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The Martyrdom Effect: When Pain and Effort Increase Prosocial Contributions
Christopher Olivola & Eldar Shafir
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, forthcoming
Abstract:
Most theories of motivation and behavior (and lay intuitions alike) consider pain and effort to be deterrents. In contrast to this widely held view, we provide evidence that the prospect of enduring pain and exerting effort for a prosocial cause can promote contributions to the cause. Specifically, we show that willingness to contribute to a charitable or collective cause increases when the contribution process is expected to be painful and effortful rather than easy and enjoyable. Across five experiments, we document this "martyrdom effect," show that the observed patterns defy standard economic and psychological accounts, and identify a mediator and moderator of the effect. Experiment 1 showed that people are willing to donate more to charity when they anticipate having to suffer to raise money. Experiment 2 extended these findings to a non-charity laboratory context that involved real money and actual pain. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the martyrdom effect is not the result of an attribute substitution strategy (whereby people use the amount of pain and effort involved in fundraising to determine donation worthiness). Experiment 4 showed that perceptions of meaningfulness partially mediate the martyrdom effect. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrated that the nature of the prosocial cause moderates the martyrdom effect: the effect is strongest for causes associated with human suffering. We propose that anticipated pain and effort lead people to ascribe greater meaning to their contributions and to the experience of contributing, thereby motivating higher prosocial contributions. We conclude by considering some implications of this puzzling phenomenon.
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Reconceptualizing Stars: Scientist Helpfulness and Peer Performance
Alexander Oettl
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
It is surprising that the prevailing performance taxonomy for scientists (star versus nonstar) focuses only on individual output and ignores social behavior, because innovation is often characterized as a communal process. To develop a deeper understanding of the mechanisms by which scientists influence the productivity of others, I expand the traditional taxonomy of scientists that focuses solely on productivity and add a second, social dimension: helpfulness to others. Using a combination of academic paper publications and citations to capture scientist productivity and the receipt of academic paper acknowledgments to measure helpfulness, I examine the change in publishing output of the coauthors of 149 scientists that die. Coauthors of highly helpful scientists that die experience a decrease in output quality but not output quantity. Meanwhile, the deaths of high productivity scientists that are not highly helpful do not influence their coauthors' output. In addition, scientists who are helpful with conceptual feedback (critique and advice) have a larger impact on the performance of their coauthors than scientists who provide help with material access, scientific tools, or technical work. Within the context of evaluating scientific productivity, it may be time to update our conceptualization of a "star."
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Agata Gasiorowska, Tomasz Zaleskiewicz & Sandra Wygrab
Journal of Economic Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The research presented in this paper shows that merely activating the idea of money affects the social behavior and social preferences of young children who do not understand the economic functions of money. From an economic point of view, money is universal, instrumental, and can be defined by the functions that it provides. From the psychological point of view, money is more symbolic and emotional than instrumental, and can serve as social resource in interpersonal and intrapersonal regulation. These effects of money are connected with its symbolic, rather than its instrumental, nature. To test whether the symbolic and instrumental meanings of money are developing at appropriate ages, we conducted two experiments on 5-8 year olds. After money activation, children were more selfish in economic games, revealing less pro-social preferences and were less prone to help the experimenter than children from the control group. Even if children at this stage do not understand the economic mechanisms of money and are not able to use money properly in the instrumental context, they react to symbolic activation. This might imply that the symbolic meaning of money is more primal than the instrumental meaning.
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Memory lane and morality: How childhood memories promote prosocial behavior
Francesca Gino & Sreedhari Desai
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although research has established that autobiographical memory affects one's self-concept, little is known about how it affects moral behavior. We focus on a specific type of autobiographical memory: childhood memories. Drawing on research on memory and moral psychology, we propose that childhood memories elicit moral purity, which we define as a psychological state of feeling morally clean and innocent. In turn, heightened moral purity leads to greater prosocial behavior. In Experiment 1, participants instructed to recall childhood memories were more likely to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than were participants in a control condition, and this effect was mediated by moral purity. In Experiment 2, the same manipulation increased the amount of money participants donated to a good cause, and both implicit and explicit measures of moral purity mediated the effect. Experiment 3 provides further support for the process linking childhood memories and prosocial behavior through moderation. In Experiment 4, we found that childhood memories led to punishment of others' ethically questionable actions. Finally, in Experiment 5, both positively valenced and negatively valenced childhood memories increased helping compared to a control condition.
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Social Welfare as Small-Scale Help: Evolutionary Psychology and the Deservingness Heuristic
Michael Bang Petersen
American Journal of Political Science, January 2012, Pages 1-16
Abstract:
Public opinion concerning social welfare is largely driven by perceptions of recipient deservingness. Extant research has argued that this heuristic is learned from a variety of cultural, institutional, and ideological sources. The present article provides evidence supporting a different view: that the deservingness heuristic is rooted in psychological categories that evolved over the course of human evolution to regulate small-scale exchanges of help. To test predictions made on the basis of this view, a method designed to measure social categorization is embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted in different countries. Across the national- and individual-level differences that extant research has used to explain the heuristic, people categorize welfare recipients on the basis of whether they are lazy or unlucky. This mode of categorization furthermore induces people to think about large-scale welfare politics as its presumed ancestral equivalent: small-scale help giving. The general implications for research on heuristics are discussed.
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Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving
Stefano DellaVigna, John List & Ulrike Malmendier
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2012, Pages 1-56
Abstract:
Every year, 90% of Americans give money to charities. Is such generosity necessarily welfare enhancing for the giver? We present a theoretical framework that distinguishes two types of motivation: individuals like to give, for example, due to altruism or warm glow, and individuals would rather not give but dislike saying no, for example, due to social pressure. We design a door-to-door fund-raiser in which some households are informed about the exact time of solicitation with a flyer on their doorknobs. Thus, they can seek or avoid the fund-raiser. We find that the flyer reduces the share of households opening the door by 9% to 25% and, if the flyer allows checking a Do Not Disturb box, reduces giving by 28% to 42%. The latter decrease is concentrated among donations smaller than $10. These findings suggest that social pressure is an important determinant of door-to-door giving. Combining data from this and a complementary field experiment, we structurally estimate the model. The estimated social pressure cost of saying no to a solicitor is $3.80 for an in-state charity and $1.40 for an out-of-state charity. Our welfare calculations suggest that our door-to-door fund-raising campaigns on average lower the utility of the potential donors.
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Avoiding The Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving
James Andreoni, Justin Rao & Hannah Trachtman
NBER Working Paper, December 2011
Abstract:
What triggers giving? We explore this in a randomized natural field experiment during the Salvation Army's annual campaign. Solicitors were at one or both of two main entrances to a supermarket, making the solicitation either easy or difficult to avoid. Additionally, solicitors were either silent, or asked "please give" to passersby. We observed over 17,000 passings over four days, and found dramatic avoidance of the solicitors, but only during a direct ask. Furthermore, asking increased donations 75%. Across all conditions, seeking the solicitor was exceedingly rare. The results do not support static views of altruism, such as inequity aversion, and instead highlight the importance of social cues and psychological features of the giver-receiver interaction. We argue that avoidance could evidence a lack of altruism or self-control strategy to deal with empathic reflexes to give.
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Do fundraisers select charitable donors based on gender and race? Evidence from survey data
Barış Yörük
Journal of Population Economics, December 2011, Pages 219-243
Abstract:
Recent studies document that people are much more likely to donate to charity and volunteer their time when they are asked to. Using household surveys of giving and volunteering in the United States conducted from 1992 to 2001, which contain questions on whether the respondent was personally asked to give or volunteer, this paper investigates the factors associated with the probability of receiving a charitable solicitation and presents substantial evidence that race and gender differences play key roles in the selection of potential donors. In particular, males, blacks, and Hispanics are less likely to be solicited compared with females and whites. Using non-linear decomposition techniques, I find that differences in observable characteristics of individuals explain most of the racial gap in the probability of being solicited for charitable causes, but they fail to explain the gender gap in the probability of being asked to volunteer. Furthermore, these results are robust to alternative specifications. I also discuss related policy implications and argue that the economic impact of selecting potential donors based on gender and race can be considerable.
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The Role of Fear of Crime in Donating and Volunteering: A Gendered Analysis
Sarah Britto, David Van Slyke & Teresa Francis
Criminal Justice Review, December 2011, Pages 414-434
Abstract:
Extensive empirical studies have established that women fear crime more than men and theoretical arguments have suggested this difference produces consequences ranging from increased medical and psychological problems to restricted movement and limited exposure to social networks and opportunities resulting in restrictive informal social control and reduced social capital. More recently, a number of studies have begun to test the theoretical link between fear and behavior, with some suggesting fear will restrict prosocial behavior and others suggesting fear will motivate behavior that improves personal and communal well-being. This study adds to this emerging literature by exploring how fear of crime affects two measures of philanthropic behavior - donating and volunteerism. Using a stratified random telephone survey of 2,361 individuals living in the 20 counties that compose the greater Metro Atlanta area, the authors explore the role of fear of crime as an independent variable in models of donating and volunteering time to a charitable organization. Additionally, interaction terms are included in models of volunteering to control for the possibility that the strength of the relationship may vary based on sex. The results indicate that fear of crime is an important predictor of volunteering, but not donating, and that the effects are stronger for women than men.
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Cheapened altruism: Discounting personally affected prosocial actors
Fern Lin-Healy & Deborah Small
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, March 2012, Pages 269-274
Abstract:
Are charitable donors always perceived as charitable? Three studies suggest that although having a personal connection to a cause motivates much charitable giving, donors who have been personally affected by the target cause are given less "credit" for their donations, i.e., are perceived as less intrinsically charitable. These donors are perceived as having selfish motivations even when they have nothing economic or social to gain from the donation. More specifically, personally-affected donors are perceived as driven by emotional selfishness, or a desire to improve their own hedonic state rather a desire to improve the welfare of others, which lessens the charitable credit that they receive. In addition, although donors who have been personally affected by the target cause are seen as less charitable, they are perceived more favorably in other ways (e.g., more loyal).
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Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment
Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan & Nikos Nikiforakis
American Economic Review, December 2011, Pages 3330-3348
Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between relative earnings and giving in a two-stage, real-effort experiment. In the first stage, four players compete in a tournament that determines their earnings. In the second stage, they decide whether to make a transfer to one or more of their group members. Our main finding is that those ranked first are significantly less likely to give than those ranked second. This difference disappears if individuals learn about the second stage after earning their income or if earnings are randomly determined. This suggests that our main finding is driven by selection based on other-regarding preferences.
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Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving
Dean Karlan & Margaret McConnell
NBER Working Paper, January 2012
Abstract:
Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social standing, but rather to motivate others to give. To tease apart these two theories, we conduct a laboratory experiment with undergraduates, and find no evidence to support the alternative, altruistic motivation. We conclude that charitable gifts increase in response to the promise of public recognition primarily because of individuals' desire to improve their social image.
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Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences
Edward Lazear, Ulrike Malmendier & Roberto Weber
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, January 2012, Pages 136-163
Abstract:
Individuals sort into and out of economic environments based on their preferences and in response to relative prices. We demonstrate the importance of such sorting for the measurement of social preferences, using two laboratory experiments. First, allowing subjects to avoid environments in which sharing is possible significantly reduces sharing. This reveals the existence of a type of individual who shares reluctantly, preferring to avoid the opportunity to share. Second, after subsidizing the sharing environment, the aggregate amount shared increases, but less is shared, on average, by those who enter. Thus, subsidies intended to induce more sharing have weak effects since they attract those who share the least.
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Substitution or Symbiosis? Assessing the Relationship between Religious and Secular Giving
Jonathan Hill & Brandon Vaidyanathan
Social Forces, September 2011, Pages 157-180
Abstract:
Research on philanthropy has not sufficiently examined whether charitable giving to religious causes impinges on giving to secular causes. Examining three waves of national panel data, we find that the relationship between religious and secular giving is generally not of a zero-sum nature; families that increase their religious giving also increase their secular giving. We argue that this finding is best accounted for by a practice theory of social action which emphasizes how religious congregations foster skills and practices related to charitable giving. We also argue that denominational variation in the influence of religious giving is best accounted for by the financial structuring of the denomination. We conclude with the implications for studies of religious causal influence more generally.
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Fairness as a Constraint on Reciprocity: Playing Simultaneously as Dictator and Trustee
Aaron Nicholas
Journal of Socio-Economics, April 2012, Pages 211-221
Abstract:
The dictator and trust games are two common games used to identify the existence of social preferences. However, in many social interactions, individuals face the environments in both games simultaneously: for example we are often engaged in charitable donations to strangers, as well as reciprocal exchange with family members and colleagues. As giving in one game could be prioritised over giving in the other, it is important to have participants play both as a dictator in the dictator game and as a trustee in a trust game simultaneously. The results indicate that when the recipient in the dictator game is significantly poorer relative to the dictator, the dictator tends to return an amount to the trustor such that the trustor neither makes a loss nor profit from trusting. This suggests that the presence of a sufficiently strong incentive to make transfers as a dictator may completely crowd-out any monetary returns to trust.
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Discrimination in wealth and power intergroup structures
Simon-Pierre Harvey & Richard Bourhis
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, January 2012, Pages 21-38
Abstract:
This study investigated the combined influence of wealth and power on discrimination. Participants (N = 243) were assigned to a 2 (ingroup wealth: rich/poor) × 2 (ingroup power: dominant/subordinate) × 2 (outgroup target wealth: rich/poor) minimal group study. After personally receiving money depending on their group ascription, participants distributed their personal money to ingroup and outgroup others. Overall, regardless of their wealth or power, participants discriminated against outgroup members. Poor group members discriminated more than rich group members and participants discriminated more when the outgroup was rich than when it was poor. Results suggest that social identity and group interest but not self-interest, explain discriminatory behaviors within wealth and power intergroup structures.
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Dariusz Dolinski
Applied Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In the literature on the foot-in-the-door technique it is usually assumed that the first of the two sequentially posed requests should not be extremely easy (trivial). An uncomplicated request would not activate self-perception mechanisms which, as it is commonly understood, lie behind the effectiveness of the technique. This article proposes that when the initial request is exceptional or odd, then even if it is easy and is fulfilled by nearly everyone it will still enhance people's inclination to fulfill the subsequent, much more complicated request. This assumption was verified in three experiments.