Flocking
Clergy-lay political (mis)alignment in 2019-2020
Joseph Roso & Mark Chaves
Politics and Religion, September 2023, Pages 533-542
Abstract:
We use data from the new and nationally representative National Survey of Religious Leaders, supplemented with the 2018 General Social Survey, to examine the extent to which clergy are politically aligned with people in their congregations. Two assessments of alignment -- clergy reports of how their political views compare to the political views held by most people in their congregations, and comparisons between clergy and lay voting preferences in the 2016 election -- yield the same findings. Clergy in Black Protestant and predominantly white evangelical churches are much more likely to be politically aligned with their people than are Catholic or, especially, white mainline Protestant clergy, who often are more liberal than their people. Contrary to media reports suggesting that evangelical clergy are now likely to be less conservative than their people, the vast majority are either politically aligned with, or more conservative than, their members.
Still Soul Searching? Remapping Adolescent Religious Commitment
Jeremy Uecker & Carl Desportes Bowman
Sociology of Religion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Sociologists know very little about the religious lives of the current generation of American adolescents. This study provides an updated portrait of adolescent religious commitment and direct tests of religious change across cohorts by comparing data from the 2017-2018 National Survey of Moral Formation to the 2002-2003 National Study of Youth and Religion. There has been a significant growth in the percentage of adolescents who are not at all religious (by multiple measures). There has been a less substantial decline in the percentage of adolescents who are highly religious. Changes in religiosity have occurred across sociodemographic groups, though not always at the same rate, resulting in new patterns across gender, race, regional, and socioeconomic lines on some aspects of religiosity. Despite declines in religiosity, however, parental transmission of religion is similar to what it was in the previous generation. The decline in adolescent religiosity, notably, reflects a decline in parental religiosity.
Exposure to automation explains religious declines
Joshua Conrad Jackson et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 22 August 2023
Abstract:
The global decline of religiosity represents one of the most significant societal shifts in recent history. After millennia of near-universal religious identification, the world is experiencing a regionally uneven trend toward secularization. We propose an explanation of this decline, which claims that automation -- the development of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) -- can partly explain modern religious declines. We build four unique datasets composed of more than 3 million individuals which show that robotics and AI exposure is linked to 21st-century religious declines across nations, metropolitan regions, and individual people. Key results hold controlling for other technological developments (e.g., electricity grid access and telecommunications development), socioeconomic indicators (e.g., wealth, residential mobility, and demographics), and factors implicated in previous theories of religious decline (e.g., individual choice norms). An experiment also supports our hypotheses. Our findings partly explain contemporary trends in religious decline and foreshadow where religiosity may wane in the future.
Thinking about God increases acceptance of artificial intelligence in decision-making
Mustafa Karataş & Keisha Cutright
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 15 August 2023
Abstract:
Thinking about God promotes greater acceptance of Artificial intelligence (AI)-based recommendations. Eight preregistered experiments (n = 2,462) reveal that when God is salient, people are more willing to consider AI-based recommendations than when God is not salient. Studies 1 and 2a to 2d demonstrate across a wide variety of contexts, from choosing entertainment and food to mutual funds and dental procedures, that God salience reduces reliance on human recommenders and heightens willingness to consider AI recommendations. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that the reduced reliance on humans is driven by a heightened feeling of smallness when God is salient, followed by a recognition of human fallibility. Study 5 addresses the similarity in mysteriousness between God and AI as an alternative, but unsupported, explanation. Finally, study 6 (n = 53,563) corroborates the experimental results with data from 21 countries on the usage of robo-advisors in financial decision-making.
Exposure to robot preachers undermines religious commitment
Joshua Conrad Jackson et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Over the last decade, robots continue to infiltrate the workforce, permeating occupations that once seemed immune to automation. This process seems to be inevitable because robots have ever-expanding capabilities. However, drawing from theories of cultural evolution and social learning, we propose that robots may have limited influence in domains that require high degrees of "credibility"; here we focus on the automation of religious preachers as one such domain. Using a natural experiment in a recently automated Buddhist temple (Study 1) and a fully randomized experiment in a Taoist temple (Study 2), we consistently show that religious adherents perceive robot preachers -- and the institutions which employ them -- as less credible than human preachers. This lack of credibility explains reductions in religious commitment after people listen to robot (vs. human) preachers deliver sermons. Study 3 conceptually replicates this finding in an online experiment and suggests that religious elites require perceived minds (agency and patiency) to be credible, which is partly why robot preachers inspire less credibility than humans. Our studies support cultural evolutionary theories of religion and suggest that escalating religious automation may induce religious decline.
Failed Secular Revolutions: Religious Belief, Competition, and Extremism
Jean-Paul Carvalho, Jared Rubin & Michael Sacks
University of Oxford Working Paper, August 2023
Abstract:
All advanced economies have undergone secular revolutions in which religious belief and institutions have been subordinated to secular forms of authority. There are, however, numerous examples of failed secular transitions. To understand these failures, we present a religious club model with endogenous entry and cultural transmission of religious beliefs. A spike in the demand for religious belief, due for example to a negative economic shock, induces a new and more extreme organization to enter the religious market and exploit the dissatisfaction of highly religious types with the religious incumbent. The effect is larger where institutional secularization is more advanced, for example where the religious establishment has moderated itself or has been moderated by the political authority. The greater the moderation of the religious incumbent, the more extreme is the position chosen by the religious entrant, and the larger is the rise in religious participation. Hence, unanticipated shifts in religious demand can lead to the emergence of new and more extreme religious organizations, and reverse previous trends toward secularization. Our model sheds light on the causes and consequences of failed secular revolutions and religious revivals in Latin America and Egypt.
Social Imagery and Judicial Legitimacy: Evidence From Evangelical Christians
Alex Badas & Eric Schmidt
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Extant research reveals that Americans hold politically consequential beliefs about the demographic composition of political groups and organizations-even when these beliefs are at odds with objective reality. In this article, we investigate the social imagery of the U.S. Supreme Court, with particular attention to beliefs about the Supreme Court Justices' religious identities. In survey analysis, we find that evangelicals who believe there are more evangelical Christians on the Court grant the Court more legitimacy compared to non-evangelicals. Further, when evangelical Christians believe there are more atheists on the Court, they view the Court less legitimately than non-evangelicals. To rule out the potential of endogeneity, we conduct a conjoint experiment which demonstrates that evangelicals believe evangelical judges will increase the fairness of the Court and are more likely to support evangelical nominees compared to the average nominee. Likewise, they tend to believe out-group judges will harm the fairness of the Court and are less likely to support out-group judges. Our results have implications for diversity on the Court and how non-ideological factors can affect the Court's legitimacy.