Knowledge of Good and Evil
Tensions within and between vegans and vegetarians: Meat-free motivations matter
Cara MacInnis & Gordon Hodson
Appetite, forthcoming
Abstract:
Under the superordinate umbrella of “veg*n”, vegans and vegetarians share a disavowal of meat consumption but differ regarding the use of animal products and by-products. Furthermore, within each subgroup there exist multiple motivations (or reasons) for diet choice, some with more moral overtones than others. Despite being on the same “team” relative to the meat-eating majority, there is tremendous potential for expressions of subgroup distinctiveness and tension. In an online sample of veg*ns, we asked participants to report on views of and experiences with veg*ns, including separately evaluating vegans and vegetarians for animal, environmental, health, or religious reasons (i.e., 8 groups). Overall vegan (vs. vegetarian) participants expressed more subgroup bias, with vegans consistently preferred over vegetarians. Both vegans and vegetarians preferred veg*ns with “ethical” motivations (animal or environmental), and reported negative experiences with their subgroup outgroups (i.e., vegetarians and vegans, respectively). Problematically, in terms of group cohesion, vegetarians reported elevated anxiety and vigilance in their interactions with animal vegans especially. Overall the results suggest that, despite sharing a superordinate category and goal, and despite recent calls for veg*nism to become a more inclusive and wider tent, substantial tensions exist that can disrupt group cohesion and productivity.
Feelings of Culpability: Just Following Orders Versus Making the Decision Oneself
Maayan Malter, Sonia Kim & Janet Metcalfe
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In five experiments (N = 1,490), participants were asked to imagine themselves as programmers of self-driving cars who had to decide how to program the car to respond in a potential accident: spare the driver or spare pedestrians. Alternatively, participants imagined that they were a mayor grappling with difficult moral dilemmas concerning COVID-19. Either they, themselves, had to decide how to program the car or which COVID-19 policy to implement (high-agency condition) or they were told by their superior how to act (low-agency condition). After learning that a tragic outcome occurred because of their action, participants reported their felt culpability. Although we expected people to feel less culpable about the outcome if they acted in accordance with their superior’s injunction than if they made the decision themselves, participants actually felt more culpable when they followed their superior’s order. Some possible reasons for this counterintuitive finding are discussed.
Two-Sided Messages Promote Openness for Morally Based Attitudes
Mengran Xu & Richard Petty
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research demonstrates that two- versus one-sided counterattitudinal messages can encourage people with a strong moral basis for their attitudes to be more open to contrary positions. Studies 1A/B demonstrated that the interaction between moral basis and message sidedness was present not just for a controversial issue with balanced views in society but also for a topic with a majority opinion. In Study 2, the relative effectiveness of two- over one-sided messages for people with a moral attitude basis was shown to occur only when the two-sided message respectfully acknowledged the recipient’s side. In Study 3, the effect was replicated in a preregistered experiment. Furthermore, moral bases provided unique predictive power beyond alternative attitude strength indicators. Across all studies, perceived appreciation of the speaker acknowledging the recipient’s view mediated the impact of the independent variables on openness.
More threatening and more diagnostic: How moral comparisons differ from social comparisons
Alexandra Fleischmann et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The current research tests how comparisons in the moral domain differ from other social comparisons in three ways. First, an initial experience-sampling study shows that people compare downward more strongly in the moral domain than in most other domains (Study 1, N = 454), because people like to feel moral and present themselves as moral. Second, the classic threat principle of social comparison holds that people choose downward comparisons to improve their well-being after a threat to their self-esteem. We propose that in the moral domain the threat principle is intensified because morality is a uniquely important and central comparison domain. Across seven experiments (Experiments 2a and 2b, 3a–3c, 4a and 4b), we find that people search for downward comparisons much more than in other domains. This effect is so strong that people are willing to forgo money and incur time costs to avoid upward moral comparisons when threatened. Third, another classic principle of social comparison holds that people only consider comparisons that are diagnostic (i.e., close or similar) and therefore self-relevant, while dismissing extreme or dissimilar comparisons as irrelevant. We propose that this diagnosticity principle is attenuated because morality is a binding code that applies equally to all humans. Across four experiments (Experiments 5a and 5b, 6a and 6b), we find that even the most extreme and dissimilar moral (but not other) comparisons are deemed relevant and potentially threatening. Together, these twelve studies (total N = 5,543) demonstrate how moral comparisons are a ubiquitous but fundamentally distinct form of social comparison with altered basic principles.
Following Your Group or Your Morals? The In-Group Promotes Immoral Behavior While the Out-Group Buffers Against It
Marc-Lluís Vives, Mina Cikara & Oriel FeldmanHall
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
People learn by observing others, albeit not uniformly. Witnessing an immoral behavior causes observers to commit immoral actions, especially when the perpetrator is part of the in-group. Does conformist behavior hold when observing the out-group? We conducted three experiments (N = 1,358) exploring how observing an (im)moral in-/out-group member changed decisions relating to justice: punitive, selfish, or dishonest choices. Only immoral in-groups increased immoral actions, while the same immoral behavior from out-groups had no effect (Experiments 1 & 2). In contrast, a compassionate or generous individual did not make people more moral, regardless of group membership (Experiments 1 & 2). When there was a loophole to deny cheating (Experiment 3), neither an immoral in-/out-group member changed dishonest behavior. Compared to observing an honest in-group member, people become more honest themselves after observing an honest out-group member, revealing that out-groups can enhance morality. Depending on the severity of the moral action, the in-group licenses immoral behavior while the out-group buffers against it.
Social mindfulness is normative when costs are low, but rapidly declines with increases in costs
Christoph Engel & Paul Van Lange
Judgment and Decision Making, March 2021, Pages 290–322
Abstract:
As a complement to high-cost cooperation as assessed in economic games, the concept of social mindfulness focuses on low-cost acts of kindness. While social mindfulness seems quite natural, performed by many most of the time (reaching a level of 60–70 percent), what happens if such acts become more costly, and if costs become more salient? The present research replicates the prevalence of social mindfulness when costs are salient, but low. Yet we show that, with small increments in costs, the vast majority no longer exhibits social mindfulness. This holds even if we keep the outcomes for self high in comparison with the beneficiary. We conclude that the literature on social mindfulness should pay attention to cost. Clearly, if being socially mindful comes with high costs, this is not what most people are prepared to do. In contrast as long as costs are low and not salient, social mindfulness seems natural and normative.
Better to give than reciprocate? Status and reciprocity in prosocial exchange
Francis Flynn & Alisa Yu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Reciprocity implies equality in the giving and receiving of benefits. However, we find that reciprocity does not generate equal benefits, in terms of social status. Instead, across 7 studies (N = 3,426), observers conferred more status to individuals who initiated (i.e., initiators) than individuals who reciprocated (i.e., reciprocators) identical prosocial acts. Further, choosing not to reciprocate a prosocial act led to a more severe status penalty than choosing not to initiate a prosocial act. We find this discounting of reciprocity is driven by perceived obligation — observers view reciprocators as acting under constraint. When reciprocation appears less obligatory (e.g., given indirectly, or privately), the status discount is mitigated. Finally, we show that the discounting of a reciprocal act can be enduring — reciprocators still received less status after 2 successive, counterbalanced rounds of exchange.
Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model
Dillon Luke & Bertram Gawronski
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.
The self and empathy: Lacking a clear and stable sense of self undermines empathy and helping behavior
Sonia Krol & Jennifer Bartz
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Empathy is fundamental to social functioning. Although empathy involves sharing the emotional experience of another, research also highlights the importance of distinguishing the self from the other for optimal empathic responding. Without adequate self–other distinction, sharing another person’s emotions can induce personal distress, a self-focused aversive reaction that often leads to withdrawing from the situation, rather than empathic concern, an other-oriented response of care. To date, no work has examined the psychological factors that might facilitate such self–other distinction in the context of empathy. We show that self-concept clarity (SCC), the extent to which the self is clearly defined, coherent, and temporally stable, predicts empathic responding. In Study 1 (N = 453, student sample), we show that low SCC is associated with more dispositional empathic personal distress and less empathic concern. We replicate these dispositional associations in Study 2 (N = 319, community sample) and, using Batson’s classic Katie Banks paradigm, show that these associations hold in an actual empathy-inducing situation. Moreover, in Study 2, SCC predicts helping behavior, an effect that is mediated by feelings of personal distress and empathic concern. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 658, community sample), we again use the Katie Banks paradigm but in an experimental framework; consistent with Study 2, state SCC predicts empathic personal distress, empathic concern and helping behavior. Our findings highlight the importance of a clear, coherent and stable self-concept for empathy, and suggest that interventions aimed at increasing empathy may be futile in the presence of a weak and unclear sense of self.
Perceived Physical Vulnerability Promotes Prosocial Behavior
Marina Motsenok, Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Our research examines the association between perceived physical vulnerability and prosocial behavior. Studies 1 to 4 establish a positive association between individuals’ vulnerability and their prosociality. To increase generality, these studies looked at different behaviors (volunteering vs. monetary donations), various physical harms (e.g., war vs. illness), and different samples (students vs. MTurk workers). Study 4 also provides initial evidence of a partial mediating effect of closeness on the observed association. In Study 5, perceived vulnerability is experimentally manipulated, demonstrating a causal link between vulnerability and willingness to donate. Study 6 further demonstrates that closeness partially mediates the association between vulnerability and donation, while ruling out an alternative explanation of the effect — such as that vulnerable people donate in expectation of future reciprocity. Together, our research demonstrates a consistent positive association between perceived physical vulnerability and prosociality. This effect appears small when considering daily threats and stronger when vulnerability becomes more salient.