I can sense it
Positioning Rationality and Emotion: Rationality Is Up and Emotion Is Down
Luca Cian, Aradhna Krishna & Norbert Schwarz
Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Emotion and rationality are fundamental elements of human life. They are abstract concepts, often difficult to define and grasp. Thus, throughout the history of western society, the head and the heart, concrete and identifiable elements, have been used as symbols of rationality and emotion. Drawing on the conceptual metaphor framework, we propose that people understand the abstract concepts of rationality and emotion using knowledge of a more concrete concept — the vertical difference between the head and heart. In six studies, we show a deep-seated conceptual metaphorical relationship linking rationality with “up” or “higher,” and emotion with “down” or “lower.” We show that the association between verticality and rationality/emotion affects how consumers perceive information, and thereby has downstream consequences on attitudes and preferences. We find the association to be most influential when consumers are unaware of it, and when it applies to an unfamiliar stimulus. Because all visual formats – from the printed page to screens on a television, computer, or smartphone – entail a vertical placement, this association has important managerial implications. Our studies implement multiple methodologies and technologies and use manipulations of logos, websites, food advertisements, and political slogans.
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Increased False-Memory Susceptibility After Mindfulness Meditation
Brent Wilson et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The effect of mindfulness meditation on false-memory susceptibility was examined in three experiments. Because mindfulness meditation encourages judgment-free thoughts and feelings, we predicted that participants in the mindfulness condition would be especially likely to form false memories. In two experiments, participants were randomly assigned to either a mindfulness induction, in which they were instructed to focus attention on their breathing, or a mind-wandering induction, in which they were instructed to think about whatever came to mind. The overall number of words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm that were correctly recalled did not differ between conditions. However, participants in the mindfulness condition were significantly more likely to report critical nonstudied items than participants in the control condition. In a third experiment, which tested recognition and used a reality-monitoring paradigm, participants had reduced reality-monitoring accuracy after completing the mindfulness induction. These results demonstrate a potential unintended consequence of mindfulness meditation in which memories become less reliable.
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Brief mindfulness induction reduces inattentional blindness
Timothy Schofield, David Creswell & Thomas Denson
Consciousness and Cognition, December 2015, Pages 63–70
Abstract:
Prior research has linked mindfulness to improvements in attention, and suggested that the effects of mindfulness are particularly pronounced when individuals are cognitively depleted or stressed. Yet, no studies have tested whether mindfulness improves declarative awareness of unexpected stimuli in goal-directed tasks. Participants (N = 794) were either depleted (or not) and subsequently underwent a brief mindfulness induction (or not). They then completed an inattentional blindness task during which an unexpected distractor appeared on the computer monitor. This task was used to assess declarative conscious awareness of the unexpected distractor’s presence and the extent to which its perceptual properties were encoded. Mindfulness increased awareness of the unexpected distractor (i.e., reduced rates of inattentional blindness). Contrary to predictions, no mindfulness × depletion interaction emerged. Depletion however, increased perceptual encoding of the distractor. These results suggest that mindfulness may foster awareness of unexpected stimuli (i.e., reduce inattentional blindness).
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Beyond Conformity: Social Influences on Pain Reports and Physiology
Leonie Koban & Tor Wager
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social information can profoundly influence behavior, but its effects are often explained in terms of “conformity,” implying effects on decision-making and communication rather than deeper sensory modulation. We examined whether information about other people’s pain reports affected both participants’ pain experience and skin conductance responses (SCR) during pain. Sixty volunteers experienced painful heat stimulation preceded by 2 kinds of informational cues: (a) nonreinforced social information indicating low or high pain ratings from previous participants; and (b) reinforced conditioned stimuli (CSlow, CShigh). Both high-pain social information and CShigh cues enhanced pain and SCRs relative to their respective controls, with particularly robust effects of social information. Effects of both manipulations on both pain and SCRs were mediated by trial-by-trial pain expectancies. These results demonstrate strong social influences on pain and autonomic responses, and suggest that expectations from multiple sources can influence pain physiology independent of reinforcement.
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Sebastian Dieguez, Pascal Wagner-Egger & Nicolas Gauvrit
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Belief in conspiracy theories has often been associated with a biased perception of randomness, akin to a nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic. Indeed, a low prior for randomness (i.e., believing that randomness is a priori unlikely) could plausibly explain the tendency to believe that a planned deception lies behind many events, as well as the tendency to perceive meaningful information in scattered and irrelevant details; both of these tendencies are traits diagnostic of conspiracist ideation. In three studies, we investigated this hypothesis and failed to find the predicted association between low prior for randomness and conspiracist ideation, even when randomness was explicitly opposed to malevolent human intervention. Conspiracy believers’ and nonbelievers’ perceptions of randomness were not only indistinguishable from each other but also accurate compared with the normative view arising from the algorithmic information framework. Thus, the motto “nothing happens by accident,” taken at face value, does not explain belief in conspiracy theories.
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Someone is pulling the strings: Hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories
Karen Douglas et al.
Thinking & Reasoning, forthcoming
Abstract:
We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.
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Eric Taylor et al.
PLoS ONE, September 2015
Abstract:
Embodied cognition holds that abstract concepts are grounded in perceptual-motor simulations. If a given embodied metaphor maps onto a spatial representation, then thinking of that concept should bias the allocation of attention. In this study, we used positive and negative self-esteem words to examine two properties of conceptual cueing. First, we tested the orientation-specificity hypothesis, which predicts that conceptual cues should selectively activate certain spatial axes (in this case, valenced self-esteem concepts should activate vertical space), instead of any spatial continuum. Second, we tested whether conceptual cueing requires semantic processing, or if it can be achieved with shallow visual processing of the cue words. Participants viewed centrally presented words consisting of high or low self-esteem traits (e.g., brave, timid) before detecting a target above or below the cue in the vertical condition, or on the left or right of the word in the horizontal condition. Participants were faster to detect targets when their location was compatible with the valence of the word cues, but only in the vertical condition. Moreover, this effect was observed when participants processed the semantics of the word, but not when processing its orthography. The results show that conceptual cueing by spatial metaphors is orientation-specific, and that an explicit consideration of the word cues’ semantics is required for conceptual cueing to occur.
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The Emotional Impact of Being Myself: Emotions and Foreign-Language Processing
Lela Ivaz, Albert Costa & Jon Andoni Duñabeitia
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, forthcoming
Abstract:
Native languages are acquired in emotionally rich contexts, whereas foreign languages are typically acquired in emotionally neutral academic environments. As a consequence of this difference, it has been suggested that bilinguals’ emotional reactivity in foreign-language contexts is reduced as compared with native language contexts. In the current study, we investigated whether this emotional distance associated with foreign languages could modulate automatic responses to self-related linguistic stimuli. Self-related stimuli enhance performance by boosting memory, speed, and accuracy as compared with stimuli unrelated to the self (the so-called self-bias effect). We explored whether this effect depends on the language context by comparing self-biases in a native and a foreign language. Two experiments were conducted with native Spanish speakers with a high level of English proficiency in which they were asked to complete a perceptual matching task during which they associated simple geometric shapes (circles, squares, and triangles) with the labels “you,” “friend,” and “other” either in their native or foreign language. Results showed a robust asymmetry in the self-bias in the native- and foreign-language contexts: A larger self-bias was found in the native than in the foreign language. An additional control experiment demonstrated that the same materials administered to a group of native English speakers yielded robust self-bias effects that were comparable in magnitude to the ones obtained with the Spanish speakers when tested in their native language (but not in their foreign language). We suggest that the emotional distance evoked by the foreign-language contexts caused these differential effects across language contexts. These results demonstrate that the foreign-language effects are pervasive enough to affect automatic stages of emotional processing.
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I Can, I Do, and So I Like: From Power to Action and Aesthetic Preferences
Karl-Andrew Woltin & Ana Guinote
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
The current work tested the hypothesis that power increases reliance on experiences of motor fluency in forming aesthetic preferences. In 4 experiments, participants reported their aesthetic preferences regarding a variety of targets (pictures, movements, objects, and letters). Experiments 1, 2, and 3 manipulated power and motor fluency (via motoric resonance, extraocular muscle training, and dominant hand restriction). Experiment 4 manipulated power and assessed chronic interindividual differences in motor fluency. Across these experiments, power consistently increased reliance on motor fluency in aesthetic preference judgments. This finding was not mediated by differences in mood, judgment certainty, perceived task-demands or task-enjoyment, and derived from the use of motor simulations rather than from power differences in the acquisition of motor experiences. This is the first demonstration suggesting that power changes the formation of preference judgments as a function of motor fluency experiences. The implications of this research for the links between power and action, as well as the understanding of fluency processes are discussed.