Endowed by their Creator
Religious People Are Trusted Because They Are Viewed as Slow Life-History Strategists
Jordan Moon, Jaimie Arona Krems & Adam Cohen
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Religious people are more trusted than nonreligious people. Although most theorists attribute these perceptions to the beliefs of religious targets, religious individuals also differ in behavioral ways that might cue trust. We examined whether perceivers might trust religious targets more because they heuristically associate religion with slow life-history strategies. In three experiments, we found that religious targets are viewed as slow life-history strategists and that these findings are not the result of a universally positive halo effect; that the effect of target religion on trust is significantly mediated by the target's life-history traits (i.e., perceived reproductive strategy); and that when perceivers have direct information about a target's reproductive strategy, their ratings of trust are driven primarily by his or her reproductive strategy, rather than religion. These effects operate over and above targets' belief in moralizing gods and offer a novel theoretical perspective on religion and trust.
Are the Politics of the Christian Right Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? The Importance of Salient Controversy
Paul Djupe, Jacob Neiheisel & Kimberly Conger
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Hout and Fischer have made the repeated, controversial claim that the dramatic rise of "religious nones" in the United States is due to the prominence of the politics of the Christian Right. As the argument goes, the movement's extreme stands on gay rights and abortion make religion inhospitable to those who take more moderate and liberal positions. We take another look at this proposition with novel data drawing on expert reports and interest group counts that capture the prominence of the movement in each American state from 2000 to 2010. We attach these data to decennial religious census data on the unchurched, as well as estimates of the nones from Cooperative Congressional Election Study data. At stake is whether religion is independent of political influence and whether American religion is sowing its own fate by failing to limit taking extreme stands. Rising none rates are more common in Republican states in this period. Moreover, when the Christian Right comes into more public conflict, such as over same-sex marriage bans, the rate of religious nones climbs.
Religious shoppers spend less money
Didem Kurt, Jeffrey Inman & Francesca Gino
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although religion is a central aspect of life for many people across the globe, there is scant research on how religion affects people's non-religious routines. In the present research, we identify a frequent consumption activity that is influenced by religiosity: grocery shopping. Using both field and laboratory data, we find that grocery spending decreases with religiosity. Specifically, we document that people who live in more religious U.S. counties spend less money on groceries and make fewer unplanned purchases. We also demonstrate this negative relationship by measuring religiosity at the individual level and employing a religious prime. That is, the more religious people are, the less willing they are to follow through on novel purchase opportunities that arise during their grocery shopping trips. This effect is consistent with the account that many religions emphasize the value of being prudent with money. Additional analysis supports our predicted indirect effect of religiosity on spending through frugality.
Religion as an Exchange System: The Interchangeability of God and Government in a Provider Role
Miron Zuckerman, Chen Li & Ed Diener
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
An exchange model of religion implies that if a secular entity such as government provides what people need, they will be less likely to seek help from supernatural entities. Controlling for quality of life and income inequality (Gini), we found that better government services were related to lower religiosity among countries (Study 1) and states in the United States (Study 2). Study 2 also showed that during 2008-2013, better government services in a specific year predicted lower religiosity 1 to 2 years later. In both studies, a combination of better government services and quality of life was related to a particularly low level of religiosity. Among countries, government services moderated the relation between religiosity and two measures of well-being, such that religiosity was related to greater well-being only when government services were low. We discuss the relation between the exchange model and other theoretical approaches to religion.
Bored like Hell: Religiosity reduces boredom and tempers the quest for meaning
Wijnand van Tilburg et al.
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Boredom involves a lack of meaning. Conversely, religiosity offers people a sense of meaning. Accordingly, we proposed that by imbuing a sense of meaningfulnesss, religiosity leads people to experience less boredom. Furthermore, we hypothesized and tested that by reducing boredom, religiosity indirectly inhibits the search for meaningful engagement. In Study 1, following boring tasks, religious people experienced lower levels of boredom and were less motivated to search for meaning than nonreligious people. We found in Study 2 that religious (vs. non- or less religious) people reported higher perceived meaning in life, which was associated with a reduced tendency to feel bored, and with a reduced need to search for meaning in life. Study 3 confirmed that the meaning in life associated with religiosity was associated with reduced state boredom. Religious participants were again less inclined to search for meaning, which was explained by the relatively low levels of boredom that religious (vs. nonreligious) participants experienced.
Why the Arab Spring turned Islamic: The political economy of Islam
Mario Ferrero
Constitutional Political Economy, June 2018, Pages 230-251
Abstract:
This paper argues that the fundamental reason for the ascendancy of political Islam in the wake of the Arab revolutions lies in the uncompetitive nature of the religion and its implications for political economy: the fact that Islam is one and long since unchanged, which makes the Islamists' call very costly to resist and very attractive to follow. The argument is developed through an examination of sectarian and legal history in Islam and a comparison of the nexus between church, state and individual in Christian and Muslim religious traditions. Special attention is devoted to Islamic Law and the law schools that define it.
Feeling Is Believing: Inspiration Encourages Belief in God
Clayton Critcher & Chan Jean Lee
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Even without direct evidence of God's existence, about half of the world's population believes in God. Although previous research has found that people arrive at such beliefs intuitively instead of analytically, relatively little research has aimed to understand what experiences encourage or legitimate theistic belief systems. Using cross-cultural correlational and experimental methods, we investigated whether the experience of inspiration encourages a belief in God. Participants who dispositionally experience more inspiration, were randomly assigned to relive or have an inspirational experience, or reported such experiences to be more inspirational all showed stronger belief in God. These effects were specific to inspiration (instead of adjacent affective experiences) and a belief in God (instead of other empirically unverifiable claims). Being inspired by someone or something (but not inspired to do something) offers a spiritually transcendent experience that elevates belief in God, in part because it makes people feel connected to something beyond themselves.
The Relation between Religiosity and Private Bank Outcomes
Brett Cantrell & Christopher Yust
Journal of Banking & Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine the effect of headquarters' local religiosity on private bank outcomes. Religiosity is associated with lower risk-taking for public banks, but the unique features of private banks may result in a different effect for private banks. We find religiosity is associated with greater asset risk-taking. At the same time, however, religiosity, is negatively associated with solvency risk and return on asset (ROA) volatility and is associated with higher ROAs and fewer failures. We reconcile these results by finding banks in areas with higher religiosity recognize larger fees from providing additional banking services, likely due to relationships formed from more risky lending. As a result, these banks are more (less) likely to realize extreme positive (negative) performance. We also find religiosity is associated with lower earnings management and increased conservatism. Collectively, our results confirm private banks are unique and religiosity can have a significant, and nuanced, effect on bank outcomes.
Voodoo, Vaccines and Bed Nets
Nik Stoop, Marijke Verpoorten & Koen Deconinck
Economics Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide the first quantitative analysis to scrutinize the ample ethnographic evidence that magico-religious beliefs affect the demand for conventional healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa. We rely on the unique case of Benin, where Voodoo-adherence is freely reported, and varies greatly within villages and even within households, yet can be traced to historic events that are arguably exogenous to present-day healthcare behavior. These features allow us to account for confounding village- and household-factors, and address self-selection into Voodoo. We find that Voodoo adherence of the mother is associated with lower uptake of preventive healthcare measures and worse child health outcomes, a relationship that weakens but remains when controlling for village dummies and a large set of observables. We employ three different strategies to test for the potential influence of unobservables. The results suggest that the estimated Voodoo-effects are partly causal. A tentative exploration of the causal mechanisms suggests a mediating role of traditional healers.
Killing for God? Factional Violence on the Transnational Stage
Jori Breslawski & Brandon Ives
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why are some factions fighting for greater national self-determination (SD) more violent than others? While previous explanations of violence in these disputes have focused on the number of factions, their internal structures, and power distributions among factions, we find many factions that do not follow the expectations of these theories. In this article, we center on religious ideology, its unique transnational character, and the opportunity it creates for political elites from competing factions within the same SD movement to mobilize support. We argue that "religious factions" have a greater incentive to use violence than other factions. Violence serves as a costly signal, and it can be used to demonstrate a faction's religious credentials to transnational networks and contacts, as they compete with each other on the international stage for the same potential benefactors. We code original data on the religious ideology of factions. We find that an increasing number of religious factions is associated with increased religious faction use of violence. Furthermore, our findings point to a critical insight: it is not religious ideology, but competition between religious factions, that generates violence.
Paths to Enlightenment: Constructing Buddhist Identities in Mainland China and the United States
Di Di
Sociology of Religion, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do national contexts influence the construction of religious identity in faith communities? In this article, I examine the construction of Buddhist identities in two similar ethnic Chinese Mahayana Buddhist temples but in distinct national contexts, one in mainland China and the other in the United States. While both are Chinese Mahayana Buddhist temples, they have distinctive temple-level cultures: a strict culture in China and a permissive culture in the United States. Individual-level cultural frameworks also differ. In mainland China, the Buddhists learn their religion dutifully while their U.S. counterparts critically explore religion inside and outside their temples. Relying on theories in cultural sociology, I argue that national contexts influence both individual-level cultural frameworks and temple-level group styles to produce different religious identities. This article has implications for future studies that examine how community-based religious identities vary according to national context.