Team players
Cross-Cultural Sex Differences in Post-Conflict Affiliation following Sports Matches
Joyce Benenson & Richard Wrangham
Current Biology, 22 August 2016, Pages 2208-2212
Abstract:
The nature of ancestral human social structure and the circumstances in which men or women tend to be more cooperative are subjects of intense debate. The male warrior hypothesis proposes that success in intergroup contests has been vital in human evolution and that men therefore must engage in maximally effective intragroup cooperation. Post-conflict affiliation between opponents is further proposed to facilitate future cooperation, which has been demonstrated in non-human primates and humans. The sex that invests more in post-conflict affiliation, therefore, should cooperate more. Supportive evidence comes from chimpanzees, a close genetic relative to humans that also engages in male intergroup aggression. Here we apply this principle to humans by testing the hypothesis that among members of a large community, following a conflict, males are predisposed to be more ready than females to repair their relationship via friendly contact. We took high-level sports matches as a proxy for intragroup conflict, because they occur within a large organization and constitute semi-naturalistic, standardized, aggressive, and intense confrontations. Duration or frequency of peaceful physical contacts served as the measure of post-conflict affiliation because they are strongly associated with pro-social intentions. Across tennis, table tennis, badminton, and boxing, with participants from 44 countries, duration of post-conflict affiliation was longer for males than females. Our results indicate that unrelated human males are more predisposed than females to invest in a behavior, post-conflict affiliation, that is expected to facilitate future intragroup cooperation.
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Almost Human: Anthropomorphism Increases Trust Resilience in Cognitive Agents
Ewart de Visser et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, forthcoming
Abstract:
We interact daily with computers that appear and behave like humans. Some researchers propose that people apply the same social norms to computers as they do to humans, suggesting that social psychological knowledge can be applied to our interactions with computers. In contrast, theories of human-automation interaction postulate that humans respond to machines in unique and specific ways. We believe that anthropomorphism - the degree to which an agent exhibits human characteristics - is the critical variable that may resolve this apparent contradiction across the formation, violation, and repair stages of trust. Three experiments were designed to examine these opposing viewpoints by varying the appearance and behavior of automated agents. Participants received advice that deteriorated gradually in reliability from a computer, avatar, or human agent. Our results showed (a) that anthropomorphic agents were associated with greater trust resilience, a higher resistance to breakdowns in trust; (b) that these effects were magnified by greater uncertainty; and c) that incorporating human-like trust repair behavior largely erased differences between the agents. Automation anthropomorphism is therefore a critical variable that should be carefully incorporated into any general theory of human-agent trust as well as novel automation design.
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How chimpanzees cooperate in a competitive world
Malini Suchak et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
Our species is routinely depicted as unique in its ability to achieve cooperation, whereas our closest relative, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), is often characterized as overly competitive. Human cooperation is assisted by the cost attached to competitive tendencies through enforcement mechanisms, such as punishment and partner choice. To examine if chimpanzees possess the same ability to mitigate competition, we set up a cooperative task in the presence of the entire group of 11 adults, which required two or three individuals to pull jointly to receive rewards. This open-group set-up provided ample opportunity for competition (e.g., freeloading, displacements) and aggression. Despite this unique set-up and initial competitiveness, cooperation prevailed in the end, being at least five times as common as competition. The chimpanzees performed 3,565 cooperative acts while using a variety of enforcement mechanisms to overcome competition and freeloading, as measured by (attempted) thefts of rewards. These mechanisms included direct protest by the target, third-party punishment in which dominant individuals intervened against freeloaders, and partner choice. There was a marked difference between freeloading and displacement; freeloading tended to elicit withdrawal and third-party interventions, whereas displacements were met with a higher rate of direct retaliation. Humans have shown similar responses in controlled experiments, suggesting shared mechanisms across the primates to mitigate competition for the sake of cooperation.
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Ownership Status Influences the Degree of Joint Facilitatory Behavior
Merryn Constable et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner's performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership - a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects - influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals' own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.
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Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
Catherine Eckel et al.
PLoS ONE, August 2016
Abstract:
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.
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Group-Level Events are Catalysts in the Evolution of Cooperation
Burton Simon & Michael Pilosov
Journal of Theoretical Biology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Group-level events, like fission and extinction, catalyze the evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations by creating new paths from uncooperative population states to more cooperative states. Group-level events allow cooperation to thrive under unfavorable conditions such as low intra-group assortment and moderate rates of migration, and can greatly speed up the evolution of cooperation when conditions are more favorable. The time-dependent effects of fission and extinction events are studied and illustrated here using a PDE model of a group-structured population based loosely on populations of hunter-gatherer tribes. By solving the PDE numerically we can compare models with and without group-level events, and explicitly calculate quantities associated with dynamics, like how long it takes a small population of cooperators to become a majority, as well as equilibrium population densities.
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The Sources of the Communication Gap
Simin He, Theo Offerman & Jeroen van de Ven
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Face-to-face communication drastically increases cooperation rates in social dilemmas. We test which factors are the most important drivers of this communication gap. We distinguish three main categories. First, communication may decrease social distance. Second, communication may enable subjects to assess their opponent's cooperativeness ("type detection") and condition their own action on that information. Third, communication allows subjects to make promises, which create commitment for subjects who do not want to break a promise. We find that communication increases cooperation very substantially. In our experiment, we find that commitment value is an important factor, but the largest part of the increase can be attributed to type detection. We do not find evidence that social distance plays a role.
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Matthew Jordan, Jillian Jordan & David Rand
Evolution and Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Explaining cooperation remains a central topic for evolutionary theorists. Many have argued that group selection provides such an explanation: theoretical models show that intergroup competition could have given rise to cooperation that is costly for the individual. Whether group selection actually did play an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, however, is much debated. Recent experiments have shown that intergroup competitions do increase human cooperation, which has been taken as evidence for group selection as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Here we challenge this standard interpretation. Competitions change the payoff structure by creating a threshold effect whereby the group that contributes more earns an additional prize, which creates some incentive for individuals to cooperate. We present four studies that disentangle competition and thresholds, and strongly suggest that it is thresholds - rather than competitions per se - that increase cooperation. Thus, prior intergroup competition experiments provide no evidence of a unique or special role for intergroup competition in promoting human cooperation, and shed no light on whether group selection shaped human evolution.
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Fear or greed? Oxytocin regulates inter-individual conflict by enhancing fear in men
Huimin Zheng, Keith Kendrick & Rongjun Yu
Hormones and Behavior, September 2016, Pages 12-18
Abstract:
People may choose non-cooperation in social dilemmas either out of fear (if others choose to defect) or out of greed (when others choose to cooperate). Previous studies have shown that exogenous oxytocin motivates a "tend and defend" pattern in inter-group conflict in which oxytocin stimulates in-group cooperation and out-group defense. Using a double-blind placebo-controlled design combined with a modified Prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), we examined the effect of oxytocin on social motivations in inter-individual conflict in men. Results showed that compared with the placebo group, oxytocin-exposed participants were less cooperative in general. Specifically, oxytocin amplified the effect of fear on defection but did not influence the effect of greed. Another non-social control study confirmed participants' decisions were sensitive to social factors. Our findings suggest that even when social group conflict is removed, oxytocin promotes distrust of strangers in "me and you" inter-individual conflict by elevating social fear in men.