Falling in Line
Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens
Andrew Engelhardt
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The conventional wisdom is that racial attitudes, by forming through early socialization processes, are causally prior to most things political, including whites' party identifications. Yet a broad literature demonstrates that partisanship can shape mass attitudes. The author argues that this influence extends even to presumptively fundamental predispositions like racial attitudes. The study applies cross-lagged models to panel data from the 1990s and 2000s to demonstrate that whites align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties. The results demonstrate that partisanship has a more pronounced influence in the latter time period, which is consistent with a view that changes in the political context can make partisanship a more likely causal force on other attitudes. Racial concerns not only provide a foundation for political conflict: my results reveal that political processes can increase or decrease racial animus.
Reducing Exclusionary Attitudes through Interpersonal Conversation: Evidence from Three Field Experiments
Joshua Kalla & David Broockman
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Exclusionary attitudes - prejudice toward outgroups and opposition to policies that promote their well-being - are presenting challenges to democratic societies worldwide. Drawing on insights from psychology, we argue that non-judgmentally exchanging narratives in interpersonal conversations can facilitate durable reductions in exclusionary attitudes. We support this argument with evidence from three pre-registered field experiments targeting exclusionary attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants and transgender people. In these experiments, 230 canvassers conversed with 6,869 voters across 7 US locations. In Experiment 1, face-to-face conversations deploying arguments alone had no effects on voters’ exclusionary immigration policy or prejudicial attitudes, but otherwise identical conversations also including the non-judgmental exchange of narratives durably reduced exclusionary attitudes for at least four months (d = 0.08). Experiments 2 and 3, targeting transphobia, replicate these findings and support the scalability of this strategy (ds = 0.08, 0.04). Non-judgmentally exchanging narratives can help overcome the resistance to persuasion often encountered in discussions of these contentious topics.
Depolarizing American voters: Democrats and Republicans are equally susceptible to false attitude feedback
Thomas Strandberg et al.
PLoS ONE, February 2020
Abstract:
American politics is becoming increasingly polarized, which biases decision-making and reduces open-minded debate. In two experiments, we demonstrate that despite this polarization, a simple manipulation can make people express and endorse less polarized views about competing political candidates. In Study 1, we approached 136 participants at the first 2016 presidential debate and on the streets of New York City. Participants completed a survey evaluating Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump on various personality traits; 72% gave responses favoring a single candidate. We then covertly manipulated their surveys so that the majority of their responses became moderate instead. Participants only noticed and corrected a few of these manipulations. When asked to explain their responses, 94% accepted the manipulated responses as their own and rationalized this neutral position accordingly, even though they reported more polarized views moments earlier. In Study 2, we replicated the experiment online with a more politically diverse sample of 498 participants. Both Clinton and Trump supporters showed nearly identical rates of acceptance and rationalization of their manipulated-to-neutral positions. These studies demonstrate how false feedback can powerfully shape the expression of political views. More generally, our findings reveal the potential for open-minded discussion even in a fundamentally divided political climate.
The Urban-Rural Gulf in American Political Behavior
James Gimpel et al.
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Urban-rural differences in partisan political loyalty are as familiar in the United States as they are in other countries. In this paper, we examine Gallup survey data from the early-2000s through 2018 to understand the urban-rural fissure that has been so noticeable in recent elections. We consider the potential mechanisms of an urban-rural political divide. We suggest that urban and rural dwellers oppose each other because they reside in far apart locations without much interaction and support different political parties because population size structures opinion quite differently in small towns compared with large cities. In particular, we consider the extent to which the compositional characteristics (i.e., race, income, education, etc.) of the individuals living in these locales drives the divide. We find that sizable urban-rural differences persist even after accounting for an array of individual-level characteristics that typically distinguish them.
Voter mobilisation in the echo chamber: Broadband internet and the rise of populism in Europe
Max Schaub & Davide Morisi
European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can the diffusion of broadband internet help explain the recent success of populist parties in Europe? Populists cultivate an anti‐elitist communication style, which, they claim, directly connects them with ordinary people. The internet therefore appears to be the perfect tool for populist leaders. This study shows that this notion holds up to rigorous empirical testing. Drawing on survey data from Italy and Germany, a positive correlation is found between use of the internet as a source of political information and voting for populist parties. By instrumenting internet use with broadband coverage at the municipality level, the study then demonstrates that this relationship is causal. The findings suggest that part of the rise of populism can be attributed to the effect of online tools and communication strategies made possible by the proliferation of broadband access.
Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization
Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro
NBER Working Paper, January 2020
Abstract:
We measure trends in affective polarization in nine OECD countries over the past four decades. The US experienced the largest increase in polarization over this period. Three countries experienced a smaller increase in polarization. Five countries experienced a decrease in polarization. These findings are most consistent with explanations of polarization based on changes (e.g., changing party composition, growing racial divisions, the emergence of partisan cable news) that are more distinctive to the US, and less consistent with explanations based on changes (e.g., the emergence of the internet, rising economic inequality) that are more universal.
Political behavior, perceived similarity to the candidates, and defensiveness: The curious case of a group of first-time voters in a bellwether-swing-state in 2016
Jennifer Howell & Erin O’Mara
Self and Identity, February 2020, Pages 164-180
Abstract:
Using a sample of 258 first-time voters in a bellwether swing state during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, we examined the extent to which people assumed that the major presidential candidates shared their values and defensiveness about these assumptions. Participants estimated their agreement with the two major-party candidates, completed an online quiz about their beliefs, and then received feedback about their actual agreement with the candidates. Consistent with hypotheses, Trump supporters overestimated their agreement with Trump and underestimated their agreement with Clinton on political issues. To the extent that they did so, they showed greater negative affective and defensive reactions to feedback. On the other hand, Clinton supporters unexpectedly underestimated their agreement with Clinton and only slightly underestimated their agreement with Trump. Also surprisingly, Clinton supporters were largely unmoved learning that they misestimated their agreement with Clinton.
Increasing American Political Tolerance: A Framework Excluding Hate Speech
Anna Boch
Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, February 2020
Abstract:
According to prior research, political tolerance has either stagnated since the 1970s (if to be tolerant one must be tolerant of every group in all circumstances) or steadily increased (if tolerance is measured using an index, averaging across groups). Using General Social Survey cross-sectional and panel data on civil liberties, this article proposes a new framework: separating out the groups that use hate speech from those that may be only controversial. The United States is unique among Western liberal democracies in not having a prohibition against hate speech. By applying a dichotomous hate speech framework to measuring political tolerance, this article finds that the proportion of Americans who are always tolerant has increased by 8 percentage points from 1996 to 2018. Meanwhile, tolerance of groups that use hate speech has remained flat and even decreased among groups that historically were more tolerant of such groups, including the college educated.
Political Ideology over the Life Course
Sam Peltzman
University of Chicago Working Paper, December 2019
Abstract:
Young people tend to be more liberal than older people. This paper goes beyond that generality to describe more precisely how self-described political ideology varies with age. I distinguish period (across people of different ages at a moment in time) from cohort (changes in people as they get older) characterizations of this age-ideology gradient. Data are from General Social Surveys from 1974 through 2018, including synthetic cohorts formed from 5 year subsamples of the data. Ideology is measured on a {-1, 1} scale: liberals (conservatives) are -1 (+1) and moderates are 0. The average of this measure (Libcon) generally increases with age both within every 5-year sub-period and among all available cohorts; the shape of these gradients varies considerably across these sub-periods. However, the longer run central tendency is a very well defined concave gradient that rises over the whole life course. The period and cohort versions of this gradient essentially overlap. The change in mean Libcon from early adulthood (25) to old age (80) is substantial (over .20 on the -1, 1 scale), and around half of this occurs after age 45. I discuss implications for “purple America” characterizations of political ideology and for the strain of literature emphasizing ideological “persistence.”
Social Norms and Selectivity: Effects of Norms of Open-Mindedness on Content Selection and Affective Polarization
Magdalena Wojcieszak, Stephan Winter & Xudong Yu
Mass Communication and Society, forthcoming
Abstract:
Given the polarizing effects of exposure to like-minded political information and the alleged societal benefits of exposure to diverse and dissimilar perspectives, we examine how to promote the selection of balanced and counter-attitudinal political content, thereby minimizing affective polarization. Two online experiments on American partisans (N = 389 and N = 1378) tested the influence of social norms promoting open-mindedness. Study 1 focused on supporters and opponents of President Trump, showing that highlighting social norm of open-mindedness (vs. close-mindedness) in the general public increased exposure to balanced articles. Study 2, which focused on Democrats vs. Republicans and on the social norms among one’s partisan ingroup, showed that highlighting ingroup open-mindedness (vs. control) enhanced counter-attitudinal exposure and indirectly attenuated several indicators of affective polarization. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for informed citizenship in an era of abundant media choice.
Peers versus Pros: Confirmation Bias in Selective Exposure to User-Generated versus Professional Media Messages and its Consequences
Axel Westerwick et al.
Mass Communication and Society, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political information is now commonly consumed embedded in user-generated content and social media. Hence, peer users (as opposed to professional journalists) have become frequently encountered sources of such information. This experiment tested competing hypotheses on whether exposure to attitude-consistent versus -discrepant political messages (confirmation bias) depends on association with peer versus professional sources, through observational data and multi-level modeling. Results showed the confirmation bias was differentiated, as attitude importance fostered it only in the peer sources condition: When consuming user-generated posts on political issues, users showed a greater confirmation bias the more importance they attached to a specific political issue. Furthermore, exposure generally affected attitudes in line with message stance, as attitude-consistent exposure reinforced attitudes, while attitude-discrepant exposure weakened them (still detectable a day after exposure). Attitude impacts were mediated by opinion climate perceptions.
What’s in a Font?: Ideological Perceptions of Typography
Katherine Haenschen & Daniel Tamul
Communication Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although extensive political communication research considers the content of candidate messages, scholars have largely ignored how those words are rendered - specifically, the typefaces in which they are set. If typefaces are found to have political attributes, that may impact how voters receive campaign messages. Our paper reports the results of two survey experiments demonstrating that individuals perceive typefaces, type families, and type styles to have ideological qualities. Furthermore, partisanship moderates subjects’ perceptions of typefaces: Republicans generally view typefaces as more conservative than Independents and Democrats. We also find evidence of affective polarization, in that individuals rate typefaces more favorably when perceived as sharing their ideological orientation. Results broaden our understanding of how meaning is conveyed in political communication, laying the groundwork for future research into the functions of typography and graphic design in contemporary political campaigns. Implications for political practitioners are also discussed.