Base instincts
Exposure to Opposing Views can Increase Political Polarization: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment on Social Media
Christopher Bail et al.
Duke University Working Paper, March 2018
Abstract:
There is mounting concern that social media sites contribute to political polarization by creating "echo chambers" that insulate people from opposing views about current events. We surveyed a large sample of Democrats and Republicans who visit Twitter at least three times each week about a range of social policy issues. One week later, we randomly assigned respondents to a treatment condition in which they were offered financial incentives to follow a Twitter bot for one month that exposed them to messages produced by elected officials, organizations, and other opinion leaders with opposing political ideologies. Respondents were re-surveyed at the end of the month to measure the effect of this treatment, and at regular intervals throughout the study period to monitor treatment compliance. We find that Republicans who followed a liberal Twitter bot became substantially more conservative post-treatment, and Democrats who followed a conservative Twitter bot became slightly more liberal post-treatment. These findings have important implications for the interdisciplinary literature on political polarization as well as the emerging field of computational social science.
On the Representativeness of Primary Electorates
John Sides et al.
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Primary voters are frequently characterized as an ideologically extreme subset of their party, and thus partially responsible for party polarization in government. This study uses a combination of administrative records on primary turnout and five recent surveys from 2008-14 to show that primary voters have similar demographic attributes and policy attitudes as rank-and-file voters in their party. These similarities do not vary according to the openness of the primary. These results suggest that the composition of primary electorates does not exert a polarizing effect above what might arise from voters in the party as a whole.
Polarization, Demographic Change, and White Flight from the Democratic Party
Joshua Zingher
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Whites have become less likely to support the Democratic Party. I show that this shift is being driven by two mechanisms. The first mechanism is the process of ideological sorting. The Democratic Party has lost support among conservative whites because the relationships between partisanship, voting behavior, and policy orientations have strengthened. The second mechanism relates to demographic changes. The growth of liberal minority populations has shifted the median position on economic issues to the left and away from the median white citizen’s position. The parties have responded to these changes by shifting their positions, and whites have become less likely to support the Democratic Party as a result. I test these explanations using 40 years of American National Election Study and DW-NOMINATE data. I find that whites have become 7.7 points more likely to vote for the Republican Party, and mean white partisanship has shifted .26 points in favor of the Republicans as a combined result of both mechanisms.
Epistemic Spillovers: Learning Others’ Political Views Reduces the Ability to Assess and Use Their Expertise in Nonpolitical Domains
Joseph Marks et al.
University College London Working Paper, April 2018
Abstract:
On political questions, many people are especially likely to consult and learn from those whose political views are similar to their own, thus creating a risk of echo chambers or information cocoons. Here, we test whether the tendency to prefer knowledge from the politically like-minded generalizes to domains that have nothing to do with politics, even when evidence indicates that person is less skilled in that domain than someone with dissimilar political views. Participants had multiple opportunities to learn about others’ (1) political opinions and (2) ability to categorize geometric shapes. They then decided to whom to turn for advice when solving an incentivized shape categorization task. We find that participants falsely concluded that politically like-minded others were better at categorizing shapes and thus chose to hear from them. Participants were also more influenced by politically like-minded others, even when they had good reason not to be. The results demonstrate that knowing about others’ political views interferes with the ability to learn about their competency in unrelated tasks, leading to suboptimal information-seeking decisions and errors in judgement. Our findings have implications for political polarization and social learning in the midst of political divisions.
Ideologues Without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities
Lilliana Mason
Public Opinion Quarterly, April 2018, Pages 280-301
Abstract:
The distinction between a person’s ideological identity and their issue positions has come more clearly into focus in recent research. Scholars have pointed out a significant difference between identity-based and issue-based ideology in the American electorate. However, the affective and social effects of these separate elements of ideology have not been sufficiently explored. Drawing on a national sample collected by SSI and data from the 2016 ANES, this article finds that the identity-based elements of ideology are capable of driving heightened levels of affective polarization against outgroup ideologues, even at low levels of policy attitude extremity or constraint. These findings demonstrate how Americans can use ideological terms to disparage political opponents without necessarily holding constrained sets of policy attitudes.
Marginalized Individuals and Extremism: The Role of Ostracism in Openness to Extreme Groups
Andrew Hales & Kipling Williams
Journal of Social Issues, March 2018, Pages 75-92
Abstract:
Does the experience of being socially ostracized increase interest in extreme groups? Drawing from the temporal need‐threat model of ostracism, and uncertainty‐identity theory, we conducted two experiments testing the hypothesis that compared to included individuals, ostracized individuals will show greater interest in extreme groups. In Study 1, following a recruitment attempt, ostracized participants expressed greater willingness to attend a meeting of an activist campus organization advocating reducing tuition. In Study 2, ostracized participants expressed greater openness towards gang membership. These findings emphasize the importance of leaders creating environments that minimize feelings of social exclusion, and suggest that approaches to international policy that exclude/marginalize (i.e., refusing to meet for negotiations) may produce greater extremity.
The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking
Sharun Mukand & Dani RodrikA
NBER Working Paper, March 2018
Abstract:
We develop a conceptual framework to highlight the role of ideas as a catalyst for policy and institutional change. We make an explicit distinction between ideas and vested interests and show how they feed into each other. In doing so the paper integrates the Keynes-Hayek perspective on the importance of ideas with the currently more fashionable Stigler-Becker (interests only) approach to political economy. We distinguish between two kinds of ideational politics - the battle among different worldviews on the efficacy of policy (worldview politics) versus the politics of victimhood, pride and identity (identity politics). Political entrepreneurs discover identity and policy ‘memes’ (narratives, cues, framing) that shift beliefs about how the world works or a person’s belief of who he is (i.e. identity). Our framework identifies a complementarity between worldview politics and identity politics and illustrates how they may reinforce each other. In particular, an increase in identity polarization may be associated with a shift in views about how the world works. Furthermore, an increase in income inequality is likely to result in a greater incidence of ideational politics. Finally, we show how ideas may not just constrain, but also ‘bite’ the interests that helped propagate them in the first instance.
“Terrorist” or “Mentally Ill”: Motivated Biases Rooted in Partisanship Shape Attributions About Violent Actors
Masi Noor et al.
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We investigated whether motivated reasoning rooted in partisanship affects the attributions individuals make about violent attackers’ underlying motives and group memberships. Study 1 demonstrated that on the day of the Brexit referendum pro-leavers (vs. pro-remainers) attributed an exculpatory (i.e., mental health) versus condemnatory (i.e., terrorism) motive to the killing of a pro-remain politician. Study 2 demonstrated that pro-immigration (vs. anti-immigration) perceivers in Germany ascribed a mental health (vs. terrorism) motive to a suicide attack by a Syrian refugee, predicting lower endorsement of punitiveness against his group (i.e., refugees) as a whole. Study 3 experimentally manipulated target motives, showing that Americans distanced a politically motivated (vs. mentally ill) violent individual from their in-group and assigned him harsher punishment - patterns most pronounced among high-group identifiers.
Is belief superiority justified by superior knowledge?
Michael Hall & Kaitlin Raimi
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, May 2018, Pages 290-306
Abstract:
Individuals expressing belief superiority - the belief that one's views are superior to other viewpoints - perceive themselves as better informed about that topic, but no research has verified whether this perception is justified. The present research examined whether people expressing belief superiority on four political issues demonstrated superior knowledge or superior knowledge-seeking behavior. Despite perceiving themselves as more knowledgeable, knowledge assessments revealed that the belief superior exhibited the greatest gaps between their perceived and actual knowledge. When given the opportunity to pursue additional information in that domain, belief-superior individuals frequently favored agreeable over disagreeable information, but also indicated awareness of this bias. Lastly, experimentally manipulated feedback about one's knowledge had some success in affecting belief superiority and resulting information-seeking behavior. Specifically, when belief superiority is lowered, people attend to information they may have previously regarded as inferior. Implications of unjustified belief superiority and biased information pursuit for political discourse are discussed.
A moral house divided: How idealized family models impact political cognition
Matthew Feinberg & Elisabeth Wehling
PLoS ONE, April 2018
Abstract:
People’s political attitudes tend to fall into two groups: progressive and conservative. Moral Politics Theory asserts that this ideological divide is the product of two contrasting moral worldviews, which are conceptually anchored in individuals’ cognitive models about ideal parenting and family life. These models, here labeled the strict and nurturant models, serve as conceptual templates for how society should function, and dictate whether one will endorse more conservative or progressive positions. According to Moral Politics Theory, individuals map their parenting ideals onto the societal domain by engaging the nation-as-family metaphor, which facilitates reasoning about the abstract social world (the nation) in terms of more concrete world experience (family life). In the present research, we conduct an empirical examination of these core assertions of Moral Politics Theory. In Studies 1-3, we experimentally test whether family ideals directly map onto political attitudes while ruling out alternative explanations. In Studies 4-5, we use both correlational and experimental methods to examine the nation-as-family metaphor’s role in facilitating the translation of family beliefs into societal beliefs and, ultimately, political attitudes. Overall, we found consistent support for Moral Politics Theory’s assertions that family ideals directly impact political judgment, and that the nation-as-family metaphor serves a mediating role in this phenomenon.
Evangelizing Congress: The Emergence of Evangelical Republicans and Party Polarization in Congress
Nicole Asmussen Mathew
Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The realignment of evangelical voters is well‐documented, but religion's impact within Congress is less clear. New data on home churches of members of Congress shows that the realignment of congressional evangelicals, combined with their growth and distinctly conservative legislative behavior, has significantly contributed to party polarization in Congress. Controlling for other factors, evangelicals are significantly more conservative than members of other religious traditions. This conservatism also has second‐order effects on the polarization of the House, where their more partisan proposals comprise a larger share of the roll‐call agenda when Republicans are in the majority. Moreover, evangelical Republicans in Congress differ significantly from evangelical Democrats in terms their geography, denominations, and experiences prior to Congress.
Happy Partisans and Ideologues: State Versus National
Jeremy Jackson
North Dakota State University Working Paper, March 2018
Abstract:
The political party of elected officials can affect the happiness of the voting public through several different channels. Partisan voters will be happier whenever a member of their party controls political office regardless of the policies implemented. Ideologues are happier when the politicians in power, regardless of party affiliation, enact policies closer to those that they prefer. Using data from the Generalized Social Survey the effect of party affiliation of national and state politicians on happiness is estimated. Political ideology scores are also gathered allowing the effect of ideology and its match with respondent preferences to be estimated. It is hypothesized that state political affiliations and ideology scores should have a greater impact on citizen happiness due to results from the literature on Tiebout sorting. However, this is not the case. Presidential party affiliation and ideology have a much greater impact on happiness than national legislative affiliation/ideology or gubernatorial and state legislative affiliation/ideology. These results suggest that identity politics appear to have the greatest effect on happiness.
In your face: Emotional expressivity as a predictor of ideology
Johnathan Caleb Peterson et al.
Politics and the Life Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
Research suggests that people can accurately predict the political affiliations of others using only information extracted from the face. It is less clear from this research, however, what particular facial physiological processes or features communicate such information. Using a model of emotion developed in psychology that treats emotional expressivity as an individual-level trait, this article provides a theoretical account of why emotional expressivity may provide reliable signals of political orientation, and it tests the theory in four empirical studies. We find statistically significant liberal/conservative differences in self-reported emotional expressivity, in facial emotional expressivity measured physiologically, in the perceived emotional expressivity and ideology of political elites, and in an experiment that finds that more emotionally expressive faces are perceived as more liberal.
Is Political Conservatism Adaptive? Reinterpreting Right‐Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation as Evolved, Sociofunctional Strategies
Jeffrey Sinn & Matthew Hayes
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The Dual Process Model (DPM) explains prejudice and political conservatism as functions of Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and a Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Duckitt, 2001). From an evolutionary perspective, such orientations may represent specific adaptations to coalitional competition in the ancestral environment (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Supporting this view, recent research suggests the two orientations represent divergent strategies, with RWA pursuing an honest‐cooperator strategy and SDO a deceptive, cooperation‐mimicking strategy (Heylen & Pauwels, 2015). In two studies, we examine additional evidence for an adaptationist interpretation of DPM. Utilizing life history theory, Study 1 finds that RWA reflects the predicted “slow” strategy by endorsing planning and control, investment in family relationships, altruism, and religiosity. In contrast, SDO reflects a “fast” strategy by devaluing planning and control, secure relationships, and altruism. Utilizing rank management theory, Study 2 finds that RWA reflects a prosocial orientation, endorsing coalition building and social networking while rejecting deception and manipulation. In contrast, SDO reflects an exploitive orientation, rejecting coalition building and networking but endorsing ruthless self‐advancement and deceptive tactics. These findings support an adaptationist revision of RWA to recognize its prosocial, honest‐cooperator dimension and of SDO to recognize proself, “dark” tactics seeking power within groups.
Partisan Barriers to Bipartisanship: Understanding Climate Policy Polarization
Phillip Ehret, Leaf Van Boven & David Sherman
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Everyday partisans evaluate policies partly by following partisan cues, fomenting polarization. However, there is debate over the influence of partisan cues in “real-world,” nonlaboratory contexts. An experiment with a real climate change initiative in the 2016 Washington State election tested whether partisan cues influenced climate policy polarization. In a primary study, 504 prospective voters were randomly assigned to view veridical policy endorsements by partisan elites; this study was followed by a preregistered conceptual replication (N = 1,178). Democrats supported the climate policy more than Republicans. But this difference was greater when Democrats endorsed the policy (with Republican opposition) than when Republicans endorsed the policy (with Democratic opposition). Neither knowledge nor belief in climate change reduced these polarizing effects, and greater policy knowledge was associated with increased polarization. Further, the effect of partisan cues on normative perceptions mediated the effect of partisan cues on policy support.
Using US Senate Delegations from the Same State as Paired Comparisons: Evidence for a Reagan Realignment
Thomas Brunell & Bernard Grofman
PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
The fact that two senators are elected from each state offers the potential for natural paired comparisons. In particular, examining historical and geographic patterns in terms of changes in the number of divided US Senate delegations (i.e., states whose two senators are of different parties) is a useful route to testing competing models of American politics, including theories of split-ticket voting, party polarization, and realignment. Brunell and Grofman (1998) used divided Senate delegations to indirectly examine evidence for realignment. We hypothesized that a partisan realignment will necessarily lead to a cyclical pattern in the number of divided Senate delegations. We predicted that the number of divided Senate delegations at the state level would decline after 1996 because we conjectured that there had been a realignment cusp around 1980. We tested this prediction with data from 1952-2016 and our prediction was confirmed.