Institutional Lockdown
Concede or Resist? Experimental Evidence on How Partisanship Shapes Local Officials' Responses to Preemption
Alexandra Artiles
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does partisanship shape local officials' opposition and resistance to state preemption? To answer this question, I report on two pre-post, between-subjects survey experiments and open-ended responses from more than 1,000 local government officers. Across both experiments, I find that local officials are substantially more opposed to preemption from an out-party state government and significantly more supportive of preemption from an in-party state government. Moreover, local officials are more (less) willing to take action to resist preemption -- including legal action, refusing to comply, initiating a resolution, and advocating for more autonomy -- when they learn that an out-party (in-party) state government is attempting preemption. The open-ended responses of local officials corroborate the results of the survey experiments. This research has important implications for state-local government relations and how elected governments represent their constituents in our federal system.
The Effect of Policy Traceability on Legislative Incentives
Matto Mildenberger & Alexander Sahn
Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 2025
Abstract:
Theories of legislative politics have long emphasized how a policy's traceability -- whether and how voters connect legislative action with policy effects -- shapes political incentives to legislate. Douglas Arnold emphasized how the "nature of the causal chain that links a policy instrument with its policy effects" structures the logic of congressional action. Despite its prominence, this key theoretical claim has received little empirical attention. In this article, we use two survey experiments to test how several policy attributes -- including traceability -- shape legislators and public policy preferences. We find that elites are responsive to both policy traceability and problem traceability -- whether a policy problem itself can be linked to elite actions. By contrast, prospective voters are indifferent to both forms of traceability. With respect to other policy attributes, elites and mass publics share similar preferences. Our results provide support for a previously untested theory of policymaking and describe the nature of strategic decision-making by legislators.
Diversity politics: The effects of elite rhetoric and issue racialization on support for descriptive representation
Nicole Huffman & Hannah Nam
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although the importance of diversity is hotly contested in U.S. politics, political parties have increasingly embraced descriptive representation as an important ideal. Indeed, in recent years both Democratic and Republican political leaders have even publicly committed to selecting underrepresented candidates for powerful roles. We examine how different types of elite rhetoric promoting racial diversity can influence evaluations of the government body, the selected candidate, and general efforts to diversify politics. With two survey experiments, we find that rhetoric emphasizing the value of diverse representation increases support for political representation of racialized minorities only when the policy domain itself is racialized. But when the policy is not racialized, even positive rhetoric about diverse representation has negative effects on evaluations of the selection process and candidate. Furthermore, leaders' commitment to select an underrepresented candidate has largely negative effects, regardless of policy racialization. This work holds important implications for how elite rhetoric can contribute to normative goals of increasing diverse political representation while minimizing undue negative evaluations of political leaders and institutional legitimacy.
Are People Willing to Trade Away Democracy for Desirable Outcomes? Experimental Evidence From Six Countries
Jonathan Chu, Scott Williamson & Eddy Yeung
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
To what extent do people prioritize living in a democracy over other indicators of good governance or personal well-being? This question has become contested as democracies come under pressure worldwide. We provide an answer through cross-national conjoint experiments in which survey respondents choose between hypothetical countries that differ in terms of societal-level attributes (e.g., elections, health care) and individual-level outcomes that the respondent would experience (e.g., wealth, minority status). People across Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Thailand, and the United States consistently prioritize living in a safe country with free and fair elections over other factors, including other components of democracy like civil liberties and checks and balances. Regarding tradeoffs, many people would forfeit democratic elections to avoid living in a dangerous society but not to obtain wealth and other goods. Electoral democracy is attractive globally but can be undermined by concerns about crime and safety.
Unexpected politics: Do interest rates influence lobbying expenditure?
Mitchell Harvey
Public Choice, October 2025, Pages 151-182
Abstract:
How do changing interest rates influence lobbying expenditure? I study a two-stage game consisting of a policy-maker and heterogeneous firms that produce partial substitutes. The policy-maker chooses whether to implement a reform that will raise production costs or maintain the status quo. Firms can allocate capital to lobbying the policymaker for their preferred outcome. After making lobbying contributions and observing the policy-maker's choice, firms compete to maximize profit. I study the relationship between interest rates and each firm's optimal lobbying expenditure. In an extension, I consider how the introduction of additional firms complicates the results. Regardless of conditions, I find that higher interest rates cause an increase in the share of total lobbying expenditure contributed by firms with a competitive advantage. Combining insights from prior research with my theoretical results, I hypothesize that firms who contribute a large share of aggregate lobbying expenditure will provide an even greater share in response to rising interest rates. Using firm level data, I present robust correlations consistent with my hypothesis. My findings reveal that interest rates may have an unexpected and complex impact on the nature and distribution of money in politics.
Institutional Structures and Judicial Legitimacy
Michael Nelson & James Gibson
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite high-profile arguments about the negative consequences of judicial elections for judicial legitimacy, empirical evidence is ambiguous, at best. Drawing on more than 28,000 survey responses, representative at the state level, we find no evidence that elected courts are less legitimate than appointed courts. To further explore this finding, we draw upon a survey of Wisconsin, a state that has experienced a large amount of politicized judicial campaigning. We demonstrate that citizens expect this type of activity in their elections, even though they say they dislike it. Then, we present new evidence on the causal effects of campaign activity on attitudes toward courts in this state. We demonstrate that, though citizens may believe that courts selected through expensive and negative elections are less fair, there is no evidence that they find elected courts to be less legitimate or worthy of compliance.
Systemic and Sequential Links Between Campaign Donations and Lobbying
In Song Kim, Jan Stuckatz & Lukas Wolters Freiheyt
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study the interconnectedness of campaign contributions and lobbying -- two distinct interest group activities often studied separately. We construct the most comprehensive dataset to date on the two linked political activities based on over 75 million US federal lobbying reports and campaign contribution records since 1999. To systematically analyze the interplay between campaign donations and lobbying, we compare future lobbying activities of firms that donated to a politician against a set of comparable firms with no donation history to the same politician. Our large-scale analysis demonstrates that special interest groups strategically donate to legislators who they anticipate will be involved in legislative activities pertinent to future lobbying objectives. Specifically, we find that previous donations are associated with an increase of 8-11 percentage points in the likelihood of the targeted politician's involvement in lobbied legislative bills. The estimated effects are large, increase over time, and are particularly pronounced for committee-related activities.
The Strategic Use of Bank Branches for Political Influence
Mihir Mehta, Allison Nicoletti & Wanli Zhao
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, July 2025
Abstract:
We document that highly scrutinized banks strategically establish new branches in the districts of House Financial Services Committee (HFSC) members immediately before elections. The effects persist after accounting for local economic conditions and bank-level factors. We do not find effects earlier in election years, after elections, during non-election years, or in the districts of powerful non-HFSC members. Following these strategic branch openings, affected HFSC members' districts experience relatively greater increases in credit access, and scrutinized banks are less likely to face enforcement by regulators overseen by the HFSC.
District Size and Proximity to the Pork Barrel in Congressional Elections
Brian Hamel & Lanie Richards
Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 2025
Abstract:
We propose that district size moderates the relationship between pork barrel spending and U.S. House election outcomes. Our argument is two-fold: (1) pork has a greater effect on citizens' lives -- and thus, their vote -- when allocated in geographic proximity to them; and (2) in smaller districts, pork projects are proximate for more people, increasing their reach and impact. We provide empirical support for our argument using a pre-registered survey experiment and observational data from two recent Congresses. Most notably, we find that earmarks are modestly associated with higher vote shares for the incumbent in smaller districts but make no electoral difference in larger districts. These results cannot be explained by other legislator and district characteristics. Our paper highlights how the physical characteristics of House districts can shape electoral accountability and offers a novel structural explanation for why decades of research have found almost no overall relationship between pork and votes.
Shining a Light on Firms' Political Connections: The Role of Dark Money
Matthew Denes & Madeline Marco Scanlon
Review of Corporate Finance Studies, November 2025, Pages 989-1023
Abstract:
We study the emergence of a new channel for firms' political activity using dark money through undisclosed and unlimited contributions. After the U.S. federal court decisions in 2010, S&P 500 firms substantially increased their use of dark money. We find that dark money contributions complement political engagement through campaign contributions and lobbying. Firms disclose dark money contributions when they face heightened nondisclosure costs. Firms contributing to dark money groups benefit by receiving more procurement contracts and increased government subsidies. Our findings highlight that political connections by firms are evolving and expanding through new and largely unexplored channels.