Force protection
Mark Gasiorowski
Middle Eastern Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so.
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Akos Lada
Harvard Working Paper, August 2014
Abstract:
How does shared identity affect interstate war-proneness and hostility? This paper argues that shared identity in the form of cultural similarity is a source of wars, but only in the presence of differences in domestic political institutions. When shared identity is based on visible cultural markers, identity ties facilitate the spread of democratization. Elites in repressive regimes are threatened by a culturally-similar country where citizens are empowered. Thus a dictator uses force against the culturally-similar democracy to ensure that his or her citizens see their empowered brothers as an enemy rather than a model. Using a new dataset on cultural similarity, coupled with the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute (1816-2008) dataset, I show that the most war-prone and the most hostile country pairs share culture, but differ in their political institutions. The cultural similarity variables are based on race, religion, and civilization, all of which are positively correlated with questions about political culture in the World Values Survey. Through the analysis of articles written by the North Korean Central News Agency, I also show that Pyongyang began to describe life in South Korea in more negative terms after South Korea democratized in 1987.
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Dead Wrong?: Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War's Demise
Tanisha Fazal
International Security, Summer 2014, Pages 95-125
Abstract:
Is war in decline? Recent scholarship suggests that it is. The empirical basis for this argument is a decline in battle deaths over the past several centuries, a standard metric for counting wars and armed conflicts. Dramatic improvements in medical care in conflict zones — in preventive medicine, battlefield medicine, evacuation, and protective equipment — have raised the likelihood of surviving battle wounds today compared with past eras. Thus the fact that war has become less fatal does not necessarily mean that it has become less frequent. Original data on wounded-to-killed ratios, supplemented by medical research and interviews with physicians from the military and nongovernmental communities, is used to advance this claim. The results show that the decline in war is likely not as dramatic as some scholars have argued. These findings question the foundation of existing datasets on war and armed conflict. They also highlight the growing need for policy focused on the battle wounded.
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Max Reibman
International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 2014, Pages 681-702
Abstract:
This article explores the American role in the Syrian political scene in Cairo toward the end of World War I and in its immediate aftermath. It challenges the absence of the United States and of American actors as primary players in much of the historical writing on the Middle East in this period. It illuminates a neglected episode of regional American diplomacy, argues that the United States was not relegated to the periphery in local debates surrounding the dismemberment of Ottoman Syria, and emphasizes the broader uncertainties that characterized the competition for Mandate territories in the Middle East prior to 1920. In doing so, it takes a close look at the long-forgotten reports of William Yale, the U.S. State Department's “Special Agent” in Cairo in late 1917, and situates them within evolving trends in Syrian-Arab politics. Yale, who surfaced in Egypt after serving with Standard Oil in Palestine, was the key Arabic-speaking American “on the spot” and proved to be an astute if imperfect observer of the diversity of Syrian national sentiment. A survey of his reports allows for a new perspective on Cairo's Syrians and their pragmatic and ideological turn toward the United States as World War I unfolded. Alienated from Britain and France, they looked increasingly to the United States, and the appeal of a postwar American trusteeship over Syria gained currency among émigré intellectuals and aspiring powerbrokers.
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Lars Berger
Journal of Peace Research, November 2014, Pages 782-796
Abstract:
This analysis uses survey data representing three of the world’s most populous Muslim majority countries to challenge conventional wisdom on what shapes Muslim public opinion on political violence against the United States. It improves previous analysis by clearly distinguishing support for violence against civilians from support for violence against military targets and by featuring independent variables that clearly separate views on US foreign policies from views on US culture. Logistic regression shows that, among Egyptian, Pakistani and Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not related to support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but only to support for attacks on US military targets. Approval of attacks on US civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of US freedom of expression, culture, and people, disapproval of the domestic political status quo and the notion of general US hostility toward democracy in the Middle East. This last finding has important implications for US and Western policies toward the post-Arab Spring Middle East in particular and the broader relationship with the Muslim World in general.
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Giulio Gallarotti & Isam Yahia Al-Filali
International Studies, July & October 2014, Pages 233-261
Abstract:
When people are asked the question, what is the source of Saudi Arabia’s power, who would cite factors other than oil? This equation of Saudi power exclusively with its oil wealth is mistaken. Historically, a principal and the most consistent source of Saudi power at the domestic, regional and global levels has not been revenues from oil, but the cultural power that inheres in a nation that is both the capital of the Muslim and Arab worlds. This soft power accounts for as much, if not more, of Saudi influence than even oil itself. To a large extent, this power explains why Saudi Arabia has remained stout in the face of the shock waves of the Arab Spring. Saudi soft power also accounts for much of the leverage that the Kingdom enjoys in its region and the world at large. This article assesses the principal sources of Saudi Arabia’s soft power, discusses the modern day international, regional and domestic challenges facing Saudi Arabia, and finally analyzes how Saudi soft power can effectively deal with those challenges.
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The Localized and Spatial Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending
Michael Allen, Julie VanDusky-Allen & Michael Flynn
Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
We analyze how the deployment of US troops affects host-state defense spending. We test this relationship, from 1951 to 2003, by examining how the deployment of US military forces impacts defense spending in different types of states, including US allies, NATO members, non-allies of the United States, and all states. We also utilize spatial measures of US troop deployments to analyze how regional and neighborhood concentrations of forces shape host-state policies. Using both traditional panel methodology, and incorporating a simultaneous equation model for the deployment of troops, we find that non-allied states tend to decrease their defense burden when the United States places troops within their borders. However, NATO allies consistently increase their defense burden in response to the presence of US troops within their borders. Additionally, most states tend to increase spending when the United States places troops near their borders.
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Beyond Emboldenment: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy
Mark Bell
MIT Working Paper, October 2014
Abstract:
What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its critical importance, this question has been understudied. This paper offers a new typology of the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy that allows us to move beyond predictions of "emboldenment," and hypothesizes the circumstances in which these effects might be observed. The paper demonstrates the utility of this typology by using it to shed light on a "hard" case: the United Kingdom. In contrast to the expectations of existing theories, the acquisition of a deliverable nuclear capability in 1955 significantly affected British foreign policy. Britain used its nuclear weapons to maintain its forward conventional posture at lower cost, bolster its junior allies in the Middle East, Far East and Europe, delay retrenchment, and respond more independently of the United States and with greater steadfastness to challenges to its position - most dramatically during the 1956 Suez crisis.
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Hidden Diplomacy: The German–American Dispute over Iran
Matthias Küntzel
American Foreign Policy Interests, July/August 2014, Pages 225-233
Abstract:
From as early as the 1920s, Germany has developed a special relationship with Iran. After the Islamic Revolution, it remained the only Western country that continued to have friendly relations with Tehran. As regards technology transfer, Germany remains to this day Iran's most important partner. As a result, the public dispute between the West and Iran over the latter's nuclear program has been accompanied by a mostly non-public dispute between Washington and Berlin over the West's overall approach to Iran. This dispute began more than 20 years ago. Germany has played the role of a “protective shield” (Joschka Fischer) for Tehran by watering down the sanctions policy and rejecting the use of the threat of military force. The latter position is supported by Moscow and Peking and rejected by London, Washington, and Paris. Germany's inclination to make the most of its geopolitical middle position has been reinforced by a semi-official German foreign policy position paper from 2013 that downgrades the principle of Western integration in favor of a strategy of multipolarity.
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Unpacking Territorial Disputes: Domestic Political Influences and War
Thorin Wright & Paul Diehl
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
What distinguishes the militarized territorial disputes that escalate to war from those that do not? Although research has clearly established that territorial conflicts are especially war-prone, the understanding as to why this is the case is less developed when compared to domestic factors such as joint democracy. We explain that territorial conflicts are especially war-prone when democratic and autocratic states are engaged in conflict against one another. Because of domestic concerns, democracies and autocracies value territory differently, generating a smaller bargaining space. Democracies will tend to be more resistant to settlement when territory is of a “public,” symbolic, or intangible value. Autocracies, on the other hand, are more likely to value the tangible qualities of territory, such as its resource value. This disparity in territorial goals makes mixed regime dyads more war-prone when territory is disputed. We further believe that the smaller the winning coalition in autocracies, the more war-prone they are against democracies. We test these propositions among all dyads as well as interstate rivals and find support for our theoretical framework.
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The terror of ‘terrorists’: An investigation in experimental applied ethics
Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Fall 2014, Pages 195-211
Abstract:
Some theorists argue that appropriate responses to terrorism are in part shaped by popular sentiment. In two experiments, using representative design and ecological stimuli (e.g. actual news reports), we present evidence for some of the ways popular sentiment about terrorism tracks theory and can be constructed. In Experiment 1, we document that using the word ‘terrorist’ to describe a group of people decreases willingness to understand the group's grievances, decreases willingness to negotiate with the group, increases perceived permissibility of violence against the group, and decreases the perceived rationality of the group. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that judgment about the permissibility of the use of force against terrorist groups can be biased by simple memory-priming manipulations. Results are interpreted in terms of (1) implications for philosophical theories about terrorism and (2) the role that experimental investigation can play in applied ethics.
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US foreign aid, interstate rivalry, and incentives for counterterrorism cooperation
Andrew Boutton
Journal of Peace Research, November 2014, Pages 741-754
Abstract:
A common strategy pursued by states targeted by international terrorism is to provide economic and military assistance to the states that host this activity. This is thought to increase their willingness and capacity to crack down on terrorism, but very little work to date has looked at whether this strategy actually leads to desirable outcomes. This article offers an explanation for why a strategy of foreign aid-for-counterterrorism can be successful in some contexts, but counterproductive in situations in which recipients have more pressing strategic priorities. Specifically, I argue that host states receiving US foreign aid that are involved in an ongoing interstate rivalry will use the aid to arm against their rival, rather than to undertake counterterrorism. These states thus have an incentive not to disarm terrorist groups, but rather to play-up the threat from terrorism in order to continue receiving aid concessions. Using data on US foreign aid and terrorist activity in recipient countries, I employ a series of duration and count models to demonstrate that, while US foreign aid can help to decrease terrorist activity in non-rivalrous states, the opposite is true in states with at least one rival.
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Does Nation Building Spur Economic Growth?
Ellyn Creasey, Ahmed Rahman & Katherine Smith
Economic Inquiry, forthcoming
Abstract:
Nation building, the allocation of economic aid conditional on military assistance in conflict and post-conflict environments, has cost the world trillions of dollars over the last half century. Yet few attempts have been made to quantify the potential economic growth effects for the recipient country from the provision of this aid. Using a 45-year panel dataset, we construct a measure of nation building using a three-way interaction term between military assistance, economic aid, and conflict regime. Considering that slow growing and problem-prone countries may be less likely to receive aid, we instrument for economic aid by estimating donor-to-donee aid flows in a first-stage procedure. Using this approach, we find that spending on nation building has positive growth effects during conflict periods, but that these effects disappear after conflict.
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Andrea Pereira et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, January 2015, Pages 4–17
Abstract:
What factors determine the willingness to inflict collective punishment upon a group for a misdeed committed by individual group members? This research investigates the effect of collective responsibility shared among group members and the moderating effect of the group’s political organization (democratic vs. nondemocratic). Hypothesizing that moral accountability should be greater for democratic offender groups compared to nondemocratic groups, five experiments showed that the positive effect of collective responsibility on support for collective punishment (experiment 1) was stronger for democratic groups than for nondemocratic groups (experiment 2-5). A sixth experiment revealed that the moral and social value ascribed to democracy led to higher expectations towards democratic groups, resulting in negative perceptions of the democratic offender group and ultimately in increased collective punishment. The results are discussed in terms of defense strategies of democratic values.
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Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat
Paul Novosad & Eric Werker
Harvard Working Paper, August 2014
Abstract:
National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60 year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which nations are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Statistically, democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions ― even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large.
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Anthony Washburn & Linda Skitka
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
We conducted an experimental test of the displaced international punishment hypothesis by testing whether reminding people about 9/11 would increase support for U.S. military intervention in Syria. A community sample of Americans were reminded of 9/11, the terrorist attacks in London in 2005, or were given no reminder before being asked their support for military intervention in Syria. Results indicated that there was a significant suppression effect of desired revenge for the 9/11 attacks on support for military intervention for liberals and moderates, but not conservatives. Liberal and moderate participants reminded of 9/11 supported military intervention because reminders of 9/11 primed strong desires for vengeance. These findings suggest that reminding people of a severe offense to their country triggers a desire for revenge, which increases the desire to punish a target symbolically similar to the original perpetrator, but only when doing so is politically expedient.
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Strategic taboos: Chemical weapons and US foreign policy
Michelle Bentley
International Affairs, September 2014, Pages 1033–1048
Abstract:
This article examines US President Barack Obama's foreign policy rhetoric on Syria, specifically in relation to the threat of chemical weapons and the prohibitionary taboo surrounding their use. It contends that Obama's rhetorical construction of the taboo is not simply a commitment to the control of these horrific weapons (where such arms have been comprehended as so extensively vile as to preclude their employment), but that this also represents the strategic linguistic exploitation of these normative ideals in order to directly shape policy. By analysing of presidential speeches made during the conflict, it demonstrates that Obama has manipulated pre-existing conceptions of chemical weapons as taboo, and also as forms of weapons of mass destruction, to deliberately construct policy in line with his own political ambitions — most notably as a way of forcing a multilateral solution to the situation in Syria. This article challenges existing perceptions of the chemical weapons taboo as an inherently normative constraint, arguing that this instead comprises a more agency-driven construct. Static notions of the taboo must be abandoned and subsequently replaced with a framework of understanding that recognizes how the taboo can be used as a deliberate driver of foreign policy.
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Taylor Fravel
MIT Working Paper, October 2013
Abstract:
A central question in the study of China’s foreign policy is the role of the PLA in national security decisionmaking. This paper seeks to illuminate this question by examining one specific issue area, territorial disputes. The role of the PLA in decisionmaking in China’s territorial disputes has been limited to bureaucratic influence within existing policymaking structures and processes. With the partial exception of China’s interpretation of the rights of coastal states under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the PLA has not played a significant role influencing the initiation of China’s territorial disputes, in the content of these claims or in how China has chosen to defend these claims. Instead, China’s behavior in territorial disputes, including its recent assertiveness in the South China Sea and East China Sea, reflects the consensus of China’s top party leaders to respond to what are seen as challenges and provocations from other states. Little evidence exists to support the view that the PLA has escalated these disputes against the wishes of top leaders.
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Mary Elisabeth Cox
Economic History Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
At the onset of the First World War, Germany was subject to a shipping embargo by the Allied forces. Ostensibly military in nature, the blockade prevented not only armaments but also food and fertilizers from entering Germany. The impact of that blockade on civilian populations has been debated ever since. Germans protested that the Allies had wielded hunger as a weapon against women and children with devastating results, a claim that was hotly denied by the Allies. The impact of what the Germans termed the Hungerblockade on childhood nutrition can now be assessed using a newly discovered dataset based on heights and weights of nearly 600,000 German schoolchildren measured between 1914 and 1924. Statistical analysis reveals a grim truth: German children suffered severe malnutrition due to the blockade. Social class impacted risk of deprivation, with working-class children suffering the most. Surprisingly, they were the quickest to recover after the war. Their rescue was fuelled by massive food aid organized by the former enemies of Germany, and delivered cooperatively with both government and civil society. The ability of former belligerents to work together after an exceptionally bitter war to feed impoverished children may hold hope for the future.