Executive decision
Corporate boards' political ideology diversity and firm performance
Incheol Kim, Christos Pantzalis & Jung Chul Park
Journal of Empirical Finance, March 2013, Pages 223-240
Abstract:
We investigate whether diversity in points of view within corporate boards. as captured by the diversity in political ideology of board members, can affect a firm's performance. We employ personal political contributions' data to measure political ideology distance among groups of inside, outside directors and the CEO. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that outside directors' monitoring effectiveness is more likely to be enhanced when their viewpoints are distinct from those of management. We find that ideologically diverse boards are associated with better firm performance, lower agency costs and less insiders' discretionary power over the firm's Political Action Committee (PAC) spending. Taken together, our results lead us to conclude that multiplicity of standpoints in corporate boardrooms is imperative for board effectiveness.
----------------------
Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance
Donald Hambrick & Timothy Quigley
Strategic Management Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20-year sample, our new "CEO in Context" technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low, medium, and high-discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different - and we argue more logical - estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses.
----------------------
Managerial Compensation: Luck, Skill or Labor Markets?
Jeff Brookman & Paul Thistlee
Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.
----------------------
Laura Casares Field, Michelle Lowry & Anahit Mkrtchyan
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising.
----------------------
Self Attribution Bias of the CEO: Evidence from CEO interviews on CNBC
Han (Andy) Kim
Journal of Banking & Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
Self attribution bias (SAB, hereafter) is a mechanism that engenders overconfidence by attributing good performance to one's ability and bad performance to bad luck or the environment (Gervais and Odean, 2001). Using the transcripts of CEO interviews on CNBC, we measure the SAB of the CEO. Consistent with the prediction by Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011) and Goel and Thakor (2008), we find concave non-linear relation between SAB and the market response to acquisition announcements. We also find that the CEOs with SAB are more likely to be fired and more sensitively to performance, especially under stronger governance regime of Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). Our results are robust after controlling for the selection bias to be in the CNBC interview. We consider and rule out alternative explanations, such as journalists' impact on governance and CEO's narcissism.
----------------------
Trond Randøy & Lars Oxelheim
Journal of Economics and Business, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the dismissal performance sensitivity faced by European CEOs, indirectly and directly. The former materializes via European firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges, the latter results from European firms hiring U.S. independent board members. Both influences are expected to result in increased dismissal performance sensitivity. Based on data from the 250 largest European publicly traded firms we find a significant increase in the dismissal sensitivity of poorly performing companies with American board members and a support for migration of American executive pay practice. However, no significant increase in dismissal performance sensitivity was identified from U.S. cross-listing. In line with our agency theory based prediction, this indicates an institutional contagion driven by the presence of U.S. board members on European corporate boards. To policy makers the message is that internationalization of boards should not be banned or restricted, since it provides owners with more options to influence the corporate governance of the firm.
----------------------
Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide
Tanja Artiga González, Markus Schmid & David Yermack
NBER Working Paper, March 2013
Abstract:
We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 216 U.S. companies accused of price fixing by antitrust authorities. We document a range of strategies used by these firms when reporting financial results, including frequent earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors who are likely to be inattentive monitors due to their status as foreign or "busy." When directors resign, they are often not replaced, and new auditors are rarely engaged. Cartel managers exercise their stock options faster than managers of other firms. While our results are based only upon firms engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor performance or personal wrongdoing.
----------------------
Fair Pay or Power Play? Pay Equity, Managerial Power, and Compensation Adjustments for CEOs
Taekjin Shin
Journal of Management, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study examines how firms use benchmarking information about peers to determine the compensation that they offer to chief executive officers (CEOs). It jointly addresses two distinct perspectives: pay equity and managerial power. Pay inequity provides strong motivation for CEOs to restore equity, by promoting the logic of external fairness and urging boards of directors to implement peer benchmarking and adjust the focal CEO's compensation levels. Although pay inequity may motivate CEOs to restore equity, their reaction to inequity may be effective only when they have sufficient power over the board of directors to influence the pay-setting process. Results from a sample of 1,555 CEOs generally support predictions about the moderating effects of CEO power in the relationship between a focal CEO's pay and peer CEOs' pay. The compensation for underpaid CEOs with relatively greater power over the board is associated with their peers' compensation, suggesting that peer benchmarking is more aggressively used to adjust CEO compensation upward. For overpaid CEOs, the relationship between the focal CEO's pay and peer CEOs' pay is weaker when the CEOs have greater influence over the board, suggesting that such CEOs are able to avoid the use of benchmarking and downward adjustments of pay.
----------------------
The cost of sin: The effect of social norms on audit pricing
Stergios Leventis, Iftekhar Hasan & Emmanouil Dedoulis
International Review of Financial Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this paper we provide evidence for the effects of social norms on audit pricing by studying companies belonging to the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries, which are often described as "sin" companies. We hypothesize that the disparities between "sin" firms operations and prevailing social norms create an adverse context which heightens the client's business risk assessment by auditors and is, thereby, reflected in the pricing decisions for audit and consulting services. Having controlled for the impact of variables relating to client attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes, we demonstrate that audit firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. Additionally, we show that audit pricing levels within the "sin" group depend both on prevailing political views and on the level of "vice" exhibited by "sin" companies.
----------------------
Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-taking in the Banking Industry
Christina Bannier, Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham
Review of Finance, April 2013, Pages 653-690
Abstract:
Remuneration systems in the banking industry, in particular bonus payments, have frequently been blamed for contributing to the buildup of risks leading to the recent financial crisis. In our model, banks compete for managerial talent that is private information. Competition for talent sets incentives to offer bonuses inducing risk-taking that is excessive not only from society's perspective but also from the viewpoint of the banks themselves. In fact, bonus payments and excessive risk-taking are increasing with competition. Thus, our model offers a rationale why bonuses are paid even when reducing the expected profits of banks.
----------------------
Takeover defenses as drivers of innovation and value-creation
Mark Humphery-Jenner
Strategic Management Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
The desirability of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) is a contentious issue. ATPs might enable managerial empire building by insulating managers from disciplinary takeovers. However, some companies, such as ‘hard-to-value' (HTV) companies, might trade at a discount due to valuation difficulties, thereby exposing HTV companies to opportunistic takeovers, and creating agency conflicts of managerial risk-aversion. ATPs might ameliorate such managerial risk aversion by inhibiting opportunistic takeovers. This paper analyzes acquisitions made by HTV firms, focusing on whether the acquirer (not the target) is entrenched in order to examine the impact of entrenchment managerial decision-making. The results show that HTV firms that are entrenched make acquisitions that generate more shareholder wealth and are more likely to increase corporate innovation, suggesting that ATPs can be beneficial in some firms.
----------------------
Information manipulation and rational investment booms and busts
Praveen Kumar & Nisan Langberg
Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
A model of endogenous investment booms and busts with rational agents is presented where outside investors are uncertain about both industry (aggregate) and firm-specific capital productivity, and insiders manipulate information through strategic productivity disclosures. For intermediate and high levels of agency conflict, there are aggregate investment distortions along the equilibrium path, investment dynamics are history-dependent, and depict patterns of persistent investment booms or investment busts even though investors design optimal incentive contracts based on Bayes-rational beliefs. Moreover, the aggregate uncertainty may not be resolved in the limit, as the number of firms and disclosures gets arbitrarily large.
----------------------
Monitoring and corporate disclosure: Evidence from a natural experiment
Rustom Irani & David Oesch
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using an experimental design that exploits exogenous reductions in coverage resulting from brokerage house mergers, we find that a reduction in coverage causes a deterioration in financial reporting quality. The effect of coverage on disclosure is more pronounced for firms with weak shareholder rights, consistent with a substitution effect between analyst monitoring and other corporate governance mechanisms. The effects we uncover using our experimental design are an order of magnitude larger than estimates from ordinary least squares regressions that do not account for the endogeneity of coverage. Overall, our results suggest that security analysts monitor managers and entrenched managers adopt less informative disclosure policies in the absence of such scrutiny.
----------------------
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber
Review of Finance, April 2013, Pages 527-563
Abstract:
We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the UK. Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK firms responded to negative say on pay voting outcomes by removing controversial CEO pay practices criticized as rewards for failure (e.g., generous severance contracts) and increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor realizations of performance.
----------------------
Learning about CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility
Yihui Pan, Tracy Yue Wang & Michael Weisbach
NBER Working Paper, March 2013
Abstract:
When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's profitability for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because the news can cause an updated assessment of the CEO's quality, affecting expectations of his ability to generate future cash flows. As a CEO's quality becomes known more precisely over time, the latter effect becomes smaller, lowering the stock price reaction to news, and hence lowering the stock return volatility. Thus, in addition to uncertainty about fundamentals, uncertainty about CEO quality is also a source of stock return volatility, which decreases over a CEO's tenure as the market learns the CEO's quality more accurately. We formally model this idea, and evaluate its implications using a large sample of CEO turnovers in U.S. public firms. Our estimates indicate that there is statistically significant and economically important market learning about CEO ability, even for CEOs whose appointments appear to be unrelated to their predecessors' performance. Also consistent with the learning model is the fact that the learning curve appears to be convex in time, and learning is faster when there is higher ex ante uncertainty about the CEO's ability and more transparency about the firm's prospects. Overall, uncertainty about management quality appears to be an important source of stock return volatility.
----------------------
Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: Are they good deals?
Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin & Micah Officer
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.
----------------------
Do Managers Define Non-GAAP Earnings to Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts?
Jeffrey Doyle, Jared Jennings & Mark Soliman
Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide evidence consistent with firm managers opportunistically defining non-GAAP earnings in order to meet or beat analyst expectations. This result is robust to controlling for other tools of benchmark beating (e.g., discretionary accruals, real earnings management, and expectation management). We also find that managers tend to exclude more expenses from non-GAAP earnings when it is costlier to use accrual earnings management due to balance sheet constraints, indicating that these tools are substitutes. Lastly, we find that investors discount positive earnings surprises when accompanied by exclusions from GAAP earnings, suggesting that the market partially understands the opportunistic nature of these exclusions. Our evidence is consistent with managers opportunistically defining non-GAAP earnings in a way that analysts fail to fully anticipate, resulting in an increased likelihood of exceeding analyst forecasts.
----------------------
The Relation Between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives
Christopher Armstrong et al.
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm's stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager's wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive "reward effect" and a negative "risk effect." In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager's wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.
----------------------
Kelly Richmond Pope & Chih-Chen Lee
Journal of Business Ethics, February 2013, Pages 597-607
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the availability of financial bounties and anonymous reporting channels impact individuals' general reporting intentions of questionable acts and whether the availability of financial bounties will prompt people to reveal their identities. The recent passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 creates a financial bounty for whistle-blowers. In addition, SOX requires companies to provide employees with an anonymous reporting channel option. It is unclear of the effect of these provisions as they relate to whistle-blowing. Our results indicate that a financial bounty has the potential to increase participants' propensity to report questionable acts and their willingness to reveal their identities when reporting, but the availability of an anonymous reporting channel does not affect participants' propensity to report questionable acts. These findings could potentially help corporate management, government policy makers and accounting researchers to assess the effectiveness of their internal compliance programs and help determine if financial bounties in the private sector could encourage whistle-blowing.
----------------------
CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework
Andrea Eisfeldt & Camelia Kuhnen
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is widespread concern about whether Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are appropriately punished for poor performance. While CEOs are more likely to be forced out if their performance is poor relative to the industry average, overall industry performance also matters. This seems puzzling if termination is disciplinary, however, we show that both absolute and relative performance-driven turnover can be natural and efficient outcomes in a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. The model also has new predictions about replacement managers' equilibrium pay and performance. We document CEO turnover events during 1992-2006 and provide empirical support for our model.