Fueled
Are Politicians Office or Policy Motivated? The Case of U.S. Governors' Environmental Policies
Per Fredriksson, Le Wang & Khawaja Mamun
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are elected politicians primarily motivated by holding office, thus choosing environmental policies accordingly? Or are they motivated by the chance to implement their preferred environmental policies? Do governors have character, in the sense that they promise and implement environmental policies consistent with their own preferences? To answer these questions, we study the differences in environmental spending across both re-electable and lame duck governors from the two main political parties. In our empirical analysis, we make use of parametric and non-parametric regression-discontinuity approaches. While re-electable governors do not set significantly different policies, lame duck governors do. We argue that in the area of environmental policy governors appear to be primarily office motivated and lack character.
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Ecological footprint feedback: Motivating or discouraging?
Amara Brook
Social Influence, Spring 2011, Pages 113-128
Abstract:
The Ecological Footprint questionnaire provides feedback about personal environmental impact, which is generally negative. An experiment examined the effect of ecological footprint feedback on pro-environmental behavior, and whether it depends on how much people base their self-esteem on environmentalism. Negative ecological footprint feedback marginally increased pro-environmental behavior of participants who based their self-esteem on environmentalism, but significantly decreased pro-environmental behavior of participants who did not base their self-esteem on environmentalism. Ecological footprint feedback seems beneficial only for people already personally invested in environmentalism.
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Is fairness blind? - The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules
Fredrik Carlsson et al.
Ecological Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper uses a choice experiment to study citizens' preferences for effort-sharing rules for reducing carbon dioxide emissions. For a given global cost and level of emission reduction, we study the willingness to pay for various rules that imply different distributions of the cost between EU, the US, China and Africa. The focus of this paper is on the use of two different treatments, one where the respondents were informed about the country (or country group) names and one where the names were replaced with anonymous labels A-D. This allows us to test whether people's preferences for effort-sharing rules depend on the framing of the problem. We find that the ranking of the rules and the strength of the preferences are not significantly different between the two treatments, and hence we find no evidence of ingroup bias in preferences for effort-sharing rules.
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Arild Aakvik & Sigve Tjøtta
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2011, Pages 343-351
Abstract:
This paper considers the effects of voluntary international environmental protocols on emissions, in particular the effect of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol and the 1994 Oslo Protocol on the reduction of sulphur oxides. The analysis employs panel data from 30 European countries over the period between 1960 and 2002. We divide all countries into ‘signatories' and ‘controls', i.e., those that have signed and ratified a specific protocol and those that have not. Using a difference-in-difference panel data regression model, including yearly dummies and country-specific quadratic growth trajectories, we find no significant effect of either the Helsinki or the Oslo agreement in reducing sulphur emissions.
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Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther
NBER Working Paper, April 2011
Abstract:
Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.
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Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008
Glen Peters et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite the emergence of regional climate policies, growth in global CO2 emissions has remained strong. From 1990 to 2008 CO2 emissions in developed countries (defined as countries with emission-reduction commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B) have stabilized, but emissions in developing countries (non-Annex B) have doubled. Some studies suggest that the stabilization of emissions in developed countries was partially because of growing imports from developing countries. To quantify the growth in emission transfers via international trade, we developed a trade-linked global database for CO2 emissions covering 113 countries and 57 economic sectors from 1990 to 2008. We find that the emissions from the production of traded goods and services have increased from 4.3 Gt CO2 in 1990 (20% of global emissions) to 7.8 Gt CO2 in 2008 (26%). Most developed countries have increased their consumption-based emissions faster than their territorial emissions, and non-energy-intensive manufacturing had a key role in the emission transfers. The net emission transfers via international trade from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 Gt CO2 in 1990 to 1.6 Gt CO2 in 2008, which exceeds the Kyoto Protocol emission reductions. Our results indicate that international trade is a significant factor in explaining the change in emissions in many countries, from both a production and consumption perspective. We suggest that countries monitor emission transfers via international trade, in addition to territorial emissions, to ensure progress toward stabilization of global greenhouse gas emissions.
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The Surprising Incidence of Tax Credits for the Toyota Prius
James Sallee
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2011, Pages 189-219
Abstract:
This paper estimates the incidence of tax incentives for the Toyota Prius. Transaction microdata indicate that both federal and state incentives were fully captured by consumers. This is surprising because Toyota faced a binding production constraint, which suggests that they could have appropriated the gains. The paper proffers an explanation based on an intertemporal link in pricing that stems from search frictions, which has the unconventional implication that statutory burden influenced economic burden. The paper develops a bounding estimator to account for endogenous selection into preferential tax regimes that may be useful in other contexts.
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The economic impact of shale gas extraction: A review of existing studies
Thomas Kinnaman
Ecological Economics, 15 May 2011, Pages 1243-1249
Abstract:
Recent advances in drilling technology have allowed for the profitable extraction of natural gas from deep underground shale rock formations. Several reports sponsored by the gas industry have estimated the economic effects of the shale gas extraction on incomes, employment, and tax revenues. None of these reports has been published in an economics journal and therefore have not been subjected to the peer review process. Yet these reports may be influential to the formation of public policy. This commentary provides written reviews of several studies purporting to estimate the economic impact of gas extraction from shale beds. Due to questionable assumptions, the economic impacts estimated in these reports are very likely overstated.
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Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions
Rabah Arezki & Markus Brückner
European Economic Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992-2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.
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The environmental efficiency of well-being: A cross-national analysis
Kyle Knight & Eugene Rosa
Social Science Research, May 2011, Pages 931-949
Abstract:
Recent research has conceptualized sustainability as the environmental efficiency of well-being (EWEB). This concept takes into account the benefits societies are able to produce from their demands on the environment. Research along these lines indicates that countries vary widely in the efficiency with which they transform the Earth's resources into well-being. Here, we take up this finding as a puzzle to be explained. We construct a new measure of EWEB using the ecological footprint per capita (a measure of environmental consumption) and average life satisfaction (a measure of subjective well-being). We draw hypotheses from political economy, modernization, and sustainable consumption theories in the environmental social sciences. Using full information maximum likelihood estimation, we test the effects of climate, political, economic, and social factors on EWEB with a sample of 105 countries. Key findings include a negative quadratic effect of economic development on EWEB, a negative effect of income inequality, and a positive effect of social capital.
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The Effect Of Intergroup Comparison On Willingness To Perform Sustainable Behavior
Mark Ferguson, Nyla Branscombe & Katherine Reynolds
Journal of Environmental Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present research examines the effects of intergroup comparison on willingness to perform sustainable behavior. In Experiment 1, university students compared current students with past or future students, and then completed measures of willingness to perform sustainable behavior. Participants who compared to past students reported more willingness to perform sustainable behavior than those who compared to future students. In Experiment 2, university students again compared current students with past or future students and completed measures of sustainable beliefs and willingness to perform sustainable behavior. Participants who compared to past students reported more willingness to perform sustainable behavior than those who compared to future students. This effect was mediated by strengthened sustainable beliefs. The results show that intergroup comparison can be strategically employed to promote motivation to perform sustainable behavior.