Divisive
Trade in Polarized America: The Border Effect between Red States and Blue States
Hirokazu Ishise & Miwa Matsuo
Economic Inquiry, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political and cultural polarization in the United States is widely discussed, but does it relate to any economic disconnection among states? We estimate the “border” effect between Red and Blue states using the gravity equation with a nonlinear generalized method of moments estimator to simultaneously overcome the problems associated with endogeneity, cross-state price differences, and zero-trade flow. The border effect is robustly confirmed for the 2000s, while not so robustly detected for the 1990s. Notably, in 2007, the border reduces trade between Red and Blue states to approximately 75% of the trade within each set of states. This estimated border effect is much smaller than the United States–Canada national border effect estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and by Feenstra (2002), yet is comparable to the border effect that Nitsch and Wolf (2009) find for the former West and East Germanies approximately 10 years after reunification. While the border effect in Germany after reunification is decreasing, the border effect between the Red and Blue states is emerging. We also find the border effect is more significant for consumption, rather than intermediate, goods. The border effect is an important indicator for a potential dismantling of the economic connectivity in the United States.
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Bias in Cable News: Real Effects and Polarization
Gregory Martin & Ali Yurukoglu
NBER Working Paper, December 2014
Abstract:
We jointly measure the persuasive effects of slanted news and tastes for like-minded news. The key ingredient is using channel positions as exogenous shifters of cable news viewership. Local cable positions affect viewership by cable subscribers. They do not correlate with viewership by local satellite subscribers, who are observably similar to cable subscribers. We estimate a model of voters who select into watching slanted news, and whose ideologies evolve as a result. We estimate that Fox News increases the likelihood of voting Republican by 0.9 points among viewers induced into watching four additional minutes per week by differential channel positions.
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Does Public Election Funding Create More Extreme Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine
Seth Masket & Michael Miller
State Politics & Policy Quarterly, March 2015, Pages 24-40
Abstract:
We investigate whether Maine and Arizona’s Clean Elections laws, which provide public funding for state legislative candidates, are responsible for producing a new cadre of legislators who are unusually ideologically extreme. We find that there is essentially no important difference in the legislative voting behavior of “clean” funded legislators and traditionally funded ones in either Arizona or Maine: those who are financed by private donors are no more or less ideologically extreme than those who are supported by the state. This finding calls into question some concerns about the effects on polarization of money generally and public funding in particular.
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Erik Nisbet, Kathryn Cooper & Kelly Garrett
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2015, Pages 36-66
Abstract:
There has been deepening concern about political polarization in public attitudes toward the scientific community. The “intrinsic thesis” attributes this polarization to psychological deficiencies among conservatives as compared to liberals. The “contextual thesis” makes no such claims about inherent psychological differences between conservatives and liberals, but rather points to interacting institutional and psychological factors as the forces driving polarization. We evaluate the evidence for both theses in the context of developing and testing a theoretical model of audience response to dissonant science communication. Conducting a national online experiment (N = 1,500), we examined audience reactions to both conservative-dissonant and liberal-dissonant science messages and consequences for trust in the scientific community. Our results suggest liberals and conservatives alike react negatively to dissonant science communication, resulting in diminished trust of the scientific community. We discuss how our findings link to the larger debate about political polarization of science and implications for science communicators.
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Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal
Andrew Eggers
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Fall 2014, Pages 441-472
Abstract:
Why do voters support corrupt politicians? One reason is that voters care about both corruption and partisan control of government; the more voters care about which party wins, the less they can deter individual wrongdoing. I highlight this tradeoff in the 2009 UK expenses scandal, showing that electoral accountability was less effective in constituencies where the partisan stakes of the local contest were higher: not only did corrupt MPs in these constituencies suffer smaller punishments, but these MPs were also more likely to be implicated in the scandal in the first place. The findings point to an under-appreciated consequence of partisanship (and underlying causes such as strong party systems and polarization at the elite or mass level) for the electoral control of politicians.
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Fear Among the Extremes: How Political Ideology Predicts Negative Emotions and Outgroup Derogation
Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
The “rigidity of the right” hypothesis predicts that particularly the political right experiences fear and derogates outgroups. We propose that above and beyond that, the political extremes (at both sides of the spectrum) are more likely to display these responses than political moderates. Results of a large-scale sample reveal the predicted quadratic term on socio-economic fear. Moreover, although the political right is more likely to derogate the specific category of immigrants, we find a quadratic effect on derogation of a broad range of societal categories. Both extremes also experience stronger negative emotions about politics than politically moderate respondents. Finally, the quadratic effects on derogation of societal groups and negative political emotions were mediated by socio-economic fear, particularly among left- and right-wing extremists. It is concluded that negative emotions and outgroup derogation flourish among the extremes.
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The Role of Ideology in State Legislative Elections
Nathaniel Birkhead
Legislative Studies Quarterly, February 2015, Pages 55–82
Abstract:
In this article, I examine the effect of incumbent ideology on elections in 45 state legislatures, showing that ideological extremists are more likely to be opposed in the general election than are moderates and that extremists tend to do worse in challenged elections than moderates do. I also explore the intervening role of legislative professionalism, finding that in the majority of state legislatures moderation is rewarded, though in the most professionalized legislatures, incumbents are actually rewarded for extremism. These results show that despite the informational disadvantage of the electorate, the ideology of state legislators is an important factor in elections.
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Seth Masket & Boris Shor
State Politics & Policy Quarterly, March 2015, Pages 67-90
Abstract:
Despite a long history of nonpartisanship, the Nebraska state legislature has polarized rapidly within the past decade. Using interviews and campaign finance records, we examine politics in the modern Unicam to investigate nonpartisan polarization. We find that newly instituted term limits created opportunities for the state’s political parties to recruit and finance candidates in an increasingly partisan fashion. Social network analysis suggests that there is a growing level of structure to campaign donations, with political elites increasingly less likely to contribute across party lines. The results offer a compelling example of parties overcoming institutions designed to eliminate them.
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Fair and Balanced? Experimental Evidence on Partisan Bias in Grading
Paul Musgrave & Mark Rom
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Is grading polarized in political science classrooms? We offer experimental evidence that suggests it is not. Many have argued that instructors’ grading in political science classrooms is skewed by the political characteristics of the instructor, the student, or an interaction between the two. Yet the evaluations of whether such biases exist has been asserted and denied with little evidence — even though prominent theories in political science suggest that the charge is not entirely implausible. Using a set of anonymous essays by undergraduates graded by teaching assistants at a variety of institutions, we test for the presence of bias in a framework that avoids the usual selection bias issues that confound attempts at inference. After evaluating the evidence carefully, we find that the evidence for bias is much weaker than activists claim.
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Joshua Blank & Daron Shaw
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2015, Pages 18-35
Abstract:
Despite the apparent partisan divide over issues such as global warming and hydraulic fracturing, little is known about what shapes citizens’ willingness to accept scientific recommendations on political issues. We examine the extent to which Democrats, Republicans, and independents are likely to defer to scientific expertise in matters of policy. Our study draws on an October 2013 U.S. national survey of 2,000 respondents. We find that partisan differences exist: our data show that most Americans see science as relevant to policy, but that their willingness to defer to science in policy matters varies considerably across issues. While party, ideology, and religious beliefs clearly influence attitudes toward science, Republicans are not notably skeptical about accepting scientific recommendations. Rather, it seems that Democrats are particularly receptive to the advice and counsel of scientists, when compared to both independents and Republicans.
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Rationalizing Conflict: The Polarizing Role of Accountability in Ideological Decision Making
Carly Wayne et al.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
How does accountability impact political decisions? Though previous research on accountability has demonstrated its potential effects in the realms of business, elections, and more, very little research has explored the effect of citizen accountability in highly ideological, intractable, and political conflicts. This article addresses this issue, looking at the unique interaction between accountability and ideology on Israeli citizens’ political attitudes regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The results of two experimental studies in Israel reveal that accountable individuals behave in significantly more ideologically partisan ways than their nonaccountable counterparts. Moreover, this polarization is dependent on the specific conflict context, with leftists more affected by the issue of negotiations and rightists by security concerns. This signals that ideological polarization under accountability may depend on the “issue ownership” each ideological group feels toward the specific conflict context and its corresponding social goal of projecting ideological consistency on these issues.
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Political Extremism Predicts Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Jan-Willem van Prooijen, André Krouwel & Thomas Pollet
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Historical records suggest that the political extremes — at both the “left” and the “right” — substantially endorsed conspiracy beliefs about other-minded groups. The present contribution empirically tests whether extreme political ideologies, at either side of the political spectrum, are positively associated with an increased tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Four studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands revealed a quadratic relationship between strength of political ideology and conspiracy beliefs about various political issues. Moreover, participants’ belief in simple political solutions to societal problems mediated conspiracy beliefs among both left- and right-wing extremists. Finally, the effects described here were not attributable to general attitude extremity. Our conclusion is that political extremism and conspiracy beliefs are strongly associated due to a highly structured thinking style that is aimed at making sense of societal events.
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Nick Dragojlovic
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does nationality disadvantage foreign actors when they attempt to persuade the American public? Using data from an online survey experiment administered to a sample of US citizens, we find that the nationality of British and French advocates only reduces persuasiveness among American Republicans with low levels of political awareness. Among American Democrats, credible French or British advocates can be more persuasive than a comparable American source. Overall, foreign messengers from friendly countries are not disadvantaged by nationality, as nationality has low political salience and other domestic characteristics (such as partisanship) dominate subjects' heuristic processing. When a foreign advocate's nationality does play a role, however, it is likely to lead to polarization in domestic audience attitudes.
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Neither Ideologues nor Agnostics: Alternative Voters’ Belief System in an Age of Partisan Politics
Delia Baldassarri & Amir Goldberg
American Journal of Sociology, July 2014, Pages 45-95
Abstract:
How do Americans organize their political beliefs? This article argues that party polarization and the growing prominence of moral issues in recent decades have catalyzed different responses by different groups of Americans. The article investigates systematic heterogeneity in the organization of political attitudes using relational class analysis, a graph-based method for detecting multiple patterns of opinion in survey data. Three subpopulations, each characterized by a distinctive way of organizing its political beliefs, are identified: ideologues, whose political attitudes strongly align with either liberal or conservative categories; alternatives, who are instead morally conservative but economically liberal, or vice versa; and agnostics, who exhibit weak associations between political beliefs. Individuals’ sociodemographic profiles, particularly their income, education, and religiosity, lie at the core of the different ways in which they understand politics. Results show that while ideologues have gone through a process of issue alignment, alternatives have grown increasingly apart from the political agendas of both parties. The conflictual presence of conservative and liberal preferences has often been resolved by alternative voters in favor of the Republican Party.
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Francis Shen & Dena Gromet
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2015, Pages 86-101
Abstract:
Advances in neuroscience are beginning to shape law and public policy, giving rise to the field of “neurolaw.” The impact of neuroscientific evidence on how laws are written and interpreted in practice will depend in part on how neurolaw is understood by the public. Drawing on a nationally representative telephone survey experiment, this article presents the first evidence on public approval of neurolaw. We find that the public is generally neutral in its support for neuroscience-based legal reforms. However, how neurolaw is framed affects support based on partisanship: Republicans’ approval of neurolaw decreases when neuroscience is seen as primarily serving to reduce offender culpability, whereas Democrats’ approval is unaffected by how neurolaw is framed. These results suggest that both framing and partisanship may shape the future of neuroscience-based reforms in law and policy.