In power
The Myth of Democratic Recession
Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way
Journal of Democracy, January 2015, Pages 45-58
"There is little evidence that the democratic sky is falling or (depending on your choice of fable) that the wolf of authoritarian resurgence has arrived. The state of global democracy has remained stable over the last decade, and it has improved markedly relative to the 1990s. Perceptions of a democratic recession, we argue, are rooted in a flawed understanding of the events of the early 1990s. The excessive optimism and voluntarism that pervaded analyses of early post–Cold War transitions generated unrealistic expectations that, when not realized, gave rise to exaggerated pessimism and gloom. In fact, despite increasingly unfavorable global conditions in recent years, new democracies remain strikingly robust."
---------------------
The Inefficacy of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions
Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg
University of Chicago Working Paper, December 2014
Abstract:
The prohibition of torture is one of the most emblematic norms of the modern human rights movement, and its prevalence in national constitution has increased steeply in the past three decades. Yet little is known about whether constitutional torture prohibitions actually reduce torture. In this paper, we explore the relationship between constitutional torture prohibitions and torture by utilizing new data that corrects for biases in previous measures of torture, and a recently developed method that mitigates selection bias by incorporating information on countries’ constitutional commitments into our research design. Using this new data and method, as well as more conventional data sources and methods, we do not find any evidence that constitutional torture prohibitions have reduced rates of torture in a statistically significant or substantively meaningful way.
---------------------
Is Africa Different? Historical Conflict and State Development
Mark Dincecco, James Fenske & Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato
University of Michigan Working Paper, December 2014
Abstract:
We show that the long-run consequences of historical warfare are different for Sub-Saharan Africa than for the rest of the Old World. We identify the locations of over 1,750 conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe from 1400 to 1799. We find that historical warfare predicts greater state capacity today across the Old World, including in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no significant correlation between historical warfare and current civil conflicts across the rest of the Old World. However, this correlation is strong and positive in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, while a history of conflict predicts higher per capita GDP for the rest of the Old World, this positive consequence is overturned for Sub-Saharan Africa.
---------------------
Weathering unrest: The ecology of urban social disturbances in Africa and Asia
Adam Yeeles
Journal of Peace Research, March 2015, Pages 158-170
Abstract:
Over the last several years research has examined anew the potential for climate change to induce political conflict and potentiate social unrest. Several explanations for the relationship between weather and social unrest have been proposed, including the idea that temperature, acting through a physiological response mechanism, gives rise to collective aggression. This proposition first appeared in the aftermath of the 1960s US riots, which occurred primarily in the heat of summer, and has re-emerged within the contemporary literature on conflict and climate, in addition to explanations rooted in political economic processes. Building on both bodies of work, this article utilizes a case-crossover time-series design to explore the relationship between meteorological factors derived from high resolution spatial data of temperature and precipitation and social disturbances occurring in 50 major cities in Africa and Asia between 1960 and 2006. Poisson regression and generalized additive modeling are utilized to model linear and non-linear effects, respectively. A significant, but qualified, association between heat and urban social disturbances is found. The general relationship is non-linear, with peak levels of unrest occurring in the upper 20s (°C). The relationship between temperature and social unrest within individual cities is linear. In addition, there are differential effects of heat on lethal versus non-lethal episodes of unrest. The non-linear response to temperature is much more pronounced among lethal events than it is among non-lethal episodes. The conclusion taken from this research is that heat is associated with urban social conflict, but generally does not trigger episodes and instead acts to supplement aggression while other factors govern the primary timing of social unrest.
---------------------
The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia
Aisha Ahmad
International Security, Winter 2014/2015, Pages 89-117
Abstract:
In civil wars across the world, certain Islamist groups have competed exceptionally well against their rivals. The conventional wisdom points to either religion or ethnic politics to explain Islamist success. These ideological and identity-based explanations, however, tend to overlook the powerful economic influence that the local business class has over civil war outcomes. Civil war can be modeled as a market for security, wherein protection must be purchased from multiple substate rackets. Using this market model, a close investigation of the Somali case reveals why and under what conditions the interests of the profit-driven business class align with those of ideologically motivated Islamist groups. Security costs are of critical importance to businesses in a civil war, and Islamists are uniquely competitive in lowering these costs. The business-Islamist alliance is therefore driven by rational, economic considerations, which can contribute to the rise of Islamist power.
---------------------
Julia Bader
European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article investigates how China's economic cooperation affects authoritarian persistence elsewhere. For the period 1998–2008, the article assesses quantitatively whether the effects of economic cooperation from China vary, conditioned by the regime type of the recipient. The analysis finds that China's economic cooperation is associated with regime durability in party-based regimes. In non-party regimes, in contrast, it is associated with regime collapse.
---------------------
Matt Qvortrup
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can electoral reform lead to a reduction in the number of terrorist incidents? Economists have shown that the introduction of constitutional institutions such as courts in the early 18th century had a direct effect on investment. Could there be a similar link between the introduction of proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and a reduction in the number of terrorist attacks? Previous studies using cross sectional data have found a negative correlation between the presence of PR-electoral systems and the number of terrorist incidents. However, earlier studies were based on aggregate figures, not on time-series data. They did not provide a direction that could be used to measure the possible effect of the introduction of PR. This research note addresses this problem. Using a Pair Sampled t-test it is possible to show that the introduction of proportional representation in Northern Ireland and Algeria led to a marked reduction in the number of terrorist attacks. The note thus adds strength to earlier studies.
---------------------
Beyond Zeroes and Ones: The Intensity and Dynamics of Civil Conflict
Stephen Chaudoin, Zachary Peskowitz & Christopher Stanton
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is a tremendous amount of variation in conflict intensity both across and within civil conflicts. Some conflicts result in huge numbers of battle deaths, while others do not. Conflict intensity is also dynamic. Conflict intensity escalates, de-escalates, and persists. What explains this variation? We take one of the most prominent explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil conflict — variation in economic conditions — and apply it to the intensity and dynamics of civil conflict. Using an instrumental variables strategy and a rich set of empirical models, we find that the intensity of conflict is negatively related to per capita income. We also find that economic conditions affect conflict dynamics, as poorer countries are likely to experience longer and more intense spells of fighting after the onset of conflict.
---------------------
Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions
Clark Gibson, Barak Hoffman & Ryan Jablonski
World Development, April 2015, Pages 323–335
Abstract:
Did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in Africa in the 1990s? We argue that after the Cold War, donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages, improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats’ ability to use aid for patronage. To remain in power, autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents — from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections. We test our theory with panel data for all sub-Saharan African countries. While other factors played pivotal roles in Africa’s political liberalization, we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of Africa’s democratization.
---------------------
Economic Shocks, Civil War and Ethnicity
Thorsten Janus & Daniel Riera-Crichton
Journal of Development Economics, July 2015, Pages 32–44
Abstract:
Using a novel cross-country panel dataset, we show that commodity terms of trade declines cause civil war in countries with intermediate ethnic diversity. The civil war effects for highly diverse or homogenous societies are negative and insignificant. Since the size of the largest ethnic group explains 96% of the variation in the ethnic diversity measure, we conjecture that a key problem may be ethnic dominance: countries where the ethnic plurality is large, but not so large it cannot be challenged, may be most vulnerable to economic shocks. The findings may help to bridge the partly distinct literatures linking ethnicity and economic factors to conflict.
---------------------
The Democratic Window of Opportunity: Evidence from Riots in Sub-Saharan Africa
Toke Aidt & Gabriel Leon
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
We show that drought-induced changes in the intensity of riots lead to moves toward democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and that these changes are often a result of concessions made as a result of the riots. This provides evidence that low-intensity conflict can have a substantial short-run impact on democratic change and supports the “window of opportunity” hypothesis: droughts lead to an increase in the threat of conflict, and incumbents often respond by making democratic concessions.
---------------------
Remittances and Democratization
Abel Escribà-Folch, Covadonga Meseguer & Joseph Wright
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances — money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country — differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers. As a result, autocracies that rely heavily on the broad-based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party-based regimes, should prove especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence consistent with this argument suggests that remittances promote democratization in some dictatorships.
---------------------
Does Reform Prevent Rebellion? Evidence From Russia’s Emancipation of the Serfs
Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach & Tricia Olsen
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Contemporary models of political economy suggest that reforms intended to reduce grievances should curtail unrest, a perspective at odds with many traditional accounts of reform and rebellion. We explore the impact of reform on rebellion with a new data set on peasant disturbances in 19th-century Russia. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the timing of various peasant reforms, we document a large increase in disturbances among former serfs following the Emancipation Reform of 1861, a development counter to reformers’ intent. Our analysis suggests that this outcome was driven by peasants’ disappointment with the reform’s design and implementation — the consequence of elite capture in the context of a generally weak state — and heightened expectations of what could be achieved through coordinated action. Reform-related disturbances were most pronounced in provinces where commune organization facilitated collective action and where fertile soil provoked contestation over land.
---------------------
Avoiding Obligation: Reservations to Human Rights Treaties
Daniel Hill
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article examines the decisions of governments to enter reservations upon ratification of international human rights treaties. I argue that, in the context of the human rights regime, reservations are simply attempts to avoid international legal obligations where they would be consequential. I develop an explanation for their use that focuses on the following two factors: the legal constraints that already exist in domestic law and the likelihood that international agreements will be enforced by domestic courts. Using an original measure of domestic legal protection of civil, political, and personal integrity rights, I find evidence that governments are more likely to enter reservations when domestic legal standards are lax compared to those in the treaty and when judiciaries are likely to enforce treaty-based obligations. This suggests that full adoption of international human rights treaties is more likely when treaties will not create genuine domestic legal constraints and that explanations for treaty adoption and implementation must take reservations into account. It also suggests that adoption of international human rights law is best explained by the specific legal institutions that relate to domestic enforcement rather than broad distinctions between democratic/autocratic political institutions.
---------------------
Paul Poast & Johannes Urpelainen
World Politics, January 2015, Pages 72-113
Abstract:
International organizations can promote democratization, but how exactly do they achieve this goal? The authors argue that to evaluate the effect of international organizations on democratization, one must distinguish between the prevention of autocratic reversals and the promotion of democratic consolidation. While international organizations cannot directly prevent autocratic reversals in nonconsolidated democracies, they can, through capacity building, increase the likelihood that a transitional democracy consolidates. An empirical analysis of democratic transitions from 1965 to 2001 supports the hypothesis that international organizations promote democratic consolidation without deterring authoritarian reversals in nonconsolidated democracies. Moreover, the authors find that international organizations are most important for consolidating transitional democracies in the difficult circumstances created by a history of military dictatorship.
---------------------
Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders: Reassessing the “Democratic Advantage”
Matthew DiGiuseppe & Patrick Shea
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this article, we contend that the “democratic advantage” literature (i) exaggerates the potential political backlash from credit downgrades in democracies; and (ii) overlooks the importance of sovereign credit to nondemocratic leaders. We argue that nondemocratic regimes receive a higher marginal political benefit from credit compared to democratic regimes. Consequently, changes in credit prices or credit access affect nondemocratic leaders' tenure more than democratic leaders' tenure. To test this argument, we provide the first statistical examination of the electoral punishment mechanism of the “democratic advantage.” Our duration analysis shows that credit downgrades increase nondemocratic leaders' vulnerability more than that of their democratic peers. Our research reinforces the growing concerns about the conventional views about regime type, domestic constraints, and leaders' preferences toward sovereign credit and other political processes.