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“Switching On” creativity: Task switching can increase creativity by reducing cognitive fixation
Jackson Lu, Modupe Akinola & Malia Mason
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, March 2017, Pages 63–75
Abstract:
Whereas past research has focused on the downsides of task switching, the present research uncovers a potential upside: increased creativity. In two experiments, we show that task switching can enhance two principal forms of creativity — divergent thinking (Study 1) and convergent thinking (Study 2) — in part because temporarily setting a task aside reduces cognitive fixation. Participants who continually alternated back and forth between two creativity tasks outperformed both participants who switched between the tasks at their discretion and participants who attempted one task for the first half of the allotted time before switching to the other task for the second half. Importantly, Studies 3a–3d reveal that people overwhelmingly fail to adopt a continual-switch approach when incentivized to choose a task switching strategy that would maximize their creative performance. These findings provide insights into how individuals can “switch on” creativity when navigating multiple creative tasks.
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Etan Green & David Daniels
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, February 2017
Abstract:
Can people form rational beliefs when making split-second, sophisticated judgments? A long literature suggests not: people often form prior beliefs from biased sampling, and they tend to overweight those prior beliefs, except when they underweight them. This paper studies belief formation by professional umpires in Major League Baseball. Past research has noted a curious pattern in umpire decisions: despite instructions to call balls and strikes based solely on the location of the pitch, umpires make different calls in different game states for pitches at the same location. We show that a Bayesian model predicts these patterns almost exactly. Calls by umpires reflect an accurate, probabilistic, and state-specific understanding of their rational expectations over the location of the pitch — as well as an ability to integrate those prior beliefs according to Bayes rule. Given that umpires have barely a second to form beliefs and make a decision, we conclude that the instincts of professional umpires approximate a sophisticated level of rationality remarkably well.
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Doing many things at a time: Lack of power decreases the ability to multitask
Ran Alice Cai & Ana Guinote
British Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Three studies investigated the effects of power on the ability to pursue multiple, concomitant goals, also known as multitasking. It was predicted that powerless participants will show lower multitasking ability than control and powerful participants. Study 1 focused on self-reported ability to multitask in a sample of executives and subordinate employees. Studies 2 and 3 investigated the ability to dual-task and to switch between tasks, respectively, using dual-task and task-switching paradigms. Across the studies, powerless individuals were less able to effectively multitask compared with control and powerful participants, suggesting that the detrimental effects of lack of power extend beyond single-task environments, shown in past research, into multitasking environments. Underlying mechanisms are discussed.
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Contextual Influences on Message Persuasion: The Effect of Empty Space
Canice Kwan, Xianchi Dai & Robert Wyer
Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
The empty space that surrounds a text message can affect the message’s persuasiveness. Seven studies provide converging evidence in both field and laboratory settings that people find a message less persuasive, and are less likely to act on its implications, when it is surrounded by empty space than when it is not. These effects are mediated by perceptions of message strength. That is, message recipients infer that a message conveys a less strong opinion when empty space surrounds it and are consequently less likely to accept its implications. This effect does not occur when the space surrounding the message is generated randomly by a computer or when the message is attributed to a low credibility source. When a message is counterattitudinal, surrounding it by empty space decreases the disposition to counterargue its implications and increases acceptance of the position advocated. When recipients are under cognitive load, however, they use the space surrounding the message as a heuristic basis for judgment and are less persuaded when the message is surrounded by empty space. This research adds not only to persuasion literature and current advertising practices, but also to an understanding of different interpretations of empty space.
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The Excessive Choice Effect Meets the Market: A Field Experiment on Craft Beer Choice
Trey Malone & Jayson Lusk
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, April 2017, Pages 8–13
Abstract:
Research in psychology suggests that, somewhat paradoxically, providing consumers more choices can reduce the likelihood of making a purchase, producing the so-called excessive choice effect (ECE). To the extent an ECE exists, firms have an incentive to alleviate the effect through a variety of institutional nudges that promote consumers to make a choice. This study empirically tests the effectiveness of two institutional nudges on the ECE in a field experiment at a bar. Focusing on craft beer sales, we manipulate the number of options on the menu and use institutional nudges (a control menu, a menu with a special prominently displayed, and a menu with Beer Advocate scores). In the field experiment, the ECE was alive and well using the control menu, but the effect reversed itself when the menu included Beer Advocate Scores. Our results suggest the ECE might be turned on and off by manipulating search costs.
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Time Matters Less When Outcomes Differ: Unimodal vs. Cross-Modal Comparisons in Intertemporal Choice
Robin Cubitt, Rebecca McDonald & Daniel Read
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Unimodal intertemporal decisions involve comparing options of the same type (e.g., apples now versus apples later), and cross-modal decisions involve comparing options of different types (e.g., a car now versus a vacation later). As we show, existing models of intertemporal choice do not allow time preference to depend on whether the comparisons to be made are unimodal or cross-modal. We test this restriction in an experiment using the delayed compensation method, a new extension of the standard method of eliciting intertemporal preferences that allows for assessment of time preference for nonmonetary and discrete outcomes, as well as for both cross-modal and unimodal comparisons. Participants were much more averse to delay for unimodal than cross-modal decisions. We provide two potential explanations for this effect: one drawing on multiattribute choice, the other drawing on construal-level theory.
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Shankha Basu & Krishna Savani
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, March 2017, Pages 76–91
Abstract:
This research examines an element of choice architecture that has received little attention — whether options are presented simultaneously or sequentially. Participants were more likely to choose dominating options when the options were presented simultaneously rather than sequentially, both when the dominance relationship was transparent (Experiment 1) and when it was not (Experiments 2–3). Depth of cognitive processing mediated the effect of option presentation on optimal choice (Experiment 4). Memory load was unlikely to be the underlying mechanism, as individual differences in working memory span did not predict optimal choice in the sequential condition (which places a greater memory load; Experiment 5), and manipulations of memory load did not reduce the benefits of simultaneous presentation (Experiments 6a–6c). Instead, participants’ working memory span predicted optimal choice in the simultaneous condition (which allows for more in-depth processing; Experiment 5), and a manipulation of processing load eliminated the benefits of simultaneous presentation (Experiment 7).
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Uncertainty Increases the Reliance on Affect in Decisions
Ali Faraji Rad & Michel Tuan Pham
Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do psychological states of uncertainty influence the way people make decisions? We propose that such states increase the reliance on affective inputs in judgments and decisions. In accord with this proposition, results from six studies show that the priming of uncertainty (vs. certainty) consistently increases the effects of a variety of affective inputs on consumers’ judgments and decisions. Primed uncertainty is shown to amplify the effects of the pleasantness of a musical soundtrack (study 1), the attractiveness of a picture (study 2), the appeal of affective attributes (studies 3 and 4), incidental mood states (study 6), and even incidental states of disgust (study 5). Moreover, both negative and positive uncertainty increase the influence of affect in decisions (study 4). The results additionally show that the increased reliance on affective inputs under uncertainty does not necessarily come at the expense of a reliance on descriptive attribute information (studies 2 and 5), and that the increased reliance on affect under uncertainty is distinct from a general reliance on heuristic or peripheral cues (study 6). The phenomenon may be due to uncertainty threatening the self, thereby encouraging a reliance on inputs that are closer to the self and have high subjective validity.
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Alexandre Pastor-Bernier, Charles Plott & Wolfram Schultz
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 7 March 2017, Pages E1766–E1775
Abstract:
Revealed preference theory provides axiomatic tools for assessing whether individuals make observable choices “as if” they are maximizing an underlying utility function. The theory evokes a tradeoff between goods whereby individuals improve themselves by trading one good for another good to obtain the best combination. Preferences revealed in these choices are modeled as curves of equal choice (indifference curves) and reflect an underlying process of optimization. These notions have far-reaching applications in consumer choice theory and impact the welfare of human and animal populations. However, they lack the empirical implementation in animals that would be required to establish a common biological basis. In a design using basic features of revealed preference theory, we measured in rhesus monkeys the frequency of repeated choices between bundles of two liquids. For various liquids, the animals’ choices were compatible with the notion of giving up a quantity of one good to gain one unit of another good while maintaining choice indifference, thereby implementing the concept of marginal rate of substitution. The indifference maps consisted of nonoverlapping, linear, convex, and occasionally concave curves with typically negative, but also sometimes positive, slopes depending on bundle composition. Out-of-sample predictions using homothetic polynomials validated the indifference curves. The animals’ preferences were internally consistent in satisfying transitivity. Change of option set size demonstrated choice optimality and satisfied the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). These data are consistent with a version of revealed preference theory in which preferences are stochastic; the monkeys behaved “as if” they had well-structured preferences and maximized utility.
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Overconfidence over the lifespan
Julia Prims & Don Moore
Judgment and Decision Making, January 2017, Pages 29–41
Abstract:
This research investigated how different forms of overconfidence correlate with age. Contrary to stereotypes that young people are more overconfident, the results provide little evidence that overestimation of one’s performance or overplacement of one’s performance relative to that of others is correlated with age. Instead, the results suggest that precision in judgment (confidence that one knows the truth) increases with age. This result is strongest for probabilistic elicitations, and not present in quantile elicitations or reported confidence intervals. The results suggest that a lifetime of experience, rather than leading to better calibration, instead may increase our confidence that we know what we’re talking about.
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Losses and External Outcomes Interact to Produce the Gambler’s Fallacy
Julia Mossbridge, Christopher Roney & Satoru Suzuki
PLoS ONE, January 2017
Abstract:
When making serial predictions in a binary decision task, there is a clear tendency to assume that after a series of the same external outcome (e.g., heads in a coin flip), the next outcome will be the opposing one (e.g., tails), even when the outcomes are independent of one another. This so-called “gambler’s fallacy” has been replicated robustly. However, what drives gambler’s fallacy behavior is unclear. Here we demonstrate that a run of the same external outcome by itself does not lead to gambler’s fallacy behavior. However, when a run of external outcomes is accompanied by a concurrent run of failed guesses, gambler’s fallacy behavior is predominant. These results do not depend on how participants’ attention is directed. Thus, it appears that gambler’s fallacy behavior is driven by a combination of an external series of events and a concurrent series of failure experiences.
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Risk Aversion, the Disposition Effect, and Group Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis
Wlademir Prates, Newton da Costa & Anderson Dorow
Managerial and Decision Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article reports a laboratory experiment comparing the behavior of individuals and groups in terms of their susceptibility to the disposition effect. A total of 174 students took part in six experimental sessions in which they made decisions individually, in pairs, or in three-person groups. It was observed that the disposition effect was attenuated when the decisions were made in groups of two or three members. It was also noted that the attenuating effect of group decision making was the result of a reduction in the proportion of gains realized, indicating that the groups were less risk averse than individuals.
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Personality, Information Acquisition, and Choice under Uncertainty: An Experimental Study
Guillaume Fréchette, Andrew Schotter & Isabel Trevino
Economic Inquiry, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article studies the role of personality in choice under risk and uncertainty. We explore the hypothesis that personality plays a role in decision making in situations of uncertainty but not in situations of risk. In addition to offering support for this main hypothesis, we explore the various pathways through which personality exerts its influence. What we find is that in uncertain environments, where decision makers are able to acquire information about the unknown probability distributions they face, personality variables influence the type of information people acquire, which then influences their choice. Our experimental design brings in two novel aspects of choice under uncertainty: information acquisition and advice. The findings indicate that indeed, under uncertainty, personality matters for choice in a way it does not under risk. Furthermore, the results suggest that personality can play a role at multiple levels, such as people's preferences for certain types of information and the likelihood of following advice.