Escalator
The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats
Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka & Ondrej Rosendorf
Journal of Experimental Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.
Taiwanese Public Opinion on the Chinese and US Military Presence in the Taiwan Strait
Wen-Chin Wu et al.
China Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Since 2016, China has been conducting military flybys around Taiwan, while the US has approved arms sales to Taiwan on several occasions and sent warplanes and battleships through the Taiwan Strait. How does Taiwanese public opinion respond to the Chinese and US military presence in the Strait? Is the public likely to become less supportive of de jure independence for Taiwan on account of China's military deterrence or more supportive owing to a perceived likelihood of US military assistance? In this report, we provide answers to these questions based on evidence from a survey experiment conducted in Taiwan in October–November 2020. We find that Taiwanese are less sensitive to the Chinese military presence in the Taiwan Strait but have become more supportive of de jure independence after seeing the US aircraft in the area. Our findings contribute to studies of cross-Strait relations and US foreign policy on the Taiwan Strait.
Transatlantic Shakedown: Presidential Shaming and NATO Burden Sharing
Jordan Becker et al.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does “shaming” work in NATO? More precisely, does publicly using negative language criticizing allies’ defense spending improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower spending? We evaluate the effectiveness of public shaming language; specifically, whether it increases allies’ defense spending or whether other considerations like external threat, domestic budgets, economic growth, or unemployment rates are better predictors of contributions. Using an original dataset of presidential statements and NATO defense spending data disaggregated across the four categories tracked by the alliance, we conclude that negative language toward allies’ spending is at best ineffective and may even adversely affect burden-sharing in the long run. These findings have important implications for the political economy of alliances and both theories and policies on the use of rhetorical pressure to elicit compliance in asymmetric power relationships.
Why don’t democracies fight each other? The role of territorial issues
Andrew Owsiak & John Vasquez
Conflict Management and Peace Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why don't democracies fight each other? Since discovering this empirical regularity, scholars have assumed that the answer must lie with regime type (i.e. democracy). Our paper provides and tests an alternative explanation: the territorial explanation of war, which stresses grievances and argues that territorial issues incentivize states to resort to war more often than disagreements over other, non-territorial issues. We show that democracies do not generally have territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) or the territorial claims that would produce territorial MIDs. Democracies are peaceful because they lack the most dangerous grievances in the international system.
Do Proxies Provide Plausible Deniability? Evidence From Experiments on Three Surveys
Scott Williamson
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
A purported advantage of secrecy in international politics is its ability to reduce pressures for conflict escalation by obscuring responsibility for hostile actions. Delegating these actions to proxies is one strategy states use to retain plausible deniability and limit escalation risks. Yet, proxies often have strong ties to sponsoring states, raising questions about their ability to influence blame and demands for retaliation. This paper tests these effects by analyzing American responses to hypothetical attacks by Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors through experiments administered on three surveys. The results show that using proxies for these attacks modestly reduced how much Americans blamed the respective foreign governments, while also limiting demands that their senior leadership be sanctioned. However, the use of proxies did not affect Americans’ attitudes toward more forceful responses by the US government. These findings contribute to understanding of how proxies shape plausible deniability and escalation risks in international conflicts.
Disorganized Political Violence: A Demonstration Case of Temperature and Insurgency
Andrew Shaver & Alexander Bollfrass
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Any act of battlefield violence results from a combination of organizational strategy and a combatant's personal motives. To measure the relative contribution of each, our research design leverages the predictable effect of ambient temperature on human aggression. Using fine-grained data collected by US forces during the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, we test whether temperature and violence are linked for attacks that can be initiated by individual combatants, but not for those requiring organizational coordination. To distinguish alternative explanations involving temperature effects on target movements, we examine situations where targets are stationary. We find that when individual combatants have discretion over the initiation of violence, ambient temperature does shape battlefield outcomes. There is no such effect when organizational coordination is necessary. We also find that ambient temperature affects combat-age males’ endorsement of insurgent violence in a survey taken during the conflict in Iraq. Our findings caution against attributing strategic causes to violence and encourage research into how strategic and individual-level motivations interact in conflict.
Madman or Mad Genius? The International Benefits and Domestic Costs of the Madman Strategy
Joshua Schwartz
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
According to the “Madman Theory” outlined by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas C. Schelling, and embraced by Presidents Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, being perceived as mad can help make seemingly incredible threats -- such as starting a nuclear war -- more credible. However, recent research has largely concluded that the Madman Theory does not work. In this study, I theorize that the international benefits of the Madman Theory have been underestimated, but also that there are significant domestic barriers associated with adopting such a strategy that undermine its effectiveness. Through a series of five novel survey experiments, I find evidence that perceived madness provides limited advantages in coercive bargaining vis-à-vis foreign adversaries, but it also entails significant domestic costs that potentially erode its efficacy. Overall, this study provides clearer support for the Madman Theory than most previous literature has found, but also breaks new theoretical ground by analyzing the domestic politics of perceived madness.
UN Security Council membership: Increased security and reduced conflict
Alastair Smith & James Raymond Vreeland
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership comes with privileges. Existing research shows that the world’s most powerful countries funnel financial favors to governments elected to the UNSC, arguably to influence their votes on matters of international importance. This study investigates whether these governments, whose election elevates them to prominent positions of power, also receive security benefits. We argue that elected UNSC members win the attention and protection of the world’s super powers, and, as a result, are less likely to be attacked. But we further argue that the General Assembly and the world’s super powers prefer pacific countries on the UNSC. In support of our theory, we find empirically that temporary membership on the UNSC is associated with lower rates of being targeted and lower rates of initiating conflict. We conclude that UNSC membership has existential benefits and is associated with a reduced likelihood of militarized disputes.
Mining for the Bomb: The Vulnerability of Buried Plutonium to Clandestine Recovery
Cameron Tracy & Rodney Ewing
Science & Global Security, Winter 2022, Pages 131-162
Abstract:
Efforts by the United States and Russia to bilaterally reduce their weapons plutonium stockpiles are currently stalled following a U.S. decision to dilute and bury excess plutonium in a geologic repository. Russia has derided this approach as impermanent and easily reversible. Conversely, many analysts contend that the recovery of buried plutonium would require large-scale mining operations, rendering it observable and preventable. Here, we show that the use of advanced mining techniques overlooked in prior analysis (namely, salt solution mining and in situ leaching) would enable the rapid, clandestine recovery of buried plutonium. Burial would therefore yield a novel plutonium geologic resource. We attribute the persistence of international technical controversy over the permanence of plutonium burial to state-level divergence in U.S. and Russian technological framings of plutonium and geologic repositories -- distinct socially constructed understandings of the meanings, uses, and risks of these technologies.
Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism
Ryan Shandler, Nadiya Kostyuk & Harry Oppenheimer
Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 2023, Pages 92–119
Abstract:
Research into cyber-conflict, public opinion, and international security is burgeoning, yet the field suffers from an absence of conceptual agreement about key terms. For instance, every time a cyberattack takes place, a public debate erupts as to whether it constitutes cyberterrorism. This debate bears significant consequences, seeing as the ascription of a “terrorism” label enables the application of heavy-handed counterterrorism powers and heightens the level of perceived threat among the public. In light of widespread conceptual disagreement in cyberspace, we assert that public opinion plays a heightened role in understanding the nature of cyber threats. We construct a typological framework to illuminate the attributes that drive the public classification of an attack as cyberterrorism, which we test through a ratings-based conjoint experiment in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (N = 21,238 observations). We find that the public (1) refrains from labeling attacks by unknown actors or hacker collectives as cyberterrorism; and (2) classifies attacks that disseminate sensitive data as terrorism to a greater extent even than physically explosive attacks. Importantly, the uniform public perspectives across the three countries challenge a foundational tenet of public opinion and international relations scholarship that divided views among elites on foreign policy matters will be reflected by a divided public. This study concludes by providing a definitive conceptual baseline to support future research on the topic.
Managing our SOBs: Washington's response to friendly dictators in trouble
Victor Béliveau
Presidential Studies Quarterly, March 2023, Pages 77-96
Abstract:
Why does the United States either continue to support or turn its back on a friendly dictator once that dictator is faced with internal uprisings? This study argues that a US president's decision to either remain loyal to or abandon dictators when they are in trouble ultimately depends on the preservation of acquired influence (PAI). This argument is tested by considering three crises in which the White House was faced with a choice between prolonging support or abandoning established alliances with Batista in Cuba (1956–1959), Mobutu in Zaire (1990–1991), and Mubarak in Egypt (2011). In all three case studies, the PAI argument is found to account for observed variations in US foreign policy toward friendly dictators in trouble.
Global Governance From Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions
Inken von Borzyskowski & Clara Portela
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity.