Crooked
The love of money results in objectification
Xijing Wang & Eva Krumhuber
British Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Objectification, which refers to the treatment of others as objectlike things, has long been observed in capitalism. While the negative impact of money on interpersonal harmony has been well documented, the social cognitive processes that underlie them are relatively unknown. Across four studies, we explored whether the love of money leads to objectification, while controlling for social power and status. In Study 1, the love and importance attached to money positively predicted the tendency to construe social relationships based on instrumentality. In Study 2, the likelihood to favour a target of instrumental use was increased by momentarily activating an affective state of being rich. Temporarily heightening the motivation for money further resulted in deprivation of mental capacities of irrelevant others, including humans (Study 3) and animals (Study 4). This lack of perceived mental states partially mediated the effects of money on subsequent immoral behaviour (Study 4). The findings are the first to reveal the role of objectification as a potential social cognitive mechanism for explaining why money often harms interpersonal harmony.
---------------------
The Order of Disorder: Deconstructing Visual Disorder and Its Effect on Rule-Breaking
Hiroki Kotabe, Omid Kardan & Marc Berman
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Disorderly environments are linked to disorderly behaviors. Broken windows theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), an influential theory of crime and rule-breaking, assumes that scene-level social disorder cues (e.g., litter, graffiti) cause people to reason that they can get away with breaking rules. But what if part of the story is not about such complex social reasoning? Recent research suggests that basic visual disorder cues may be sufficient to encourage complex rule-breaking behavior. To test this hypothesis, we first conducted a set of experiments (Experiments 1-3) in which we identified basic visual disorder cues that generalize across visual stimuli with a variety of semantic content. Our results revealed that spatial features (e.g., nonstraight edges, asymmetry) are more important than color features (e.g., hue, saturation, value) for visual disorder. Exploiting this knowledge, we then reconstructed stimuli contrasted in terms of visual disorder, but absent of scene-level social disorder cues, to test whether visual disorder alone encourages cheating in a second set of experiments (Experiments 4 and 5). In these experiments, manipulating visual disorder increased the likelihood of cheating by up to 35% and the average magnitude of cheating by up to 87%. This work suggests that theories of rule-breaking that assume that complex social reasoning (e.g., about norms, policing, poverty) is necessary, should be reconsidered (e.g., Kelling & Coles, 1997; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Furthermore, these experiments show that simple perceptual properties of the environment can affect complex behavior and sheds light on the extent to which our actions are within our control.
---------------------
Selective Exposure to Deserved Outcomes
Annelie Harvey et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Research has shown that people often reinterpret their experiences of others' harm and suffering to maintain the functional belief that people get what they deserve (e.g., by blaming the victim). Rather than focusing on such reactive responses to harm and suffering, across 7 studies we examined whether people selectively and proactively choose to be exposed to information about deserved rather than undeserved outcomes. We consistently found that participants selectively chose to learn that bad (good) things happened to bad (good) people (Studies 1 to 7) - that is, they selectively exposed themselves to deserved outcomes. This effect was mediated by the perceived deservingness of outcomes (Studies 2 and 3), and was reduced when participants learned that wrongdoers otherwise received "just deserts" for their transgressions (Study 7). Participants were not simply selectively avoiding information about undeserved outcomes but actively sought information about deserved outcomes (Studies 3 and 4), and participants invested effort in this pattern of selective exposure, seeking out information about deserved outcomes even when it was more time-consuming to find than undeserved outcomes (Studies 5 and 6). Taken together, these findings cast light on a more proactive, anticipatory means by which people maintain a commitment to deservingness.
---------------------
When fairness matters less than we expect
Gus Cooney, Daniel Gilbert & Timothy Wilson
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 4 October 2016, Pages 11168-11171
Abstract:
Do those who allocate resources know how much fairness will matter to those who receive them? Across seven studies, allocators used either a fair or unfair procedure to determine which of two receivers would receive the most money. Allocators consistently overestimated the impact that the fairness of the allocation procedure would have on the happiness of receivers (studies 1-3). This happened because the differential fairness of allocation procedures is more salient before an allocation is made than it is afterward (studies 4 and 5). Contrary to allocators' predictions, the average receiver was happier when allocated more money by an unfair procedure than when allocated less money by a fair procedure (studies 6 and 7). These studies suggest that when allocators are unable to overcome their own preallocation perspectives and adopt the receivers' postallocation perspectives, they may allocate resources in ways that do not maximize the net happiness of receivers.
---------------------
Michael Gill & Phillip Getty
British Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
People respond compassionately to transgressors whose immorality is rooted in an unfortunate life history. But, are reactions to such historicist narratives uniformly compassionate? We suggest not. We propose that historicist narratives also have a dark side. Specifically, they encourage blame shifting, in which negative evaluations of humanity arise hand in hand with compassion for the focal transgressor of the narrative. Indeed, historicist narratives portray the focal transgressor as victimized by multiple others, who destroy her goodness and remove her chance to flourish in life. This destruction of another's potential is itself a profound moral violation and thus activates far-reaching blame responses that feed a disdainful view of humanity. In three studies, we provide evidence that historicist narratives evoke compassion for one but disdain for the multitude. We show that the resulting disdain can diminish prosocial behaviour in unrelated contexts, that it is elicited by both experimenter-provided and participant-generated historicist narratives, and that it is created via blame shifting. Our findings question the assumption that proliferation of historicist thinking would necessarily contribute to creating a more compassionate, humane society.
---------------------
Everything We Do, You Do: The Licensing Effect of Prosocial Marketing Messages on Consumer Behavior
Maryam Kouchaki & Ata Jami
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do prosocial corporate marketing messages promote consumers' altruistic behaviors, or do they advance self-interested and self-indulgent actions? To answer this question, the current research investigates the impact of different framings of prosocial marketing messages on consumers' behaviors and choices more generally. Results from six laboratory studies and a field experiment demonstrate that exposure to messages that praise customers for good deeds can increase subsequent self-interested and self-indulgent behaviors more than messages that publicize a company's good deeds or thank consumers for their patronage. Our findings demonstrate the possibility that a temporary boost in one's self-concept drives this observed effect. In addition, the recipient's level of support for the issue praised for moderates the effect of customer-praise messages on the recipient's less altruistic behaviors. This paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications.
---------------------
Dries Bostyn & Arne Roets
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present study investigated whether and to what extent people's judgments on trolley-type moral dilemmas are subject to conformity pressures. Trolley dilemmas contrast deontological (principled) moral concerns with consequentialist (outcome based) moral reasoning. Subjects were asked to respond to trolley dilemmas in a forced choice format and either simultaneously received bogus information about the base rate of consequentialist and deontological responding for each dilemma or received no distribution information. In the information condition, the bogus distributions showed that either the consequentialist or the deontological choice option was favored by a majority of previous participants. In a set of two independent studies, we showed that subjects exhibit little conformity to a consequentialist majority opinion but strongly conform when confronted with a deontological majority opinion. We suggest this asymmetric conformity effect demonstrates that subjects are less willing to appear consequentialist than deontological, and we explain these results through mutualistic partner choice models.
---------------------
Gewnhi Park et al.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, October 2016, Pages 1588-1596
Abstract:
To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV) - an index of cardiac vagal tone - such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed.
---------------------
The frame of the game: Loss-framing increases dishonest behavior
Simon Schindler & Stefan Pfattheicher
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Occasionally, people trade monetary gains for moral costs and engage in dishonest behavior. Based on research showing that people react more sensitively toward a possible loss compared to a possible gain (i.e., loss aversion), the present contribution examines the idea that people will more likely engage in dishonest behavior to reduce the extent of a loss compared to increasing the extent of a gain. In the two experimental studies, participants could engage in dishonest behavior either to avoid a loss (loss condition) or to approach an equivalent gain (gain condition). To assess dishonest behavior, a die-under-the-cup paradigm (Study 1) and a coin-toss task (Study 2) was applied. Results of both studies demonstrated the predicted effect of framing, supporting the idea that people show more dishonest behavior to avoid a loss compared to approaching an equivalent gain.
---------------------
The Eyes Are the Windows to the Mind: Direct Eye Gaze Triggers the Ascription of Others' Minds
Saara Khalid, Jason Deska & Kurt Hugenberg
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Eye gaze is a potent source of social information with direct eye gaze signaling the desire to approach and averted eye gaze signaling avoidance. In the current work, we proposed that eye gaze signals whether or not to impute minds into others. Across four studies, we manipulated targets' eye gaze (i.e., direct vs. averted eye gaze) and measured explicit mind ascriptions (Study 1a, Study 1b, and Study 2) and beliefs about the likelihood of targets having mind (Study 3). In all four studies, we find novel evidence that the ascription of sophisticated humanlike minds to others is signaled by the display of direct eye gaze relative to averted eye gaze. Moreover, we provide evidence suggesting that this differential mentalization is due, at least in part, to beliefs that direct gaze targets are more likely to instigate social interaction. In short, eye contact triggers mind perception.
---------------------
Virtual Morality: Transitioning from Moral Judgment to Moral Action?
Kathryn Francis et al.
PLoS ONE, October 2016
Abstract:
The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numerous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of utilitarian responses - killing one in order to save many others - when action was required in moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral dilemmas was significantly increased when compared to both judgment counterparts and control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for investigating and assessing moral behaviour.
---------------------
Monica Gamez-Djokic & Daniel Molden
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, November 2016, Pages 1522-1537
Abstract:
Past research suggests that deontological judgments, which condemn deliberate harm no matter what the beneficial consequences, typically arise from emotional and intuitive reactions to the harm, whereas utilitarian judgments, which acknowledge the potential benefits of deliberate harm, typically arise from rational deliberation about whether these benefits outweigh the costs. The present research explores whether specific motivational orientations might, at times, increase the likelihood of deontological judgments without increasing emotional reactions. A meta-analysis of 10 newly conducted studies indicated that, compared with when focused on advancement (promotion), when people were focused on security (prevention) they made stronger deontological judgments in hypothetical moral dilemmas. Moreover, this effect could not be explained by participants' differing emotional reactions to the dilemmas when prevention-focused, but instead mirrored reports of their explicit reasoning. Implications for expanding current models of deontological and utilitarian moral judgment are discussed.
---------------------
The Road to Heaven Is Paved With Effort: Perceived Effort Amplifies Moral Judgment
Yochanan Bigman & Maya Tamir
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
If good intentions pave the road to hell, what paves the road to heaven? We propose that moral judgments are based, in part, on the degree of effort exerted in performing the immoral or moral act. Because effort can serve as an index of goal importance, greater effort in performing immoral acts would lead to more negative judgments, whereas greater effort in performing moral acts would lead to more positive judgments. In support of these ideas, we found that perceived effort intensified judgments of both immoral (Studies 1-2) and moral (Studies 2-7) agents. The effect of effort on judgment was independent of the outcome (Study 3) and of perceptions of the outcome extremity (Study 6). Furthermore, the effect of effort on judgment was mediated by perceived goal importance (Studies 4-6), even when controlling for perceived intentions (Studies 5-6). Finally, we demonstrate that perceived effort can influence actual behavior, such as the assignment of monetary rewards (Study 7). We discuss the possible implications of effort as a causal motivational factor in moral judgment and social retribution.
---------------------
Andrew Christy et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, November 2016, Pages 1538-1550
Abstract:
The present research addresses the relationship between morally valenced behavior and perceptions of self-knowledge, an outcome that has received little attention in moral psychology. We propose that morally valenced behavior is related to subjective perceptions of self-knowledge, such that people experience lower levels of self-knowledge when they are reminded of their immoral behaviors. We tested this proposition in four studies (N = 1,177). Study 1 used daily-diary methods and indicates that daily perceptions of self-knowledge covary with daily levels of morally valenced behavior. The final three studies made use of experimental methods and demonstrate that thinking about immoral behaviors attenuates current perceptions of self-knowledge. The predicted relationships and effects generally persist when controlling for self-esteem. Based on our findings, we argue that perceived self-knowledge may play a functional role in moral self-concept maintenance and moral regulatory processes.
---------------------
Reflexive Intergroup Bias in Third-Party Punishment
Daniel Yudkin et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Humans show a rare tendency to punish norm-violators who have not harmed them directly - a behavior known as third-party punishment. Research has found that third-party punishment is subject to intergroup bias, whereby people punish members of the out-group more severely than the in-group. Alhough the prevalence of this behavior is well-documented, the psychological processes underlying it remain largely unexplored. Some work suggests that it stems from people's inherent predisposition to form alliances with in-group members and aggress against out-group members. This implies that people will show reflexive intergroup bias in third-party punishment, favoring in-group over out-group members especially when their capacity for deliberation is impaired. Here we test this hypothesis directly, examining whether intergroup bias in third-party punishment emerges from reflexive, as opposed to deliberative, components of moral cognition. In 3 experiments, utilizing a simulated economic game, we varied participants' group relationship to a transgressor, measured or manipulated the extent to which they relied on reflexive or deliberative judgment, and observed people's punishment decisions. Across group-membership manipulations (American football teams, nationalities, and baseball teams) and 2 assessments of reflexive judgment (response time and cognitive load), reflexive judgment heightened intergroup bias, suggesting that such bias in punishment is inherent to human moral cognition. We discuss the implications of these studies for theories of punishment, cooperation, social behavior, and legal practice.
---------------------
Andrew Monroe, Garrett Brady & Bertram Malle
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
According to previous research, threatening people's belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people's belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will beliefs but found strong effects when manipulating the perceived choice capacity of the judged agent. Study 4 used pretested narratives that varied agents' apparent free will and found that perceived choice capacity mediated the relationship between free will and blame. These results suggest that people's general beliefs about whether free will exists have no impact on moral judgments but specific judgments about the agent's choice capacity do.
---------------------
Social Perception of Self-Enhancement Bias and Error
Patrick Heck & Joachim Krueger
Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do social observers perceive and judge individuals who self-enhance (vs. not)? Using a decision-theoretic framework, we distinguish between self-enhancement bias and error, where the former comprises both correct and incorrect self-perceptions of being better than average. The latter occurs when a claim to be better than others is found to be false. In two studies, we find that when judging people's competence, observers are sensitive to the accuracy of self-perception. When judging their morality, however, they tend to respond negatively to any claims of being better than average. These findings are further modulated by the domain of performance (intelligence vs. moral aptitude). Implications for the strategic use of self-enhancement claims are discussed.