Gray area
Control Deprivation Motivates Acquisition of Utilitarian Products
Charlene Chen, Leonard Lee & Andy Yap
Journal of Consumer Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research investigates how the fundamental desire for control affects product acquisition. The authors propose that consumers compensate for a loss of perceived control by buying utilitarian products (e.g., household cleaning agents) because of these products’ association with problem solving, a quality that promotes a sense of control. Study 1 demonstrates this basic effect in a field setting involving real purchases, while studies 2 and 3 show that framing a product as utilitarian (vs. hedonic) moderates the effect of control on purchase intentions. Study 4 shows that a generalized problem-solving tendency mediates the effect of control on eagerness to pursue utilitarian consumption. Given the pervasiveness and ease of using product acquisition as a means to cope with psychological threat, this research has important implications for theory and practice.
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Lisa Scharrer et al.
Public Understanding of Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Science popularization fulfills the important task of making scientific knowledge understandable and accessible for the lay public. However, the simplification of information required to achieve this accessibility may lead to the risk of audiences relying overly strongly on their own epistemic capabilities when making judgments about scientific claims. Moreover, they may underestimate how the division of cognitive labor makes them dependent on experts. This article reports an empirical study demonstrating that this “easiness effect of science popularization” occurs when laypeople read authentic popularized science depictions. After reading popularized articles addressed to a lay audience, laypeople agreed more with the knowledge claims they contained and were more confident in their claim judgments than after reading articles addressed to expert audiences. Implications for communicating scientific knowledge to the general public are discussed.
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Exponential-Growth Bias and Overconfidence
Matthew Levy & Joshua Tasoff
Journal of Economic Psychology, February 2017, Pages 1–14
Abstract:
There is increasing evidence that people underestimate the magnitude of compounding interest. However, if people were aware of their inability to make such calculations they should demand services to ameliorate the consequences of such deficiencies. In a laboratory experiment, we find that people exhibit substantial exponential-growth bias but, more importantly, that they are overconfident in their ability to answer questions that involve exponential growth. They also exhibit overconfidence in their ability to use a spreadsheet to answer these questions. This evidence explains why a market solution to exponential-growth bias has not been forthcoming. Biased individuals have suboptimally low demand for tools and services that could improve their financial decisions.
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DeepStack: Expert-Level Artificial Intelligence in No-Limit Poker
Matej Moravčík et al.
University of Alberta Working Paper, January 2017
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence has seen a number of breakthroughs in recent years, with games often serving as significant milestones. A common feature of games with these successes is that they involve information symmetry among the players, where all players have identical information. This property of perfect information, though, is far more common in games than in real-world problems. Poker is the quintessential game of imperfect information, and it has been a longstanding challenge problem in artificial intelligence. In this paper we introduce DeepStack, a new algorithm for imperfect information settings such as poker. It combines recursive reasoning to handle information asymmetry, decomposition to focus computation on the relevant decision, and a form of intuition about arbitrary poker situations that is automatically learned from self-play games using deep learning. In a study involving dozens of participants and 44,000 hands of poker, DeepStack becomes the first computer program to beat professional poker players in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em. Furthermore, we show this approach dramatically reduces worst-case exploitability compared to the abstraction paradigm that has been favored for over a decade.
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The Heart and the Head: On Choosing Experiences Intuitively and Possessions Deliberatively
Iñigo Gallo et al.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, forthcoming
Abstract:
An enduring question in the field of judgment and decision making is when people are likely to choose on the basis of intuition and when they are likely to pursue a more deliberative decision strategy. Here, we attempt to shed light on that question by examining whether people tend to weight intuition more heavily when making experiential purchases, and to weight deliberation more heavily when making material purchases. Results from seven studies indicate that they do. In Study 1 (and a replication), participants expressed an explicit preference for choosing experiential purchases intuitively and material purchases analytically. In Study 2 (and a replication), participants anticipated experiencing more regret after going against reason for material purchases and going against intuition for experiential purchases. Participants in Study 3 who were asked to think about an experiential purchase wanted to see the relevant information presented by alternative, which facilitates intuitive/holistic processing, more than did those who were asked to consider a material purchase. In two additional studies, participants who were induced to think intuitively chose experiential purchases more often (Study 4) and reported a higher willingness to pay for them (Study 5) compared with participants induced to think analytically.
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Hierarchy stability moderates the effect of status on stress and performance in humans
Erik Knight & Pranjal Mehta
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 3 January 2017, Pages 78–83
Abstract:
High social status reduces stress responses in numerous species, but the stress-buffering effect of status may dissipate or even reverse during times of hierarchical instability. In an experimental test of this hypothesis, 118 participants (57.3% female) were randomly assigned to a high- or low-status position in a stable or unstable hierarchy and were then exposed to a social-evaluative stressor (a mock job interview). High status in a stable hierarchy buffered stress responses and improved interview performance, but high status in an unstable hierarchy boosted stress responses and did not lead to better performance. This general pattern of effects was observed across endocrine (cortisol and testosterone), psychological (feeling in control), and behavioral (competence, dominance, and warmth) responses to the stressor. The joint influence of status and hierarchy stability on interview performance was explained by feelings of control and testosterone reactivity. Greater feelings of control predicted enhanced interview performance, whereas increased testosterone reactivity predicted worse performance. These results provide direct causal evidence that high status confers adaptive benefits for stress reduction and performance only when the social hierarchy is stable. When the hierarchy is unstable, high status actually exacerbates stress responses.
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Oshin Vartanian et al.
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, forthcoming
Abstract:
Beginning in the 1950s, the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (IPAR) began a program of research to study the psychology of effectively functioning persons. Among the most influential series of studies conducted by IPAR were the assessments of highly creative architects in 1957–1961, a sample that included some of the most eminent architects of the 20th century such as Eero Saarinen, Louis I. Kahn, I. M. Pei, and Philip C. Johnson. In turn, in 2006–2007, the American Institute of Architects conducted a survey to identify America’s favorite architecture, first among its 2,448 members and subsequently among 2,214 members of the general public. Creativity ratings of the architects (N = 40) by (a) journal editorial board members, (b) expert judges, and (c) the architects themselves collected in 1957–1961 predicted the popularity of their works 50 years later. Our results suggest that in the domain of architecture, expert assessments of individual-level creativity predict future product-level popularity.
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Arousal and Economic Decision Making
Salar Jahedi, Cary Deck & Dan Ariely
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, February 2017, Pages 165–189
Abstract:
Previous experiments have found that subjecting participants to cognitive load leads to poorer decision making, consistent with dual-system models of behavior. Rather than taxing the cognitive system, this paper reports the results of an experiment that takes a complementary approach: arousing the emotional system. The results indicate that exposure to arousing visual stimuli as compared to neutral images has a negligible impact on performance in arithmetic tasks, impatience, risk taking in the domain of losses, and snack choice although we find that arousal modestly increases risk-taking in the gains domain and increases susceptibility to anchoring effects. We find the effect of arousal on decision making to be smaller and less consistent then the effect of increased cognitive load for the same tasks.
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Mind the Gap! Automated Concept Map Feedback Supports Students in Writing Cohesive Explanations
Andreas Lachner, Christian Burkhart & Matthias Nückles
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many students are challenged with the demand of writing cohesive explanations. To support students in writing cohesive explanations, we developed a computer-based feedback tool that visualizes cohesion deficits of students’ explanations in a concept map. We conducted three studies to investigate the effectiveness of such feedback as well as the underlying cognitive processes. In Study 1, we found that the concept map helped students identify potential cohesion gaps in their drafts and plan remedial revisions. In Study 2, students with concept map feedback conducted revisions that resulted in more locally and globally cohesive, and also more comprehensible, explanations than the explanations of students who revised without concept map feedback. In Study 3, we replicated the findings of Study 2 by and large. More importantly, students who had received concept map feedback on a training explanation 1 week later wrote a transfer explanation without feedback that was more cohesive than the explanation of students who had received no feedback on their training explanation. The automated concept map feedback appears to particularly support the evaluation phase of the revision process. Furthermore, the feedback enabled novice writers to acquire sustainable skills in writing cohesive explanations.
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Guy Itzchakov, Avraham Kluger & Dotan Castro
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, January 2017, Pages 105-120
Abstract:
We examined how listeners characterized by empathy and a non-judgmental approach affect speakers’ attitude structure. We hypothesized that high quality listening decreases speakers’ social anxiety, which in turn reduces defensive processing. This reduction in defensive processing was hypothesized to result in an awareness of contradictions (increased objective-attitude ambivalence), and decreased attitude extremity. Moreover, we hypothesized that experiencing high quality listening would enable speakers to tolerate contradictory responses, such that listening would attenuate the association between objective- and subjective-attitude ambivalence. We obtained consistent support for our hypotheses across four laboratory experiments that manipulated listening experience in different ways on a range of attitude topics. The effects of listening on objective-attitude ambivalence were stronger for higher dispositional social anxiety and initial objective-attitude ambivalence (Study 4). Overall, the results suggest that speakers’ attitude structure can be changed by a heretofore unexplored interpersonal variable: merely providing high quality listening.
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Who “believes” in the Gambler’s Fallacy and why?
George Farmer, Paul Warren & Ulrike Hahn
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, January 2017, Pages 63-76
Abstract:
Humans possess a remarkable ability to discriminate structure from randomness in the environment. However, this ability appears to be systematically biased. This is nowhere more evident than in the Gambler’s Fallacy (GF) — the mistaken belief that observing an increasingly long sequence of “heads” from an unbiased coin makes the occurrence of “tails” on the next trial ever more likely. Although the GF appears to provide evidence of “cognitive bias,” a recent theoretical account (Hahn & Warren, 2009) has suggested the GF might be understandable if constraints on actual experience of random sources (such as attention and short term memory) are taken into account. Here we test this experiential account by exposing participants to 200 outcomes from a genuinely random (p = .5) Bernoulli process. All participants saw the same overall sequence; however, we manipulated experience across groups such that the sequence was divided into chunks of length 100, 10, or 5. Both before and after the exposure, participants (a) generated random sequences and (b) judged the randomness of presented sequences. In contrast to other accounts in the literature, the experiential account suggests that this manipulation will lead to systematic differences in postexposure behavior. Our data were strongly in line with this prediction and provide support for a general account of randomness perception in which biases are actually apt reflections of environmental statistics under experiential constraints. This suggests that deeper insight into human cognition may be gained if, instead of dismissing apparent biases as failings, we assume humans are rational under constraints.