Traitors among us
The Economic Consequences of Partisanship in a Polarized Era
Christopher McConnell et al.
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
With growing affective polarization in the United States, partisanship is increasingly an impediment to cooperation in political settings. But does partisanship also affect behavior in non-political settings? We show evidence that it does, demonstrating its effect on economic outcomes across a range of experiments in real-world environments. A field experiment in an online labor market indicates that workers request systematically lower reservation wages when the employer shares their political stance, reflecting a preference to work for co-partisans. We conduct two field experiments with consumers, and find a preference for dealing with co-partisans, especially among those with strong partisan attachments. Finally, via a population-based, incentivized survey experiment, we find that the influence of political considerations on economic choices extends also to weaker partisans. Whereas earlier studies show the political consequences of polarization in American politics, our findings suggest that partisanship spills over beyond the political, shaping cooperation in everyday economic behavior.
Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization? Evidence from Demographics
Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro
NBER Working Paper, March 2017
Abstract:
We combine nine previously proposed measures to construct an index of political polarization among US adults. We find that the growth in polarization in recent years is largest for the demographic groups least likely to use the internet and social media. For example, our overall index and eight of the nine individual measures show greater increases for those older than 75 than for those aged 18–39. These facts argue against the hypothesis that the internet is a primary driver of rising political polarization.
Social and economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice across the political spectrum, but social issues are most divisive
Jarret Crawford et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, March 2017, Pages 383-412
Abstract:
Liberals and conservatives both express prejudice toward ideologically dissimilar others (Brandt et al., 2014). Previous work on ideological prejudice did not take advantage of evidence showing that ideology is multidimensional, with social and economic ideologies representing related but separable belief systems. In 5 studies (total N = 4912), we test 3 competing hypotheses of a multidimensional account of ideological prejudice. The dimension-specific symmetry hypothesis predicts that social and economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice against targets who are perceived to vary on the social and economic political dimensions, respectively. The social primacy hypothesis predicts that such ideological worldview conflict is experienced more strongly along the social than economic dimension. The social-specific asymmetry hypothesis predicts that social conservatives will be more prejudiced than social liberals, with no specific hypotheses for the economic dimension. Using multiple target groups, multiple prejudice measures (e.g., global evaluations, behavior), and multiple social and economic ideology measures (self-placement, issue positions), we found relatively consistent support for the dimension-specific symmetry and social primacy hypotheses, and no support for the social-specific asymmetry hypothesis. These results suggest that worldview conflict and negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors are dimension-specific, but that the social dimension appears to inspire more political conflict than the economic dimension.
The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate
Steven Webster & Alan Abramowitz
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Democratic and Republican partisans dislike the opposing party and its leaders far more than in the past. However, recent studies have argued that the rise of affective polarization in the electorate does not reflect growing policy or ideological differences between supporters of the two parties. According to this view, though Democratic and Republican elites are sharply divided along ideological lines, differences between the policy preferences of rank-and-file partisans remain modest. In this article, we show that there is a close connection between ideological and affective polarization. We present evidence from American National Election Studies surveys that opinions on social welfare issues have become increasingly consistent and divided along party lines and that social welfare ideology is now strongly related to feelings about the opposing party and its leaders. In addition, we present results from a survey experiment showing that ideological distance strongly influences feelings toward opposing party candidates and the party as a whole.
Comic Agonism in the 2016 Campaign: A Study of Iowa Caucus Rallies
Benjamin Warner et al.
American Behavioral Scientist, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this study, we assess the extent to which attending a candidate rally was associated with distrust of democratic institutions, epistemic rigidity, attribution of malevolent intentions to the political outgroup, and acceptance of political violence. Surveys (N = 251) were distributed at rallies the night before and day of the 2016 Iowa Caucuses. Results suggest that attendees of rallies for Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump were more likely to distrust democracy relative to attendees of a Hillary Clinton or Ted Cruz rally. Findings also suggest that mistrust of democracy was associated with greater attribution of malevolence and acceptance of political violence. Attending a Sanders or Trump rally was indirectly associated with attribution of malevolence and acceptance of political violence through democratic mistrust.
Exposure to the American flag polarizes Democratic-Republican ideologies
Eugene Chan
British Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Some prior research has suggested that exposure to the American flag tilts Americans towards Republicanism, while others have proffered that it brings outs a common ‘together’ perspective instead. We explore a third possibility – that it may actually polarize Americans’ political ideology. It is generally accepted that exposure to an environmental cue can shift attitudes and behaviours, at least partly or temporarily, in a manner that is consistent with that cue. Yet, the same cue can mean different things to different people. In the same vein, given how national identity and political ideology are intertwined in the United States, we hypothesize that the American flag should heighten different political beliefs depending on individuals’ political ideology. To Democrats, being American is to support Democratic values, but to Republicans, being American is to support Republican values. The American flag thus should heighten Democrats of their Democratic identity, and it should heighten Republicans of their Republican one. The results of an experiment with 752 American respondents who were representative of the US population supported this polarizing effect of the American flag. The theoretical and policy implications of the findings are offered.
Economic Behavior and the Partisan Perceptual Screen
Mary McGrath
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Winter 2017, Pages 363-383
Abstract:
Partisans report different perceptions from the same set of facts. According to the perceptual screen hypothesis, this difference arises because partisans perceive different realities. An alternative hypothesis is that partisans take even fact-based questions as an opportunity to voice support for their team. In 2009, Gerber and Huber conducted the first behavioral test of the perceptual screen hypothesis outside of the lab. I re-analyze Gerber and Huber's original data and collect new data from two additional U.S. elections. Gerber and Huber's finding of a relationship between partisanship and economic behavior does not hold when observations from a single state-year (Texas in 1996) are excluded from their analysis. Out-of-sample replication based on the two U.S. presidential elections since the original study similarly shows no evidence of an effect. Given these results, the balance of evidence tips toward the conclusion that economic perceptions are not filtered through partisanship.
Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid exposure to one another's opinions
Jeremy Frimer, Linda Skitka & Matt Motyl
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, September 2017, Pages 1–12
Abstract:
Ideologically committed people are similarly motivated to avoid ideologically crosscutting information. Although some previous research has found that political conservatives may be more prone to selective exposure than liberals are, we find similar selective exposure motives on the political left and right across a variety of issues. The majority of people on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate willingly gave up a chance to win money to avoid hearing from the other side (Study 1). When thinking back to the 2012 U.S. Presidential election (Study 2), ahead to upcoming elections in the U.S. and Canada (Study 3), and about a range of other Culture War issues (Study 4), liberals and conservatives reported similar aversion toward learning about the views of their ideological opponents. Their lack of interest was not due to already being informed about the other side or attributable election fatigue. Rather, people on both sides indicated that they anticipated that hearing from the other side would induce cognitive dissonance (e.g., require effort, cause frustration) and undermine a sense of shared reality with the person expressing disparate views (e.g., damage the relationship; Study 5). A high-powered meta-analysis of our data sets (N = 2417) did not detect a difference in the intensity of liberals' (d = 0.63) and conservatives' (d = 0.58) desires to remain in their respective ideological bubbles.
Conservatism and Switcher’s Curse
Aaron Edlin
American Law and Economics Review, Spring 2017, Pages 49-95
Abstract:
This article formally models the virtues of Edmund Burke’s conservatism, characterizes the optimal level of conservatism, and applies the model to management, law, and policy. I begin by introducing “switcher’s curse,” a trap in which a decision maker systematically switches too often. Decision makers suffer from switcher’s curse if they forget the reason that they maintained incumbent policies in the past and if they naively compare rival and incumbent policies with no bias for incumbent policies. Conservatism emerges as a heuristic to avoid switcher’s curse. The longer a process or policy has been in place, the more conservative one should be. On the other hand, the more conservative were past decision makers, the more progressive one should be today.
Gender Linked Fate, Race/Ethnicity, and the Marriage Gap in American Politics
Christopher Stout, Kelsy Kretschmer & Leah Ruppanner
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this study, we explore the predictors of gender linked fate with a focus on marital status for different racial/ethnic groups. We argue that marriage alters women’s perceptions of self-interest by institutionalizing their partnerships with men and consequently leading women to feel less connected to other women. We assess our hypothesis using the 2012 American National Election Study. While we find that married white women and Latinas have significantly lower levels of linked fate than unmarried women of the same race/ethnicity, we find no such relationship for black women. We then explore the implications of these findings by examining the role of gender linked fate in explaining political differences among married and unmarried women using mediation analysis. Ultimately, we find that differences in perceptions of linked fate explain a significant amount of the variation in political ideology and partisanship for white and Latina women.
Who Gets Covered? Ideological Extremity and News Coverage of Members of the U.S. Congress, 1993 to 2013
Michael Wagner & Mike Gruszczynski
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does the news media cover ideological extremists more than moderates? We combine a measure of members of Congress’ ideological extremity with a content analysis of how often lawmakers appear in the New York Times from the 103rd to the 112th Congresses and on CBS and NBC’s evening newscasts in the 112th Congress. We show that ideological extremity is positively related to political news coverage for members of the House of Representatives. Generally, ideological extremity is not related to the likelihood of coverage for senators. Finally, we show that extreme Republicans are more likely to earn media attention than extreme Democrats.
Solitary Discourse Is a Productive Activity
Julia Zavala & Deanna Kuhn
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Young adults received information regarding the platforms of two candidates for mayor of a troubled city. Half constructed a dialogue between advocates of the candidates, and the other half wrote an essay evaluating the candidates’ merits. Both groups then wrote a script for a TV spot favoring their preferred candidate. Results supported our hypothesis that the dialogic task would lead to deeper, more comprehensive processing of the two positions, and hence a richer representation of them. The TV scripts of the dialogue group included more references to city problems, candidates’ proposed actions, and links between them, as well as more criticisms of proposed actions and integrative judgments extending across multiple problems or proposed actions. Assessment of levels of epistemological understanding administered to the two groups after the writing tasks revealed that the dialogic group exhibited a lesser frequency of the absolutist position that knowledge consists of facts knowable with certainty. The potential of imagined interaction as a substitute for actual social exchange is considered.
Thatcher’s Children, Blair’s Babies, Political Socialization and Trickle-down Value Change: An Age, Period and Cohort Analysis
Maria Teresa Grasso et al.
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
To what extent are new generations ‘Thatcherite’? Using British Social Attitudes data for 1985–2012 and applying age-period-cohort analysis and generalized additive models, this article investigates whether Thatcher’s Children hold more right-authoritarian political values compared to other political generations. The study further examines the extent to which the generation that came of age under New Labour – Blair’s Babies – shares these values. The findings for generation effects indicate that the later political generation is even more right-authoritarian, including with respect to attitudes to redistribution, welfare and crime. This view is supported by evidence of cohort effects. These results show that the legacy of Thatcherism for left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values is its long-term shaping of public opinion through political socialization.
Blaming a Few Bad Apples to Save a Threatened Barrel: The System-Justifying Function of Conspiracy Theories
Daniel Jolley, Karen Douglas & Robbie Sutton
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research demonstrates that conspiracy theories — often represented as subversive alternatives to establishment narratives — may bolster, rather than undermine, support for the social status quo when its legitimacy is under threat. A pilot study (N = 98) found a positive relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with the status quo. In Study 1 (N = 120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to endorse conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally threatened. In Study 3 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively more strongly to small groups of people rather than systemic causes. By blaming tragedies, disasters, and social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention from the inherent limitations of social systems.
Millions of online book co-purchases reveal partisan differences in the consumption of science
Feng Shi et al.
Nature Human Behaviour, April 2017
Abstract:
Passionate disagreements about climate change, stem cell research and evolution raise concerns that science has become a new battlefield in the culture wars. We used data derived from millions of online co-purchases as a behavioural indicator for whether shared interest in science bridges political differences or selective attention reinforces existing divisions. Findings reveal partisan preferences both within and across scientific disciplines. Across fields, customers for liberal or ‘blue’ political books prefer basic science (for example, physics, astronomy and zoology), whereas conservative or ‘red’ customers prefer applied and commercial science (for example, criminology, medicine and geophysics). Within disciplines, ‘red’ books tend to be co-purchased with a narrower subset of science books on the periphery of the discipline. We conclude that the political left and right share an interest in science in general, but not science in particular. This underscores the need for research into remedies that can attenuate selective exposure to ‘convenient truth’, renew the capacity for science to inform political debate and temper partisan passions.
Agents of Prosociality: Agency Affirmation Promotes Mutual Prosocial Tendencies and Behavior Among Conflicting Groups
Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli et al.
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Members of conflicting groups are motivated to restore their ingroup's agency, leading to antisocial tendencies against the outgroup. The present research tested the hypothesis that affirming conflicting groups' agency would increase their members' mutual prosociality. The effectiveness of agency affirmation was demonstrated in three contexts of conflict between groups: Switzerland and the EU following the 2014 referendum (Study 1), Israelis and Palestinians (Study 2), and Israeli rightists and leftists (Study 3). Study 1 found that in a nonconflictual context Swiss participants prioritized their moral (prosocial) over agentic goals, yet in the context of conflict with the EU, they prioritized their agentic over moral goals. This “primacy-of-agency” effect, however, was eliminated once their ingroup's agency was affirmed. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated the positive effect of agency affirmation on prosociality among Israelis referring to Palestinians and Israeli rightists and leftists referring to the adversarial political camp. This effect was mediated by group members' readiness to relinquish some power for the sake of morality. Pointing to the importance of the affirmation's specific content, Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that morality affirmation failed to increase prosociality. As such, the present research puts forward a promising strategy to reduce hostility and promote prosociality between conflicting groups.
Giving the People What They Want? Legislative Polarization and Public Approval of State Legislatures
Lilliard Richardson & Jeffrey Milyo
State and Local Government Review, December 2016, Pages 270-281
Abstract:
The relationship between approval of the state legislature and political polarization in the legislature is investigated by matching responses from a large national survey to Shor and McCarty’s ideological scores for state parties. In contrast to popular wisdom, citizens do not have a negative view of more polarized legislatures or more extreme majority parties, all else constant. Instead, legislative approval is filtered primarily through a partisan lens; partisans are more approving when their party is in control and more extreme (and less approving when the opposing party is in control and more extreme).