Martial Arts
Opening up Military Innovation: Causal Effects of Reforms to U.S. Defense Research
Sabrina Howell et al.
Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
For governments procuring innovation, one choice is whether to specify desired products (a "Conventional" approach) or allow firms to suggest ideas (an "Open" approach). Using a U.S. Air Force R&D grant program, where Open and Conventional competitions were held simultaneously, we find that Open awards increase both commercial innovation and technology adoption by the military. In contrast, Conventional awards have no positive effects on new technology, but do create more program lock-in. We present evidence that openness matters independently from inducing differential selection, for example of less well-established firms. These results suggest benefits from open approaches to innovation procurement.
Public and expert preferences in survey experiments in foreign policy: Evidence from parallel conjoint analyses
Melle Scholten & Kirill Zhirkov
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
The boom in survey experiments in international relations has allowed researchers to make causal inferences on longstanding foreign policy debates such as democratic peace, and audience costs. However, most of these experiments rely on mass samples, whereas foreign policy is arguably more technocratically driven. We probe the validity of generalizing from mass to elite preferences by exploring preferences of ordinary U.S. citizens and foreign policy experts (employees of the U.S. Department of State) in two identical conjoint experiments on democratic peace. We find that experts are not only more opposed to military actions against other democracies than members of the public -- but also that overall preferences about the matters of war and peace are stronger among foreign policy professionals.
The Politics of Promotion in China's Foreign Policy Bureaucracy
Tyler Jost & Yucong Li
China Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
A robust literature on the professional advancement of Chinese officials has paid comparatively little attention to an important elite group: the foreign policy bureaucracy. We introduce original data documenting over 11,000 career assignments of 1,357 senior officials in the foreign ministry from 1949 to 2023 and leverage these data to offer the first systematic analysis of who rises to the top of China's foreign affairs system. We find that diplomats who spend a greater share of their careers in postings abroad are less likely to be promoted to higher ranks than diplomats who remain at home -- and that these patterns persisted even after the professionalization of the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the analysis finds only mixed evidence that diplomatic performance assists promotion. The data and analysis draw attention to the unique challenges of professional advancement in bureaucracies charged with managing China's foreign relations.
Conflicts that Leave Something to Chance
Peter Schram
International Organization, Spring 2025, Pages 199-232
Abstract:
The development of nuclear weapons added a new dimension to conventional conflict: the possibility that it could inadvertently escalate into a nuclear exchange. How does this relationship between conventional war and nuclear escalation shape deterrence? I present a formal model of deterrence and arming. The novelty here is that investing in conventional capabilities has a direct effect on the balance of power but also an indirect effect on conflict duration and the likelihood of an accidental nuclear exchange. I find that accounting for the risk of nuclear escalation may require greater conventional force postures for deterrence, thus lowering welfare in the absence of nuclear war. I also find the nuclear era will be more peaceful, but when conflicts occur, they may be more aggressive and decisive. These results (and others) offer insight into the difficulty of substituting nuclear weapons for conventional arms, and into the Soviet response to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
Democratic victory and war duration: Why are democracies less likely to win long wars?
Keisuke Nakao
Conflict Management and Peace Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The probability of democracies winning wars appears negatively associated with the duration of wars. This relationship might be explained by two contrasting mechanisms besides the selection effect. According to one mechanism, democracies require a long time to reach a surrender decision, because they face audience costs if they break a prewar commitment hastily. The other mechanism suggests that democracies are less likely to win prolonged wars, because their battlefield effectiveness declines over time. To explore these ideas, we develop game-theoretic models of war incorporating democratic citizens and soldiers. Although the two mechanisms diametrically differ in their logic, the models based on them yield similar predictions about military-strategy choices. These predictions are consistent with empirical findings indicating that while democracies increase their likelihood of victory through maneuver strategies, autocracies display mixed incentives between maneuver and attrition strategies. These results suggest that both mechanisms may influence how democracies conduct wars.
Frontline Leadership: Evidence from American Civil War Captains
Andreas Ferrara, Christian Dippel & Stephan Heblich
NBER Working Paper, July 2025
Abstract:
This paper presents new evidence on the critical role of lower-level organizational leaders. Unlike top managers, frontline leaders are essential for implementing organizational strategies by maintaining team cohesion when shirking is profitable for workers. We study this in the context of the Union Army during the U.S. Civil War, using data on 2.2 million soldiers and tracking captains and their 100-soldier companies at weekly frequency throughout the conflict. We estimate leader fixed effects during non-combat weeks to measure leadership quality in a leader value-added framework. We validate this measure by showing that captains were not assigned based on prior unit performance or observable pre-war characteristics. High-quality leaders earned more after the war, but not before, and were more frequently recognized as good leaders in their postwar biographies. Daily event-study estimates around major battles show that better captains significantly reduced desertions in combat. Exploiting quasi-random leader turnover, we find evidence that this effect is causal. Using digitized battle maps, we rule out risk aversion as a mechanism and find instead that better leaders had higher mortality rates, consistent with a leading-by-example explanation. We also document modest learning-by-doing effects. These findings highlight the often-overlooked importance of frontline leadership, where direct supervision and interpersonal influence are strongest.
Racial Bias and Public Support for US Drone Strikes
Paul Lushenko, Keith Carter & Srinjoy Bose
Security Studies, April-May 2025, Pages 228-260
Abstract:
Critics argue that public support for US drone strikes is racially biased. We assess this claim by fielding two separate image-based survey experiments among representative samples of Americans. These studies isolate the effect of two mechanisms that scholars argue can shape racial preferences for strikes -- targets' skin color and location. Our analysis of the data reveals three key findings. First, public support for US drone strikes is not shaped by targets' skin color, though Americans may interpret targets' location as a proxy for their race. Second, Americans with racist worldviews are more likely to support drone strikes regardless of targets' skin color and location. Third, Americans draw on myriad considerations in forming their attitudes of support for drone strikes, which are not reducible to targets' race. These findings provide the first experimental evidence for public support toward US drone strikes in terms of race and have important policy and research implications.
Apology Diplomacy: The International Image Effects of Interstate Apologies
Michaela Mattes & Jessica Weeks
International Organization, Spring 2025, Pages 306-331
Abstract:
Can states improve their international image by apologizing for past wrongs, or do apologies hurt countries' reputations? We argue that apologizing can boost a country's international image by providing reassurance about future behavior and conveying appropriate values. Yet apologies could also signal weakness, and their international effects could depend on reactions in the sending and receiving countries. To test these arguments, we pair large-scale US-based survey experiments involving Russia's invasion of Ukraine with the historical case of Germany's 1951 Holocaust apology. In our experiments, respondents learned whether a foreign state apologized for past offenses, how the target of the apology responded, whether key domestic groups in the sender opposed the apology, and whether the sender was democratic or not. We found that apologies boosted foreign favorability and willingness to cooperate, and did not indicate weakness. These effects persisted even if the target rejected the apology or the apology provoked backlash inside the sender, and did not depend on whether the sender was described as democratic. The case of Germany's 1951 Holocaust apology corroborates these patterns. Together, our findings suggest that apologies may be a powerful tool of public diplomacy.