategic behavior during goal pursuit
Patricia Chen et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many attractive jobs in today’s world require people to take on new challenges and figure out how to master them. As with any challenging goal, this involves systematic strategy use. Here we ask: Why are some people more likely to take a strategic stance toward their goals, and can this tendency be cultivated? To address these questions, we introduce the idea of a domain-general “strategic mindset.” This mindset involves asking oneself strategy-eliciting questions, such as “What can I do to help myself?”, “How else can I do this?”, or “Is there a way to do this even better?”, in the face of challenges or insufficient progress. In three studies (n = 864), people who scored higher on (or were primed with) a strategic mindset reported using more metacognitive strategies; in turn, they obtained higher college grade point averages (GPAs) (Study 1); reported greater progress toward their professional, educational, health, and fitness goals (Study 2); and responded to a challenging timed laboratory task by practicing it more and performing it faster (Study 3). We differentiated a strategic mindset from general self-efficacy, self-control, grit, and growth mindsets and showed that it explained unique variance in people’s use of metacognitive strategies. These findings suggest that being strategic entails more than just having specific metacognitive skills — it appears to also entail an orientation toward seeking and employing them.
Why are consistently-handed individuals more authoritarian? The role of need for cognitive closure
Keith Lyle & Michael Grillo
Laterality: Asymmetries of Brain, Behaviour, and Cognition, June 2020, Pages 490-510
Abstract:
Recent studies indicate that individuals with consistent hand preference are more authoritarian than individuals whose preference is relatively inconsistent. We explored the role of epistemic needs in the handedness-authoritarianism relationship. Based on findings that consistent individuals are less cognitively flexible than inconsistent individuals, we hypothesized that consistent-handers would report greater need for definite knowledge. To measure this, we administered the revised Need for Cognitive Closure scale to a sample of undergraduates (N = 235), along with measures of handedness consistency and authoritarian submission. Consistent individuals scored significantly higher on authoritarian submission and need for closure. Need for closure fully mediated the relationship between consistency and submission. Consistent individuals also expressed greater prejudice against authoritarian out-groups such as immigrants and liberals. This effect was partially mediated by authoritarian submission. We theorize that consistent-handers’ cognitive inflexibility leads them to covet definite knowledge. These individuals turn to authoritarianism because it promises to stifle dissent and protect existing (conventional) knowledge.
Paranoia as a deficit in non-social belief updating
Erin Reed et al.
eLife, May 2020
Abstract:
Paranoia is the belief that harm is intended by others. It may arise from selective pressures to infer and avoid social threats, particularly in ambiguous or changing circumstances. We propose that uncertainty may be sufficient to elicit learning differences in paranoid individuals, without social threat. We used reversal learning behavior and computational modeling to estimate belief updating across individuals with and without mental illness, online participants, and rats chronically exposed to methamphetamine, an elicitor of paranoia in humans. Paranoia is associated with a stronger prior on volatility, accompanied by elevated sensitivity to perceived changes in the task environment. Methamphetamine exposure in rats recapitulates this impaired uncertainty-driven belief updating and rigid anticipation of a volatile environment. Our work provides evidence of fundamental, domain-general learning differences in paranoid individuals. This paradigm enables further assessment of the interplay between uncertainty and belief-updating across individuals and species.
Consistency just feels right: Procedural fluency increases confidence in performance
Elanor Williams, Kristen Duke & David Dunning
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Incidental features of a stimulus can increase how easily it is processed, which can then increase confidence in task performance. Here, we examine the impact of fluency stemming from procedural features embedded in a task rather than in the features of a stimulus. We propose that manipulating the consistency of procedural features over a series of stimuli can produce procedural fluency, a metacognitive sense of ease in processing that can inflate confidence without boosting accuracy. That is, even superficial consistency within a task can lead people to inaccurately believe they are performing better. As with fluency derived from features of individual stimuli, drawing attention to procedural consistency leads people to discount it, attenuating its impact on confidence. Further, the influence of procedural fluency on confidence relies on individuals’ naïve theories about what fluency signals about their performance. Accordingly, manipulating these naïve theories mitigates the effects of procedural fluency on confidence.
Neural Representations of Procedural Knowledge
Robert Mason & Marcel Adam Just
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although declarative concepts (e.g., apple) have been shown to be identifiable from their functional MRI (fMRI) signatures, the correspondence has yet to be established for executing a complex procedure such as tying a knot. In this study, 7 participants were trained to tie seven knots. Their neural representations of these seven procedures were assessed with fMRI as they imagined tying each knot. A subset of the trained participants physically tied each knot in a later fMRI session. Findings demonstrated that procedural knowledge of tying a particular knot can be reliably identified from its fMRI signature, and such procedural signatures were found here in frontal, parietal, motor, and cerebellar regions. In addition, a classifier trained on mental tying signatures was able to reliably identify when participants were planning to tie knots before they physically tied them, which suggests that the mental-tying and physical-tying procedural signatures are similar. These findings indicate that fMRI activation patterns can illuminate the representation and organization of procedural knowledge.